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Abstract
Although coworkers are spending an increasing share of their working time interacting with one
another, little is known about how the coordination of hours among heterogenous coworkers affects
pay, productivity and labor supply. In this paper, we use new linked employer-employee data
on hours worked in Denmark to first document evidence of positive correlations between wages,
productivity and the degree of hours coordination – measured as the dispersion of hours – within
firms. We then estimate labor supply elasticities by exploiting changes made to the personal income
tax schedule in 2010. We find that hours coordination is associated with attenuated labor supply
elasticity and spillovers on coworkers not directly affected by the tax change. These spillovers led
to a 15% increase in the marginal excess burden from the 2010 tax reform, and if ignored, they
induce substantial downward bias in estimates of the labor supply elasticity. We explain these
findings in a framework in which differently productive firms choose whether to coordinate hours
in exchange for productivity gains, leading more productive firms to select into coordinating hours
and to pay compensating wage differentials.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades firms have become more collaborative, with coworkers spending a greater share
of their working time interacting with one another (Delarue et al., 2008; Cross and Gray, 2013).
One key aspect of the cooperation within firms is that it necessitates some degree of coordination
of hours. Specifically, a greater need for interaction may require that coworkers work a more
similar number of hours, despite possibly different labor supply preferences. While existing
studies suggest that greater cooperation is associated with improved worker productivity (e.g.,
Hamilton et al., 2003; Chan, 2016), little is known about how hours coordination affects worker
behavior or firm performance.
However, a better understanding of hours coordination is important for at least two reasons.
First, coordination ties together the hours supplied by heterogeneous coworkers and, in doing
so, it distorts the effects of policies that only affect the labor supply of a group of workers in
a firm. In fact, coordination restrains the ability of the workers who are targeted by a policy
to change their supply of hours. At the same time it generates labor supply spillovers from
changes in the hours of targeted workers to other coworkers. In the specific case of tax reforms,
these distortions result in higher tax efficiency costs and provide a new explanation for the low
elasticity of labor supply found in several other studies (e.g., Chetty, 2012). Second, to the
extent that hours coordination improves productivity but requires that firms pay compensating
wage differentials for offering a limited choice of hours, the study of coordination may help
explain the observed link between productivity and wages in a firm (e.g., Card et al., 2018).
In this paper, we first document the features of coordinated firms. We use unique linked
employer-employee data from Denmark to measure hours coordination and to shed light on
how this correlates with other firm characteristics, including wages and productivity. Next,
we explore how coordination distorts the effects of a policy intervention by studying the la-
bor supply response to a Danish tax reform that predominantly affected high-income workers.
The specific features of this reform combined with the richness of the Danish data provide a
rare opportunity to quantify the effects of hours coordination on the labor supply and on the
efficiency costs of a tax reform.
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We conceptualize the link between firm profitability, coordination of hours, wages and labor
supply elasticities in a framework where firms with different productivity employ workers with
heterogeneous desired work hours. In this framework, firms can choose whether to coordinate
hours. Coordination enhances productivity but entails fixed costs and requires the hours worked
to be the same across heterogeneous coworkers. We derive four main predictions. (1) Firms
that coordinate hours pay compensating wage differentials for imposing sub-optimal hours.
(2) Firms that are ex ante more productive, which gain the most from coordination, choose
to coordinate hours and thus incur higher labor costs. (3) Coordination attenuates the labor
supply responses of workers targeted by a tax change. (4) In coordinated firms, a tax change
that affects one type of workers has spillovers on the hours worked by other coworkers.
We investigate these predictions using linked employer-employee registers of the Danish
population. Denmark is a particularly fitting setting for our study. The unique features of the
Danish data allow us to link the number of hours worked to individual and firm characteristics.
Additionally, in 2010, the government mandated a personal income tax reform that substantially
lowered the marginal tax rates on high incomes while leaving almost unchanged the marginal
tax rates of low-income workers. Furthermore, compared to other European countries, Denmark
has a relatively flexible labor market in which employers have considerable discretion in setting
wages and hours (Botero et al., 2004; Hummels et al., 2014). In particular, there are two
institutional features that allow for discretion in the provision of hours by salaried and hourly
workers: overtime hours and the possibility to convert paid vacation in working time.
We measure coordination using the standard deviation of average hours worked across skill
groups in a firm. In doing so, we assume – consistent with survey data on desired working hours
in Denmark – that workers in different skill groups have different labor supply preferences. Thus,
we interpret a lower dispersion of hours as implying a greater overlap of workers at the workplace
and, therefore, higher coordination.1 In line with this interpretation, we find that alternative
measures of the interaction among coworkers from O*NET, the Survey of Adult Skills, and the
Danish Time Use Survey strongly correlate with our measure of hours coordination.
1Ideally, we would measure coordination based on the degree to which coworkers with different labor supply
preferences work at the same time of the day or interact with one another. Unfortunately, data of this type do
not exist on such a large scale. We focus on full-time workers because Danish Time Use Survey data reveal that
part-timers are more likely to start working later during the day or to work over weekends.
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With this measure of coordination in hand, we first document the features of coordinated
firms. This analysis reveals that more-coordinated firms are more productive, larger in size,
more likely to export and less likely to employ part-time, hourly and female workers. Next,
we turn to a more systematic analysis of how the degree of coordination at a firm relates to
the wage premium paid to workers. We estimate the premium as the firm fixed effect from
a regression of hourly wages on individual, firm fixed effects and time-varying characteristics
(Abowd et al., 1999). Then, we regress this premium on our measure of coordination. In
line with the theory (Prediction 1), we find a strong and positive association between the firm
component of wages and hours coordination across and within sectors. This correlation is robust
to a number of firm characteristics that are known to affect wage inequality across firms.2 In
the same specification, exporter status has a similar predictive power while firm size is not as
predictive as coordination.
After controlling for measures of firm productivity, the correlation between wages and coor-
dination is insignificant. In line with the theory (Prediction 2), this suggests that only highly
productive firms can afford to pay higher wages to achieve greater coordination. Specifically,
we estimate that coordination can explain between 4% and 12% of the wage inequality due
to productivity across firms within the same sector. While descriptive, these findings suggest
that a relevant part of the documented correlation between the firm component of wages and
productivity may reflect wage differentials for greater coordination in more productive firms.
In the second part of the paper, we analyze the effects of a tax reform that abolished the
middle bracket of a 3-bracket progressive tax schedule and lowered the top tax rates. This
resulted in a sizable reduction of the marginal tax rates of workers who were formerly in the
top and middle tax brackets prior to the reform (henceforth, high-skilled workers).
To identify the attenuating effects of coordination, we estimate the elasticity of hours worked
by high-skilled workers in high- versus low-coordination firms. In doing so, we use the tax reform
as an instrument for the observed changes in after-tax earnings (Gruber and Saez, 2002). In
line with the model (Prediction 3), we find an elasticity that is close to zero and insignificant
2For instance, we control for firm size (Mueller et al., 2015), exporter status (e.g., Helpman et al., 2016),
the skill and gender composition of the workforce (Card et al., 2016, Song et al., 2016), the average number of
hours, the unionization rate (e.g., Dickens, 1986), and overtime premiums (Cardoso et al., 2012).
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in high-coordination firms and a significant elasticity of -0.1 in low-coordination firms.
Next, we test for the existence of labor supply spillovers by estimating the elasticity of hours
worked by low-skilled workers to the tax-driven change in average hours worked by high-skilled
coworkers. We find an elasticity of 0.88, which implies an increase of 0.85 hours worked by low-
skilled workers for each additional hour provided by high-skilled coworkers. Consistent with
our framework (Prediction 4) we find lower spillover effects among workers in low-coordination
firms. Importantly, the effects of coordination are robust to an extensive set of other firm
controls such as firm productivity, size or workforce unionization.
Our findings of attenuating and spillover effects of coordination have multiple implications.
First, they show that the elasticity of labor supply captures only part of the burden associated
with a tax change (Feldstein, 1999) since it neglects the indirect effects on untargeted coworkers.
By including spillovers, we estimate a 15% increase in the marginal excess burden from the
2010 Danish tax reform. Second, due to hours coordination, using workers who are not directly
targeted by a tax change as a control group produces downward-biased estimates of the labor
supply elasticity. We estimate that in our setting, the elasticity obtained using low-skilled
workers as a control group would capture only 20% of the high-skilled response. More generally,
our study suggests that hours coordination is important for policy evaluation, and it should be
taken into account in the analysis of any intervention that affects the labor supply of one group
of workers in a firm (e.g., older workers, parents).
This study relates to multiple strands of the literature. First, it relates to the literature
on the effects of labor market frictions on labor supply responses to taxation (e.g., Kleven
and Waseem, 2013). Within this literature, constraints on hours imposed at the firm level are
usually viewed as a leading explanation for small labor supply responses to tax changes (Chetty
et al., 2011; Best, 2014; Battisti et al., 2015). However, due to the lack of information on hours
worked within firms, little is known about the source of these constraints or the magnitude
of their effects. Using newly available data on hours and the quasi-experimental variation
derived from a tax reform, we provide the first firm-level evidence quantifying the magnitude
of a mechanism – coordination of hours – through which hours constraints attenuate the labor
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supply responses to taxation.3
Second, we contribute to the extensive literature on wage and productivity differentials
across firms (e.g., Syverson, 2011; Card et al., 2018). Specifically, we offer a look inside firms
by modeling, and empirically quantifying, the importance of coordination of hours as a rationale
that leads more-productive firms to pay higher wages. In this respect, our results document
a specific mechanism that can explain recent findings on compensating differentials as an im-
portant source of wage inequality across firms (Lavetti and Schmutte, 2016; Sorkin, 2018).4
Relative to the literature on compensating differentials from less-desirable hours, our results
emphasize the importance of considering hours worked relative to those of other workers in the
firm as a way to measure dis-amenities from hours at the workplace (e.g., Rosen, 1986; Abowd
and Ashenfelter, 1981; Card et al., 2016; Goldin and Katz, 2016; Mas and Pallais, 2017).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual
framework, Section 3 describes the data and the institutional setting. Section 4 presents the
empirical relationships between coordination, wages and firm productivity. Section 5 quantifies
the effects of coordination on the elasticity of labor supply. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Conceptual framework
The standard labor supply model is based on the assumption that employers are indifferent to
the hours supplied by their employees. However, hours worked vary across sectors and, most
notably, across firms within a sector. Figure 1 shows the distribution of weekly hours worked
across six major sectors in Denmark. The distribution is considerably more concentrated in
3Battisti et al. (2015) present evidence of reduced intertemporal elasticities from structural simulations of a
policy that only affects a fraction of a firm’s workforce. This evidence is consistent with the attenuating effects
of coordination on steady-state elasticities that we document. We complement their analysis by being able to
measure coordination using firm-level data on hours and an actual preference shock deriving from a tax reform.
Our results also help to shed light on existing evidence at more aggregate levels. Kahn and Lang (1991) finds
the elasticity of actual hours to be lower than the elasticity of desired hours. Our findings suggest that this
difference may be linked to firm-level coordination. Hamermesh et al. (2008) documents synchronization of
working schedules across US states. Our results indicate that coordination among coworkers is associated with
co-movement of hours.
4Siow (1987) found higher wages in industry-occupations with less-volatile hours. Our research complements
these findings with results from the linked employer-employee level. This allows us to measure the dispersion
of hours between coworkers and examine how this relates to wage inequality across firms.
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the service sector than in agriculture, manufacturing or construction, despite that the latter
sectors are more unionized than services.
The variation in hours worked across sectors, however, accounts only for a small part of
the overall variation in hours. A decomposition of the variance of total annual hours worked
in Denmark into between- and within-sector variability first, and then into cross- and within-
firm variability shows that cross-firm variation explains more than 35% of the overall variance,
whereas merely 4% of the overall variation occurs between 1-digit sectors (Figure 2).5 This
descriptive evidence suggests that employers may not be indifferent to their workers’ supply
of hours. Motivated by this evidence, in this section, we propose a model in which firms
endogenously choose whether to restrict the range of hours available to their employees. Then,
we examine how this affects wages and labor supply elasticities.
2.1 Workers
There are two types i of workers, NH workers with high skill (i = H) and NL workers with
low skill (i = L). Workers have preferences over a continuum of consumption goods ω ∈ Ω and
leisure `i of the following type (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Prescott, 2004):
U (Qi, `i) = log
[∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
+ η v (`i ) , (1)
where (Qi)
(σ−1)/σ ≡ ∫
ω∈Ω qi(ω)
(σ−1)/σdω is the (exponentiated) consumption index for a worker
of skill i, and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two goods. We assume that
the taste parameter η is positive and that the utility of leisure v(`i) is increasing and concave
with v′(`i) > 0 and v′′(`i) < 0.
Workers can take employment either in the non-coordinated or in the coordinated labor
5 The variance of hours is decomposed into between- and within-group components as follows:
1
Nt
∑
i
(
hit − ht
)
=
1
Nt
∑
g
∑
i∈g
(
hit − hgt
)
+
1
Nt
∑
g
Ngt
(
hgt − ht
)
Where workers are indexed by i and years by t, g denotes groups (i.e., firms or sectors), while Ngt and Nt denote
the number of groups and the number of workers, respectively. hit, hgt and ht are the worker hours, the average
hours within each group and the average hours across all workers, respectively. The variance is decomposed for
each year between 2003 and 2008. Figure 2 shows the average shares across all years. To the extent that hours
are measured with errors, the within-firm component of the variance may be overestimated, which means that
hours may vary between firms even more than our measure indicates.
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market. In the non-coordinated labor market, workers face equilibrium wages w∗i and pick
their optimal hours h∗i = 1− `∗i , allowing for an optimal consumption level Q∗i with individual
product demand q∗i (ω), and resulting in a utility level U
∗
i ≡ U(Q∗i , h∗i ) (see details in the online
Appendix A.1).
In contrast, workers employed in the coordinated labor market must work for a prescribed
number of hours hˆ regardless of their skill level. In the coordinated market, firms offer skill-
specific hourly wages wˆH and wˆL that are discussed in the next subsection. Workers in this
segment consume Qˆi and qˆi(ω), resulting in utility Uˆi ≡ U(Qˆi, hˆi).
Workers face a skill-specific tax rate ti that generates tax revenues distributed through a
lump-sum transfer T that balances the government’s budget. The overall labor market for each
skill group clears such that N∗i + Nˆi = Ni for equilibrium wages w
∗
i and wˆi.
2.2 The wage-hour function
We assume perfect worker mobility between firms in the non-coordinated and coordinated
segments of the labor market. One implication of this assumption is that, in equilibrium, a
coordinated labor market can only co-exist with a non-coordinated labor market if workers are
indifferent between employment in the two market segments. The indifference condition for
each type-i worker between coordinated and non-coordinated labor market segments is:
U
(
wˆi
P
hˆ (1− ti) + T + p¯i
P
, hˆ
)
= U
(
w∗i
P
h∗i (1− ti) +
T + p¯i
P
, h∗i
)
, (2)
where P σ−1 ≡ ∫
ω∈Ω p(ω)
−(σ−1) dω is the (exponentiated) price index, and p¯i ≡ ∫
ω∈Ω pi(ω)dω/(NH+
NL) represents the equal distribution of firm profits as dividends. This condition implicitly de-
fines the wage rates wˆi for each type-i worker as a function of the hours worked hˆ. To illustrate
this, in Figure 3, we assume that hˆ > h∗i . For the sake of clarity in the figure, we ignore T
and p¯i and assume ti = 0, P = 1. Figure 3 shows that the wage rate wˆi that makes the worker
indifferent between working h∗i at rate wi
∗ and working hˆ is greater than the equilibrium wage
wi
∗. Since this applies to any hours choice hˆ 6= h∗i , condition (2) defines a function wˆi(hˆ), which
has wi
∗ as parameter, and that we refer to as the wage-hour function.
Regarding the properties of this function, under standard regularity conditions on the shape
7
of the utility function, it can be shown that wˆ′i(hˆ) < 0 if hˆ < h
∗
i . In this case, a marginal increase
in hˆ shortens the distance between hˆ and h∗i , thus requiring less extra compensation to make
the worker indifferent between working hˆ and working h∗i . Similarly, wˆ
′
i(hˆ) > 0 if hˆ > h
∗
i ,
whereas if hˆ = h∗i , no extra compensation is needed, and thus, wˆ
′
i(hˆ) = 0. Additionally, it can
be shown that wˆ′′(hˆ) > 0 (online Appendix A.2).6 Therefore, the resulting wage-hour function
is U-shaped with its minimum at the equilibrium wage w∗i , where hours hˆ = h
∗
i .
The economic insight behind this function is that firms in the coordinated market need to
offer higher wages to both skill groups when the coordinated hours differ from optimal hours.7
2.3 Firms
There is a continuum of firms, each producing a different variety ω of consumption goods under
monopolistic competition. Every firm produces with a constant-returns-to-scale technology
q(ω) = γ φG(nHhH , nLhL), where φ is a productivity parameter that differs from firm to firm
under some probability distribution (similar to Melitz, 2003), γ is a Hicks neutral productivity
shifter that varies with hours coordination, and G(·, ·) is the production function. The firm
employs nH high-skilled and nL low-skilled workers. In what follows, we denote by GH(·, ·) the
first derivative of G(·, ·) with respect to its argument (nHhH) and by GL(·, ·) the first derivative
with respect to (nLhL). For simplicity, we do not allow for market entry (Chaney, 2008).
However, firms can choose whether to operate in the non-coordinated or in the coordinated
labor market. In the non-coordinated labor market, γ = 1, such that firms produce with
productivity φ. In the coordinated labor market, γ = γˆ > 1, meaning that firms can raise their
productivity to γˆφ but must pay a fixed cost Fˆ to achieve hours coordination.8
6As we show in the online Appendix A.2, there are conditions on the curvature of the leisure preferences or
economy-wide productivity that ensure that wˆ′′(hˆ) is positive.
7In the presence of search frictions, coordinated firms would still pay higher wages compared to their non-
coordinated peers as long as search costs do not exceed the utility losses from accepting standardized hours
hˆ.
8The fixed costs of coordination can be thought of as the infrastructure needed to sustain coordinated
production such as office space, conference rooms, scheduling software, and the like.
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2.3.1 Non-coordinated labor market
In the non-coordinated labor market, firms take equilibrium wages w∗i and workers’ preferred
hours h∗i as given. Thus, they choose the number of high- and low-skilled workers that minimize
costs:
C∗(ω) ≡ min
nH ,nL
w∗HnHh
∗
H + w
∗
LnLh
∗
L s.t. G (nHh
∗
H , nLh
∗
L) ≥ q∗(ω)/φ. (3)
The first-order conditions imply that
GH(n
∗
Hh
∗
H , n
∗
Lh
∗
L)
GL(n∗Hh
∗
H , n
∗
Lh
∗
L)
=
w∗H
w∗L
.
We assume that GH(·, ·) > GL(·, ·), such that w∗H > w∗L and h∗L 6= h∗H , with h∗L < h∗H if the
substitution effect prevails and the opposite if the income effect prevails.
2.3.2 Coordinated labor market
Firms in the coordinated labor market offer contracts for a single number of hours hˆ that workers
of all skill levels must accept but offer skill-specific wages along the wage-hours function wˆi(hˆ)
such that each type-i worker is indifferent between employment in the coordinated or non-co-
ordinated labor market. This results in the following cost minimization problem:
Cˆ(ω) ≡ min
nH ,nL,h
wˆH nH h+ wˆL nL h s.t. hG(nH , nL) ≥ q∗(ω)/(γˆφ)
and U
(
h
wˆi
P
(1− ti) + T + p¯i
P
, h
)
= U(Q∗i , h
∗
i )
for i = H,L.
From which the first-order condition that implicitly defines hˆ is (see online Appendix A.3):
nˆH wˆ
′
H(hˆ) = −nˆL wˆ′L(hˆ). (4)
Condition (4) has several implications. First, it implies that optimal hours hˆ are between
h∗L and h
∗
H . In fact, since h
∗
H 6= h∗L, hˆ cannot be equal to either h∗L or h∗H . Furthermore, if hˆ
is greater than h∗L and h
∗
H , then wˆ
′
H > 0 and wˆ
′
L > 0, and thus, (4) cannot be satisfied. For
a similar reason, hˆ cannot be smaller than h∗L or h
∗
H to satisfy (4). Second, (4) establishes
that optimal hours are such that the marginal costs of increasing hours in coordinated firms
equal the marginal benefits. To understand this, let us consider the case in which high-skilled
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workers desire to work more than low-skilled workers (h∗H > h
∗
L). For any choice of coordinated
hours h∗L < hˆ < h
∗
H , a marginal increase in hˆ moves them closer to h
∗
H . Therefore, it results in
lower wage premiums paid to high-skilled workers and thus in wage bill savings in the amount
of nˆH wˆ
′
H. However, the same increase in hours moves hˆ further away from h
∗
L. Thus, it results
in higher wages paid to low-skilled workers and therefore in a higher wage bill in the amount
of nˆL wˆ
′
L. At the optimum, the savings from marginally higher hours equal the costs. Finally,
(4) implies that hˆ is set closer to the desired hours of the larger group of workers in the firm.9
Based on (4), both high- and low-skilled workers in coordinated firms work suboptimal hours
and are therefore compensated with wage premiums. We thus have the following:
Prediction 1 Firms that coordinate work time at a common number of hours for both skill
groups pay higher hourly wages than non-coordinated firms, which take the supply of work
hours as given.
2.3.3 Endogenous market segmentation
We now establish the conditions for the existence of the coordinated labor market segment in
equilibrium. A firm producing variety ω maximizes its profits by setting the variety-specific
price p(ω) given total demand. Maximized profits in the two segments are (online Appendix
A.4):
pi∗(φ) =
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ−1(
P
µ∗
)σ−1
E
σ
φσ−1,
pˆi(φ) =
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ−1(
γˆP
µˆ
)σ−1
E
σ
φσ−1 − Fˆ ,
where E = PQ are economy-wide expenditures, and µ∗, µˆ are minimized marginal production
costs in the uncoordinated and coordinated segment, respectively. Based on this, a firm with
productivity φ will choose to enter the coordinated labor market if and only if
pˆi(φ) > pi∗(φ).
9A greater nˆi in (4) raises the marginal costs of increasing hˆ if hˆ > h
∗
i or decreases the marginal benefits of
increasing hˆ if hˆ < h∗i . This implies that hˆ moves closer to h
∗
i as nˆi increases.
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If γˆ > µˆ/µ∗, this inequality can be rewritten in terms of a firm’s productivity φ:
φ >
σ
σ − 1
Fˆ 1/(σ−1)
E1/(σ−1)P
µˆ
γˆ − µˆ/µ∗ ≡ φˆ, (5)
where φˆ is the productivity threshold above which firms select into the coordinated segment.
Intuitively, the higher the fixed cost Fˆ of coordinating or the higher the marginal cost µˆ of pro-
ducing in the coordinated market, the more elevated the entry threshold would be. Conversely,
a less competitive market with a high overall price level P and a larger aggregate economy with
higher E facilitates entry and therefore reduces the entry threshold. The inequality would be
reversed if γˆ < µˆ/µ∗, and a coordinated labor market would not exist. Therefore, we can state
the following:
Prediction 2 If a firm’s productivity premium resulting from coordinating work hours is suf-
ficiently large, γˆ > µˆ/µ∗, a coordinated labor market co-exists with a non-coordinated labor
market. Firms with productivity above a unique threshold φˆ coordinate work time, whereas
firms with productivity weakly below that threshold remain non-coordinated.
Assuming that γˆ > µˆ/µ∗, we indicate with Mˆ and M∗ the total mass of non-coordinated and
coordinated firms in equilibrium, respectively. It follows that the total number of each type-i
worker in the two labor market segments is Nˆi = Mˆ · nˆi and N∗i = M∗ · n∗i .
2.4 The effect of a tax rate change on hours worked
In this section, we explore the consequences of a change in the tax rate faced by high-skilled
workers tH on optimal hours in the coordinated sector of the economy. Based on (4), one can
derive the following expression (see online Appendix A.3):
dhˆ
dtH
= −
[
wˆH
Ucc,HU`,H
U2c,H (1− tH)
+
P U`,H
Uc,H hˆ (1− tH)2
]
×
[
wˆ′′H(hˆ) + α wˆ
′′
L(hˆ)
]−1
, (6)
where Ucc,H(< 0), Uc,H(> 0) and U`,H(> 0) are the second derivative of the utility function
relative to consumption, the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal utility of leisure
for high-skilled workers, respectively, whereas α = nˆL/nˆH .
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10Here, we consider the case of a generic additively separable utility function of which (1) is an example.
Since firms simultaneously optimize hours worked and the number of workers of each type, the envelope theorem
implies that α = nˆL/nˆH is not affected by changes in tH .
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Since wˆ′′i (hˆ) > 0 (Section 2.2), the sign in (6) depends on the first term in brackets that
consists of two terms. Starting from the left, the first term captures the income effect, while the
second term is the substitution effect. If the income effect prevails over the substitution effect,
the derivative is positive. In that case, the desired hours of high-skilled workers increase when
tH increases, and so do the hours worked in the coordinated sector. Conversely, the derivative
is negative if the substitution effect prevails over the income effects.
Hours worked by high-skilled workers in coordinated firms, however, are less elastic to the
tax change than high-skilled workers’ hours in uncoordinated firms. To visualize this, in Figure
4, we plot the case, consistent with our empirical findings, in which high-skilled workers desire to
work more hours than low-skilled workers, the tax rate on high-skilled workers declines, and the
income effect from the tax change prevails. In this case, as tH declines, desired hours decrease
from h∗0H to h
∗
1H , and thus, optimal hours in coordinated firms shift down from hˆ0 to hˆ1. If hours
in the coordinated sector were to decline by as much as desired hours (| hˆ1−hˆ0 |= | h∗1H − h∗0H |),
the benefits for coordinated firms from marginally increasing hours would remain unchanged
relative to the pre-tax-change period. However, the marginal costs from increasing hours would
be lower because coordinated hours after the tax change are closer to the desired hours of low-
skilled workers. Therefore, due to the convexity of the wage-hours function, a marginal increase
in hours would imply a smaller increase in the wage premiums paid to low-skilled workers than
prior to the tax change. As a result, marginal benefits would exceed marginal costs, and hours
would optimally increase. This implies that | hˆ1 − hˆ0 |< | h∗1H − h∗0H |.
Based on the discussion in the paragraph above, we can state the following two predictions:
Prediction 3 (Attenuation): High-skilled workers in coordinated firms are less responsive to
tax rate changes than are high-skilled workers in uncoordinated firms.
Prediction 4 (Spillovers) In firms that coordinate work hours, changes in tax rates that affect
only high-skilled workers have spillover effects on the hours worked by low-skilled coworkers.
Hours worked by high- and low-skilled workers move together.
In the empirical analysis that follows, Prediction 1 and 2 are discussed in Section 4, while the
empirical analysis of Predictions 3 and 4 is presented in Section 5.11
11The algebra behind Prediction 4 remains difficult to treat even when assuming specific functional forms for
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3 Institutional framework and data sources
We base the empirical part of the study on a panel of Danish workers. In this section, we
describe the main features of the Danish labor market and the main sources of our data.
3.1 The Danish labor market
Denmark is a particularly fitting setting for our study. In fact, a soft employment protection
legislation combined with a generous social safety net makes the Danish labor market one of
the most flexible in the world (Botero et al., 2004). In the past, wages and working time were
set at the industry level through collective bargaining, but over time, the system has undergone
a decentralization process that has made the negotiation much more firm-level based.
As an effect of this process and despite the fact that approximately 70% of the workers
in the private sector are unionized, the wages of approximately 85% of them are negotiated
directly at the worker-firm level (Hummels et al., 2014). The wage premium for workers who
work overtime is usually equivalent to 50% of the normal wage for the first 3 hours and 100%
of the normal wage for each hour of overtime that exceeds the first 3 hours.
Regarding working time regulation, sectoral agreements usually define the normal week to
be composed of 37 hours on average and by not more than 8 hours of overtime work. Firms,
however, have made increasing use of “opening clauses”, which allow the union representatives
at the company to develop local regulations that can deviate from sector-level agreements. In
2008, approximately 60% of full-time workers in the private sector were estimated to be covered
by this type of local regulation (Dansk-Arbejdsgiverforening, 2012).
Further discretion in the choice of working hours comes from overtime work. Approximately
20% of the salaried workers and 60% of the hourly workers in our sample report at least one hour
of paid overtime work. Finally, flexibility in the supply of hours derives from the possibility
the utility function. Therefore, we only propose a graphical examination of this prediction. While our main
analysis focuses on hours worked, a tax change that moves coordinated hours also affects wage rates. These
effects are discussed in the online Appendix A.5. In the model in this section, we do not explicitly consider
unions. As long as unions’ preferences reflect workers’ preferences, including unions would not change the main
predictions. Moreover, in the empirical analysis, we do not find sizable differences in the magnitude of the
effects between highly and less unionized firms.
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to convert hours of vacation into working hours at the contractual wage (online Appendix
B.1). According to a survey of Danish private firms, 73% of HR managers report having
employees who do not make full use of their vacation time (Bluegarden, 2014). In line with
this, a decomposition of the variance of annual vacation hours into between- and within-firm
variability reveals substantial variation in vacation time between firms, particularly among
salaried workers (online Appendix Figure D.1). The relative flexibility that Danish firms have
in setting hours is consistent with the substantial variation in hours worked across firms that
we observe in the data (Figure 2).
3.2 The data
The empirical analysis is based on data from multiple sources (online Appendix Table D.2).
We use data on individual socio-economic characteristics such as tax returns, earnings and
education from the Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (IDA) that collects annual
data on the entire Danish population. Data on annual hours of regular and overtime work are
extracted from Lønstatistikken (LON). These are reported by employers whose contributions
to the employees’ pensions are based on hours worked.12 Unfortunately, not all workers in IDA
can be matched to LON. For our study, however, it is particularly important to observe the
hours of as many workers as possible within a firm. For this reason, we only consider firms in
which the number of hours worked in a year are available for at least 95% of their workforce.
Hourly wages are obtained as annual earnings over the sum of regular and overtime hours.
We use firm-level data from the Firm Statistics Register (Firmstat) and the Danish Foreign
Trade Statistics Register that provide information on firm characteristics such as number of
employees, industry affiliation, accounting and trade data. These registers cover the totality
of private firms with more than 50 full-time equivalent employees and a representative sample
of smaller private firms. We match each employee to the highest paying employer using the
Firm-Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (FIDA) that links workers to firms in the
employment spell of week 48 of each year only. For workers whose spell in week 48 lasted less
12Employers’ pension contributions discontinuously jump at certain hours levels, and this may induce bouncing
of reported hours. However, in the Danish setting, these discontinuities only affect part-time employees (< 27
weekly hours) that are not included in the sample used for estimation.
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than 1 entire year, we use annualized hours and earnings.
We focus on full-time employees who were 15 to 65 years old in the period 2003–2011, when
data are available from all sources. Following the official definition in place during that period,
we define full-timers as those working more than an average of 26 weekly hours over a one-year
period, which represent approximately 90% of the workers in the sample. We exclude part-
timers for two main reasons: first, because they are more likely to work at unusual hours or
fewer days in a week, and this can be problematic for measuring coordination (Section 4.3).
The second reason is because focusing on full-timers makes our results more easily comparable
to other studies, especially those on wage inequality across firms.
The final sample that we use includes more than 400,000 employees and approximately
8,300 firms. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the entire population (column 1), on the
sample of the population that can be linked to data on firms and hours (column 2), and on our
final sample that comprises firms for which data on hours are reported for 95% or more of the
workforce (column 3). A comparison of columns 2 and 3 suggests that our final sample, while
providing better information on hours worked, does not substantially distort the composition
of the population for which records on individuals and firms are available.
4 Coordination and wage differentials across firms
4.1 The empirical model
In this section, we study the relationship between employer-specific wage premiums and the
coordination of hours. To do so, we use an empirical model that relates the average wage
premium paid by each firm j to all its workers over the time period of the study (ψ̂j(i,t)) with a
measure of the average coordination of hours over the same period (σj) and a vector of average
firm controls (Z¯j). The equation to be estimated is as follows:
ψ̂j(i,t) = δ0 + δ1 σj + δ2 Z¯j + vj (7)
where ψ̂j(i,t) is the firm fixed effect from a firm-worker fixed effect model of the type described in
Abowd, Kramatz and Margolis (1999) (henceforth, AKM) that we discuss in Section 4.2. The
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term σj measures the average dispersion of hours worked across skill groups in a firm. Higher
dispersion is interpreted as lower coordination. In Section 4.3, we discuss the details behind
this variable. Based on Prediction 1 from the stylized model, we expect δˆ1 to be negative.
Existing studies have shown that wage differentials across firms correlate with a number of
other firm characteristics, some of which may confound the estimated correlation between the
coordination of hours and wages. For this reason, in our empirical specifications, we include
in Z¯j an extensive set of controls intended to reduce these concerns. Among the controls,
we include detailed geographic and industry fixed effects, controls for the composition of the
workforce of a firm both in terms of gender and ability, as well as other firm characteristics
such as firm size, exporter status or unionization rate, all of which have been found to correlate
with wage differentials across firms.
Furthermore, one may worry that a negative correlation might be driven by institutional
factors. In particular, workers in high-paying firms may work longer hours, and in doing so,
they may bunch at 37 hours, which is the upper limit imposed on the average number of hours
by most of the collective labor agreements. For a similar reason, if workers in high-paying
firms are more likely to work overtime, higher wages may reflect statutory overtime premiums
rather than compensating wage differentials. To take these factors into account, first, in all the
specifications, we control for the average number of hours worked. Then, in a set of robustness
checks, we explicitly explore these potential concerns by excluding firms that bunch at 37 hours
and by considering only the earnings from regular hours.
While we control for a large number of confounding factors, in the absence of an exogenous
change in coordination, the results of this analysis remain of a correlational nature. However,
due to the limited evidence that exists on coordination of hours among coworkers, we regard
this analysis as an important first step towards understanding a relevant economic phenomenon.
A growing number of studies have found evidence of a positive correlation between wage
and productivity differentials across firms (e.g., Card et al., 2018). In the setting of our study,
the coordination of hours can be regarded as a factor by which higher productivity in a firm
translates into higher wages through compensating wage differentials. To measure the share of
the correlation between wages and productivity in a firm that can be predicted by coordination,
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we first estimate equation (7) while omitting σj and including measures of firm productivity
such as value added and total factor productivity (TFP). From this alternative specification
of equation (7), we obtain the partial R-squared associated with value added and TFP. Then,
we measure the predictive power of hours coordination as the ratio of the partial R-squared
associated with σj from equation (7) and the partial R-squared associated with valued added
and TFP. Henceforth, we refer to this ratio as the coordination share.
4.2 The firm component of wages
We estimate the average wage premium paid by a firm to all workers as the firm fixed effect in
the following regression model:
lnwijt = αi + ψj(i,t) + β1Xijt + rijt (8)
where wijt is the gross hourly wage earned by individual i in firm j in year t. Xijt is a vector of
time-varying controls, while αi controls for individual fixed effects.
13 The variable of primary
interest to us is the firm fixed effect ψj(i,t) that measures the fixed component of the wage that
is specific to firm j once we control for individual fixed and time-varying characteristics.
Equation (8) is similar to the model used in AKM and several other studies. However,
unlike most other studies, we use hourly wages rather than annual or monthly earnings as a
dependent variable to better fit the theoretical model that refers to wage rates. Furthermore,
we consider both male and female workers since coordination of hours involves all coworkers in
a firm regardless of their gender. As in other studies, we focus on full-time workers only.
The AKM wage decomposition rests on the assumption of exogenous worker mobility con-
ditional on observables. Following Card et al. (2013), in online Appendix C.1, we present a
number of tests performed with the aim of investigating the plausibility of this assumption.
The results of these tests suggest that endogenous mobility is unlikely to be an issue in our
13Following Card et al. (2013), we include in Xijt a set of interactions between year dummies and educational
attainment, as well as interaction terms between quadratic and cubic terms in age and educational attainment.
In addition, we also control for firm characteristics that change over time such as value added, sales, capital per
employee, exporter status and the share of hourly workers. These additional firm controls isolate the average
wage premium paid by a firm from temporary fluctuations due to firm-level shocks. The results obtained when
we only include individual characteristics are noisier but still in line with the baseline regression and are shown
in the robustness section. We estimate this regression on all workers and firms for which data on hourly wages,
individual and firm characteristics are available (column 2 in Table 1).
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setting.
4.3 Coordination of hours: measures and facts
Ideally, we would measure coordination based on the degree to which coworkers with differ-
ent labor supply preferences work at the same time of the day or interact with one another.
Unfortunately, data of this type do not exist on a large scale. In what follows, we introduce
an alternative measure of coordination based on the number of hours worked. Then, we use
survey data to validate it, and finally, we discuss how this measure correlates with other firm
characteristics.
Our measure of coordination is the standard deviation of hours worked across skill groups:
σjt =
 1
Sjt
Sjt∑
s=1
(
h˜sjt − µjt
)21/2 , h˜sjt = 1
Nsjt
Nsjt∑
i=1
hisjt (9)
where hisjt is the number of annual hours (regular and overtime) worked by employee i in skill
group s in firm j at time t, h˜sjt is the average of hisjt across workers in sjt, and µjt is the average
of h˜sjt across skill groups in firm-year jt. Finally, Nsjt and Sjt are the number of workers in
sjt and the number of skill groups in jt, respectively. We interpret a low value of this standard
deviation as implying greater overlap of workers at the workplace and thus greater coordination.
σj in equation (7) is the average of σjt over the years 2003–2011.
In measuring coordination, we use skill groups to proxy for differences in desired hours.
Labor force survey data on desired hours support this assumption and indicate that desired
hours increase with skills (online Appendix Table D.3). We use two alternative definitions
of skill groups. First, starting from the estimated coefficients from equation (8), we measure
skills as the sum of the fixed and the time-varying individual components of the hourly wages:
ŝijt = Xijtβˆ1 + αˆi (Iranzo et al., 2008 and Irarrazabal et al., 2014). We thus assign workers in
each year to one of 10 skill groups defined as deciles of the distribution of ŝijt. As this measure
of skills is based on individual fixed effects and observable time-varying characteristics, it might
more closely reflect a worker’s skills. In a setting where wages depend on hours, however, ŝijt
might still reflect compensating wage differentials to the extent that they are not fully captured
by the firm component of wages in equation (8). For this reason, in online Appendix D.3,
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we present the results of a parallel analysis in which we define skills at the intersection of 3
educational groups (i.e., primary, secondary and tertiary education) and 3 broad occupational
categories (i.e., manager, middle manager and blue collar). The results obtained from these
two alternative definitions of skills do not differ in a meaningful way.
Since we do not observe the days and times when workers provided hours, our measure
of coordination may be misleading if coworkers work a similar number of hours at different
times of the day, on different days of the week or in different periods of the same year. For
the latter case, since the vast majority of the workers in our sample work for the entire year,
this is unlikely to play a major role.14 Furthermore, by focusing on full-time workers in private
firms, we reduce concerns regarding whether they work on different days of the week or at
different times of the working day. In fact, descriptive evidence from time use survey (TUS)
data indicates that approximately 70% of full-time workers in Denmark start working between
7am and 9am. Of the remaining 30%, the vast majority are employed in either manufacturing or
the health-care sector. However, the former sector emerges as one of the least coordinated from
our analysis (Section 4.3.2), while most of the health-care sector is public and thus excluded
from the analysis. Similarly, approximately 60% of full-time workers in the TUS do not work
on weekends, and those that do work are mostly concentrated in the health-care sector (for
further details see online Appendix C.2).
While focusing on full-timers reduces the concerns mentioned above, this may come at the
cost of ignoring some of the variation that is of interest to us. In particular, firms with a low
degree of coordination may hire relatively more part-timers. This concern, however, is mitigated
by the fact that our measure of coordination strongly correlates with the share of part-timers,
such that, based on σjt, more coordinated firms also hire fewer part-timers (Section 4.3.2).
4.3.1 Validation exercises
In this section, we use O*NET data to validate our measures of firm-level coordination. O*Net
is a survey that provides information on 277 occupation-specific descriptors such as work style,
work content, interests and experience on 965 occupations. It is based on an ongoing survey of
14More than 75% of the workers in our sample have yearly employment spells that last more than 360 days.
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workers in the United States. We use the US survey because a similar survey is not available
in Denmark. For each descriptor, O*Net provides a measure of its importance in each of the
occupations surveyed. We match this information to Danish registers based on occupation. We
select the 3 descriptors in O*NET that capture aspects of a job that involve coordination of
hours across skills. Similar descriptors are used in other studies to capture skill complementary
(Bombardini et al., 2012). The descriptors are as follows: Contact : “How much does this job
require the worker to be in contact with others (face-to-face, by telephone, or otherwise) in
order to perform it?”; Teamwork : “How important is it to work with others in a group or team
in this job?”; and Communication: “How important is communicating with supervisors, peers,
or subordinates to the performance of your current job?”.
The measure of the importance of these 3 descriptors ranges between 1 and 100. We take
the median score across coworkers each year as a measure of the importance of each factor
in a specific firm in that year. In Figure 5, we plot the standard deviation of hours versus
the importance of the 3 descriptors across firm-year observations. A negative and statistically
significant correlation emerges between each of the above descriptors and the standard deviation
of hours across skill groups. That is, in firms where coordination of hours is low, the importance
of aspects that involve coordination is also low.
In the online Appendix C, we discuss an additional set of validation exercises based on the
Survey of Adult Skills and the Danish Time Use Survey. The evidence emerging from these
surveys is consistent with the evidence we found using O*NET.
4.3.2 Coordination and firm characteristics
In this section, we document new facts that emerge when we examine the correlations between
our measures of coordination and other firm characteristics.
Table 2 reports the standardized coefficients obtained from a set of regressions of coordina-
tion on a number of firm characteristics. A few interesting facts emerge from the table. First,
firms that coordinate are more profitable: they have higher value added per employee and TFP.
This evidence supports our theoretical framework in which more productive firms select into
coordination. Moreover, firms that coordinate are more likely to be exporters and to employ
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a greater share of tertiary educated workers. Second, less coordinated firms employ relatively
more hourly, part-time and female workers, which suggests that greater flexibility in these firms
is achieved through the hiring of these workers. Third, conditional on industry fixed effects,
the relationship between coordination and the share of unionized workers is insignificant. This
suggests that a low dispersion of hours is not systematically linked to institutional constraints
imposed by unions.
Existing studies document that managerial ability in a firm strongly correlates with the
use of more advanced management practices and higher productivity (Ichniowski et al., 1997,
Bloom et al., 2015). In a recent study by Bender et al. (2018), managerial ability is measured
as the average individual fixed effect (αˆi) from an AKM model among the workers in the top
quartile of the distribution of αˆi in each firm. In Table 2, we examine the correlation between
this measure of managerial ability and hours coordination and find a strong positive association
between the two. This suggests that hours are more coordinated in better managed firms.
Deming (2017) highlights the importance of social skills in reducing the costs of coordination
among workers. To examine how coordination of hours correlates with social skills at the firm
level, we construct 4 measures of social skill intensity within firms. These are based on the
same O*NET descriptors used in Deming (2017) to measure the intensity of social skills at
the occupational level (i.e.,Coordination, Negotiation, Persuasion and Social Perceptiveness).
Consistent with Deming (2017), we find that hours coordination is stronger in firms where the
social skill intensity is greater. In this respect, our empirical findings support the theoretical
work that links synchronization of working schedules to the potential for better communication
and cooperation (Lewis, 1969; Weiss, 1996).
If hours coordination is thought of as decreasing the costs of communication, then greater
coordination may lead to more problems being solved at the top of the firm hierarchy, and thus
to a decrease in wage inequality among blue collar workers and an increase in wage inequality
among managers and between managers and blue collar workers (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg,
2006). In line with this hypothesis, we find that high coordination in a firm is associated with
a lower 90th–10th wage ratio among blue collar workers, a greater 90th–10th ratio among top
managers, and a greater ratio between the average wage of managers and blue collar workers.
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Comparing the degree of coordination of firms in different sectors, we find that firms in the
service industry coordinate more on average than those operating in the agriculture, manufac-
turing or construction sectors (online Appendix Table D.4). However, most of the correlations
discussed in this section hold within narrowly defined sectors, which suggests that they are
driven by differences across firms within sectors (see column 2 in Table 2). Reassuringly, when
we use time use survey data to measure coordination based on the overlap of differently skilled
workers at the workplace across hours of the day, we obtain a similar ranking of the sectors to
that based on our measure of coordination (online Appendix C.2.2).
4.4 Results
In this section, we discuss the correlation between the firm component of wages and hours
coordination. We begin by estimating this correlation across all firms and checking for the
importance of other confounding factors. Then, we study how wages and coordination of hours
correlate across firms within sectors, and finally, we assess the importance of coordination in
linking productivity to wages in a firm.
Column 1 in Table 3 shows the standardized correlation between coordination and the firm
component of wages. In line with Prediction 1 from the theory, higher coordination in a firm is
associated with higher relative wage premiums. The magnitude of the coefficient is such that a
one-standard-deviation (95 yearly hours) increase in hours coordination is associated with an
increase equivalent to 0.9% of the average wage.15
However, from the discussion in the previous section, one may be concerned that this cor-
relation may be driven by other firm characteristics. Thus, in column 2, we control for firm
size and exporter status to account for the fact that large firms and exporters pay higher wages
(e.g., Mueller et al., 2015, Helpman et al., 2016, Macis and Schivardi, 2016). We also include
region fixed effects to control for geographic differences in pay. In this last specification, we also
control for the share of female workers in the firm because females are more likely to sort into
low-paying firms or to bargain lower wages (Card et al., 2016). Finally, we control for the share
15This is obtained by multiplying the coefficient (0.075) by the standard deviation of the firm component of
wages (0.26) that gives a 0.0195 log wage increase, which is 0.9% of the average log wage (2.26 ≈ 183 DKK).
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of unionized workers as a way to capture rents from unions (Dickens, 1986), and the average
number of hours worked to control for compensating differentials due to long hours.
In line with the literature, we find that firm size and export status are positively associated
with wages and that better paying firms employ fewer female workers. Importantly, as in other
recent studies, we find no evidence of compensating differentials due to long hours (Card et al.,
2016). In contrast, we find that the magnitude, sign and significance of the correlation between
wages and coordination is unaffected by these controls. This result highlights the importance
of measuring relative hours in a firm to capture dis-amenities from working time.
In column 3, we add to the previous specification further controls for the skill composition
of a firm’s workforce. Recent studies show that the sorting of better able workers into better
paying firms is important in determining wage inequality between firms (Card et al., 2013,
Song et al., 2016). We control for the skill composition of the workforce in two ways. First,
we include controls for the share of workers in each skill group. Then, to account for the fact
that workers in the same skill group might differ across unobserved dimensions, we also control
for the average values of the individual fixed effect (αˆi) in each quartile of the firm distribution
of αˆi. The average αˆi in the top quartile of the firm distribution has been found to correlate
strongly with better managerial practices (Bender et al., 2018). Therefore, this additional set of
controls also provides a way to proxy for differences in managerial practices across firms. The
findings from this specification are reassuring because the coefficient attached to coordination
retains its sign and significance while the magnitude increases.
The correlation remains negative and of similar magnitude when we exclude from the anal-
ysis firms that bunch at 37 hours (average hours between 36.5 and 37.5) or when we consider
earnings and coordination from normal hours only, thus excluding overtime (columns 4 and 5).
This suggests that the results are not affected substantially by these other institutional factors.
From the results of the previous section, we know that coordination positively correlates
with the intensity of social skills in a firm. These skills have been associated with higher wages
(Deming, 2017). In light of this, one possible reason for the higher returns associated with
social skills may be that they allow for a greater degree of hours coordination that requires
compensating wage differentials. However, to the extent that the returns to social skills are
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associated with other factors such as low substitutability with new production technologies, it
is important to assess the extent to which the correlation between coordination of hours and
wages can be linked to social skills. Thus, in column 6, we add to the baseline specification the 4
measures of social skill intensity described in the previous section. We find that approximately
1/3 of the correlation estimated in column 3 can be attributed to these skills, suggesting that
most of the returns from coordination are not driven by social skills.
The strong correlation between the firm component of wages and coordination of hours per-
sists within 1-, 2- or 3-digit sectors (columns 1 to 3 in Table 4), which suggests that coordination
plays a non-negligible role in predicting wage inequality across firms within sectors.16
In most of the specifications, the magnitude of the correlation between wages and coor-
dination is greater than the association between wages and firm size or capital per employee
and of comparable magnitude to export status. These findings establish compensating differ-
entials from hours coordination as an important predictor of between-firm wage inequality and
are in line with other recent studies that, using a structural approach, identify compensating
differentials as an important determinant of wage inequality across firms (Sorkin, 2018).17
In online Appendix C.3, we discuss a set of additional robustness checks to the results
presented in this section, including a discussion of measurement errors in hours.
4.4.1 Coordination of hours, wages and firm productivity
Existing studies find that the firm component of wages strongly correlates with productivity
in a firm (e.g., Card et al., 2018). In our theoretical model, more productive firms select into
coordination and pay wage premiums (Predictions 1 and 2). Consistent with this, conditional on
measures of firm productivity, such as value added per employee, the coefficient on the standard
deviation of hours decreases and becomes insignificant, while value added per employee strongly
16The correlation within 2- or 3-digit industries is less precisely estimated. This is likely due to outliers. If
coordination is measured through the median absolute deviation from the median hours, the coefficients are
negative and strongly significant (columns 4 to 6 in Table 4).
17If we allow for mobility frictions, the wage differentials may also reflect rent sharing at better paying firms
(Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). However, in a recent work, Lavetti and Schmutte (2016) propose an estimation
procedure to identify compensating wage differentials using matched employer-employee data in the case of
mobility under frictions. Following this procedure, we obtain estimates of similar magnitude (online Appendix
Table D.5). This suggests that mobility frictions are unlikely to play a major role in our specific analysis.
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and positively correlates with wage premiums (column 8 in Table 4).
To measure the importance of hours coordination in explaining the wage inequality across
firms that is due to productivity, we use the coordination share described in Section 4.1. In line
with the evidence provided in the previous paragraph, this measure rests on the assumption
that coordination only affects wages through productivity. We estimate a coordination share
of 20% across all firms (column 3 in Table 3) and of 12% (4%) among firms in the same 1-digit
(3-digit) industry (columns 1 and 3 in Table 4). This suggests that coordination predicts a
non-negligible share of the variation of firm wages that is linked to productivity differentials
and that cannot be explained by other factors that are known to affect wages and productivity.
5 Coordination, labor supply and tax rate changes
5.1 The 2010 Danish tax reform
We base the analysis presented in this section on the changes to the Danish personal tax
schedule mandated by the 2010 tax reform. This reform led to a substantial decrease in the
marginal tax rate on labor income faced by high income earners, while it left the tax rate of
low-income workers almost unchanged. To the extent that low- and high-income workers differ
in desired work hours, the reform provides an ideal setting to test for spillovers and attenuating
effects from coordination.
The Danish income tax system is based on different types of income that are aggregated in
multiple ways to form different tax bases that are taxed at different rates. A detailed description
of the tax system can be found in online Appendix B.5. Relevant to our analysis, prior to the
2010 reform, income was taxed using a three-bracket progressive tax schedule. The 2010 reform
abolished the middle tax bracket and decreased tax rates in the bottom and top brackets by 2
and 7 percentage points, respectively, between 2008 and 2011. The reform also increased the
income amount at which the top bracket becomes effective, which increased by approximately
9% in real terms between 2008 and 2011 (Figure D.2 in the Appendix). This led to a substantial
decrease in the marginal tax rate on labor income faced by workers in the middle and top tax
brackets. For them, marginal tax rates declined by approximately 16% and 10%, respectively
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(Figure 6). The decrease was less pronounced in the bottom bracket, where the marginal tax
rate decreased by approximately 4% (for further details, see online Appendix B.5).
Based on this, henceforth, by low-skilled workers, we mean the workers who were either tax
exempt or in the bottom tax bracket in 2008 (left of the dashed line in Figure 7). Conversely,
we define high-skilled workers as the workers who were in the middle or top tax bracket in 2008.
From this group, however, we exclude workers who were in the top bracket in 2008 and who,
based on their 2008 real income and the tax schedule in place after the reform, are predicted to
be in the bottom tax bracket in 2011. We refer to these workers as the residual group. Workers
in this group had incomes just above the lower limit of the top bracket in 2008 (dotted line
in Figure 7). When the reform increased this limit (solid line in Figure 7) and abolished the
middle bracket, these workers ended up (mechanically) in the bottom bracket after the reform.
Since the supply of hours in the residual group is unchanged by the reform and to keep the
empirical framework as close as possible to the stylized model, in the baseline specification,
we only study the spillovers from high- to low-skilled workers.18 However, we then show in
the online Appendix that including the residual group does not affect the conclusions of the
baseline analysis. Based on this classification, approximately 34% of the workers in our sample
are low skilled, 54% are high skilled, the remaining 12% are in the residual category (Figure 8).
5.2 The Tax Data
We base the tax analysis on records from the Danish Tax Register that collects detailed in-
formation on all the items that determine individual tax liabilities in Denmark. Marginal tax
rates, however, are not directly observable. For this reason, we use the available tax records to
simulate marginal tax rates for each worker using a simulator model of the Danish tax system.
We do so by extending the tax simulator used in Kleven and Schultz (2014) to the years 2006–
2011. In this simulator, marginal tax rates on labor income are obtained as the increase in tax
18Relative to the high-skilled, workers in the residual group experienced a net-of-tax rate change that was
approximately 3 times as large (Figure 8). As an effect of this, while for high-skilled workers, the income effect
prevails and hours decrease as a consequence of the reform (Section 5.6.1), for workers in the residual group,
the substitution effect prevails, and the estimated labor supply elasticity is positive but insignificant. In online
Appendix C.4, we show that the insignificant effects may be due to the fact that these workers are close, in
terms of income, to the top bracket and thus are unwilling to work more hours to avoid substantially higher
taxes.
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liabilities due to a rise in labor income of 100 DKK. In particular, since the tax liability T() is
a function of labor income (zLAB) and other income components (z1, ...zN), the marginal tax
rate on labor income is derived as follows τ = [T (zLAB + 100, z1, ...zN)− T (zL, z1, ...zN)]/100.
In the empirical models that we use, we relate changes in labor supply to changes in marginal
tax rates over 3-year intervals. Intervals of 3 years are commonly used in the taxation literature
(e.g., Feldstein, 1995, Gruber and Saez, 2002, Kleven and Schultz, 2014). In the baseline
specification, we focus on the interval 2008–2011 for two main reasons: first to minimize the
concerns related to the inter-temporal shift in earnings for tax avoidance purposes that occurred
between 2009 and 2010 (Kreiner et al., 2016) and, second, to reduce the possibility that the
effects measured could capture lagged effects of a prior tax reform that occurred in 2004.
However, as a robustness check, we also consider the years 2006 to 2008, but we exclude the
years prior to 2006, as they would be too close to the 2004 reform.
5.3 The attenuating effects of coordination
We analyze the effect of the tax reform on the labor supply of high-skilled workers using the
following empirical model:
log
(
hHit+3
hHit
)
= β0 + β1 log
(
1− τHit+3
1− τHit
)
+ β3Xijt + υijt (10)
In this model, the dependent variable is the log change in hours worked by high-skilled workers
between 2008 and 2011. We relate this to the individual variation in the marginal net-of-tax
rate on labor income (1-τ) that occurred over the same period. We control for a number of
individual (i) and firm (j) characteristics Xij measured in 2008 (time t). The effect of the
reform is captured by β1, which measures the elasticity of hours worked to changes in the
marginal net-of-tax rate.
To test whether the response of high-skilled workers in more coordinated firms is lower
than that of similar workers in less coordinated firms, we estimate this model separately on
workers employed in high- and low-coordination firms. In the presence of attenuating effects,
the elasticity β1 is expected to be smaller, in absolute terms, for workers in high-coordination
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firms.
In this specification, the labor supply elasticity is inclusive of the income effect. In online
Appendix C.5, we attempt to separate the uncompensated elasticity of labor supply from the
income elasticity. However, our study is based on a single tax change that primarily affected
workers in the upper part of the income distribution. Therefore, unlike other existing studies, we
have limited variation in tax rates across the income distribution that is needed to separately
estimate the two effects in a precise way. Despite the noisy estimates, the results in online
Appendix C.5 support our baseline findings.
5.4 The spillover effects of a tax change
In firms that coordinate hours worked, a tax rate change that targets one type of workers can
affect hours worked by other workers in the same firm (Prediction 3). We test this prediction by
relating the effects of a tax-driven change in hours worked by high-skilled workers to changes in
the supply of hours by low-skilled coworkers. The equation to be estimated takes the following
form:
log
(
hLijt+3
hLijt
)
= α0 + α1 log
(
hHjt+3
hHjt
)
+ α2 log
(
1− τLit+3
1− τLit
)
+ α3Xijt + ijt (11)
The dependent variable in this model is the log change in the number of hours worked by
low-skilled worker i in firm j between 2008 and 2011. The regressor of key interest is
log
(
hHjt+3
hHjt
)
= log
(
H−1jt+3
∑Hjt+3
h=1 hhjt+3
H−1jt
∑Hjt
h=1 hhjt
)
(12)
This term captures the log change in the average number of hours worked by high-skilled
workers in firm j. We isolate the tax-related component of this change using the average
variation in the marginal net-of-tax rate on labor income among high-skilled workers in firm j
as an instrument for the change in hours. Section 5.5 describes this instrument in detail. Based
on the theory, we expect α1 to be positive and greater in magnitude in more coordinated firms.
The term log
(
1− τLit+3/1− τLit
)
in equation (11) captures the changes of the marginal net-
of-tax rate on labor income faced by low-skilled workers between 2008 and 2011. Since the
reform lowered the marginal tax rate paid by low-skilled, this term controls for the direct effect
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of the reform on the supply of hours of low-skilled workers. Finally, Xijt is a vector of firm and
individual controls measured in 2008.
The empirical specifications that we have discussed thus far differ from the standard model
in the taxable income literature (e.g., Gruber and Saez, 2002) along two important dimensions.
First, we estimate the effect of tax changes on hours worked rather than on labor income. In
our setting, a tax rate change can shift hours and wage rates in opposite directions, which
makes it difficult to interpret the overall effect on labor income. Second, in equation (11), we
augment the standard model with an additional term that captures the spillover effects of the
tax change among coworkers. This is done to reflect a key feature of our framework whereby
the hours worked by one type of worker depend on the hours worked by the other workers in the
same firm. Section A.6 in the online Appendix describes how to adapt the standard economic
model underlying the empirical specification used in the literature to the specific features of
our setting.
5.5 Identification
The identification of the effects of the reform from equations (10) and (11) needs to address
multiple issues. First, due to the non-linearity of the tax schedule, the marginal tax rate in the
post-reform period depends on post-reform income, which is endogenous to the supply of hours.
This creates a correlation between ∆ log (1− τit) and the error terms in our specifications.
Second, changes in the supply of hours by high-skilled workers in equation (11) might be
correlated with changes in the supply of hours worked by low-skilled coworkers in endogenous
ways. This might be the case, for instance, if both types of workers experience the same
unobserved local labor market shocks, local policy reforms or changes specific to a firm (e.g.,
firm organizational changes, changes to the technologies used in production).
To address the first set of concerns, following the literature (e.g., Gruber and Saez, 2002),
we construct a set of instruments based on mechanical tax rate changes that are driven only by
variations in the tax laws. In practice, for each individual in the sample, we use a simulator of
the Danish tax system to obtain marginal tax rates on labor income (τMit+3) in the post-reform
period (time t + 3) based on income in the pre-reform period (time t) adjusted for inflation.
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We then construct the mechanical change in the marginal net-of-tax-rate on labor income of
high-skilled workers as log
(
1− τHMit+3
)− log (1− τHit ), and we use this as an instrument for the
observed change ∆ log
(
1− τHit
)
in equation (10). Similarly, we use the mechanical change in the
marginal net-of-tax rate of low-skilled workers log
(
1− τLMit+3
)− log (1− τLit ) as an instrument
for the observed change ∆ log
(
1− τLit
)
in equation (11).
By holding real income constant between t and t+3, these instruments exploit the variation
in the marginal tax rates due to changes in the tax schedule only. To give a sense of the
identifying variation, Figure 8 plots the average mechanical change in the marginal net-of-tax
rates among high- and low-skilled workers between 2008 and 2011. Due to the nature of the
reform, the change is more pronounced for high-skilled (18%) than for low-skilled (2%) workers.
While these instruments are exogenous to post-reform income, they still depend on pre-
reform income, which is problematic if the latter correlates with the error term due, for instance,
to mean reversion or long-term income trends (Slemrod, 1998, Saez et al., 2012). To address
this, we follow the existing literature and estimate a set of additional regressions in which we
control for pre-reform income in a flexible way. Overall, however, we find that our baseline
results are not affected in a noticeable way by these controls. This may be because, unlike
most other studies, we estimate separate regressions on rather homogeneous groups of workers
(i.e., low-skilled and high-skilled). Furthermore, we study a relatively short time period, thus
limiting the concerns related to long-term trends.
Turning to the identification of the spillover effects (α1) from equation (11), we use simulated
marginal tax rates to construct the mechanical change in the average marginal net-of-tax rate
on labor income faced by high-skilled workers in each firm j:
log
(
1− τHMjt+3
1− τHMjt
)
= log
[
H−1jt+3
∑Hjt+3
h=1 ( 1− τMhjt+3 )
H−1jt
∑Hjt
h=1 (1− τMhjt)
]
(13)
We then use this term as an instrument for log
(
hHjt+3/h
H
jt
)
in equation (11). This instru-
ment isolates the component of the change in hours of the high-skilled due to the tax reform
from other confounding factors. Its validity relies on the assumption that the instrument affects
hours worked by low-skilled workers only through changes in the average hours of high-skilled
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coworkers. This assumption may be violated if, for instance, the tax reform, while changing
the supply of hours by high-skilled workers, also led to the adoption of new technologies that
required a different supply of hours by low-skilled workers. However, we fail to find significant
effects of the reform on firm size, physical capital or the share of high- relative to low-skilled
workers, which suggests that firm technologies were not affected by the reform (Appendix C.6).
Finally, one general concern regarding the instruments that we use is that they might capture
other unobserved changes that occurred between t and t + 3, thus confounding the estimated
effect of the tax reform (e.g., other policy reforms or macroeconomic shocks). For this reason,
we present additional specifications in which we follow the workers from the baseline regressions
back to 2006; then, we estimate our baseline models on all 3-year intervals between 2006 and
2011 while adding base-year fixed effects. These specifications also allow us to control for
unobserved characteristics specific to all coworkers using firm fixed effects. While these models
have some advantages over the baseline estimation, they result in weaker first stages (Section
5.6.2) and are more likely to capture lagged effects of the 2004 tax reform.
5.6 Results
5.6.1 Coordination and attenuating effects
Table 5 reports the elasticity of hours worked by high-skilled workers to the net-of-tax rate
estimated from equation (10). In columns 1 to 3, we estimate the regression on all high-skilled
workers in the sample, while in columns 4 to 7, we differentiate between workers in high- and
low-coordination firms. The base year in all the specifications is 2008. We measure the degree
of coordination of each firm in the base year using the standard deviation of hours worked
across skill groups, as described in Section 4.3. Highly coordinated firms are in the bottom
half of the distribution of the standard deviation across firms, while low-coordination firms are
in the top half. To attach each worker to the correct measure of coordination, we restrict the
analysis to high-skilled workers who are at the same firm in 2008 and 2011.
The first column in Table 5 shows the OLS estimates, while all other columns are based
on the IV model described in the previous section. In the absence of controls for pre-reform
income, the elasticity from the IV model in column 2 is approximately -0.07. Likely due to
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mean reversion, the elasticity increases to -0.05 when we control for income in 2008 (column
3). Based on this estimate, the total hours of high-skilled workers decreased by approximately
0.8% or about 15 hours on a yearly basis as an effect of the reform.19
When we divide the sample between workers at firms with a high (column 4) versus low (col-
umn 5) degree of coordination, however, we find substantial differences between the two groups.
In line with Prediction 4, we estimate a statistically significant elasticity of approximately -0.1
in low-coordination firms, while in high-coordination firms, the elasticity is insignificant and
approximately -0.02. The two elasticities are statistically different at the 5% level. Therefore,
based on these estimates, hours worked by high-skilled workers in firms with a high degree
of coordination were not significantly affected by the reform, while high-skilled hours in low-
coordination firms decreased by approximately 1.6%, or about 30 hours per year.20
The difference between the two elasticities widens as we move towards the extremes of the
distribution of coordination. In fact, workers in the top 25% most coordinated firms show even
lower elasticities than in the baseline. Conversely, workers in the bottom 25% least coordi-
nated firms are more responsive than the baseline (columns 6 and 7). This indicates that the
attenuating effects increase with the degree of hours coordination in a firm.
The differential effects in the two types of firms are not driven by other observable firm
characteristics, firm fixed effects or unobserved factors that occurred between 2008 and 2011.
In fact, the results hold conditional on firm and base-year fixed effects (columns 1 to 4 in Table
6), and they are robust to the interaction between changes in marginal tax rates due to the
reform and other base-year firm characteristics such as size, export status, share of unionized
workers or productivity (columns 5 to 10 in Table 6).
When we separate the sample between salaried and hourly workers (online Appendix Ta-
ble D.6), we find evidence suggesting that the different responses between high- and low-
coordination firms are driven by changes in the overtime hours of salaried workers (columns 1
19The result of -0.5% is obtained as the product of the the elasticity (-0.047) and the average log change in
the net-of-tax rate between 2008 and 2011 (17%). The figure -0.8% is then multiplied by the average number
of hours worked in 2008 by the high-skilled workers in the estimation sample (i.e., 1924) to obtain the change
in hours due to the reform.
20The average change in hours worked is derived as the product of the elasticities in low-coordination firms
(i.e., -0.097 for total hours and -0.061 for regular hours), the average net-of-tax rate change (17%) and the
average number of hours worked by high-skilled workers in low-coordination firms (i.e., 1914 total hours).
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and 2), while we fail to find sizable differences in the normal hours of salaried workers (columns
3 and 4) or in the total hours of hourly workers (columns 5 and 6).
Therefore, in agreement with the existing literature, we find an average elasticity of hours
across all firms close to zero (Pencavel, 1986, Triest, 1990, Chetty, 2012). However, we doc-
ument pronounced attenuating effects associated with coordination that provide a mechanism
to explain the low elasticities reported by previous studies. Other studies that focus on labor
income (rather than hours) find small and positive elasticities in Denmark (Kleven and Schultz,
2014). However, these studies consider the entire population, while we focus on full-time work-
ers in private firms for whom data on hours are available. Using a comparable sample to analyze
the effects on labor income, we find results that are in line with other studies (online Appendix
Table D.24).
While coordination attenuates behavioral responses, it also lowers the dead-weight burden
of taxation on high-skilled workers. Based on our results, we can conclude that if workers in
high-coordination firms were to change their supply of hours as workers in low-coordination
firms do, then the marginal excess burden would be twice as large.21
5.6.2 Coordination and spillovers
Table 7 reports the estimated elasticity of low-skilled hours to the average hours of high-skilled
coworkers obtained from equation (11). In these specifications, the base year is 2008, and we
focus only on low-skilled workers who are at the same firm in 2008 and 2011. Column 1 reports
the OLS estimates, while columns 2 to 7 show the IV estimates. In the first 5 columns, we
estimate the effects on regular hours, while in the last two, we examine the effects on total
hours.
In line with Prediction 3, we estimate positive and significant spillovers that are robust to
controls for pre-reform income (columns 3 and 4). Specifically, in our preferred specification
(column 3), we estimate an elasticity of regular hours of low-skilled workers to the average hours
of high-skilled coworkers of 0.88. This implies an increase of 0.85 hours worked by low-skilled
workers for each additional hour that high-skilled coworkers provide, on average. Based on
21The marginal excess burden (MEB) is defined as the ratio between the change in tax revenues due to
behavioral responses to the tax reform and the total change in tax revenues (see also online Appendix A.6.1).
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this, we estimate that the regular hours of low-skilled coworkers decreased by approximately
8.5 hours (or 0.5%) on a yearly basis as an effect of the reform.22
When we consider overtime hours, the elasticity of low-skilled to high-skilled hours is higher,
which suggests even stronger spillovers from overtime (column 6). However, the point estimate
from this specification might be inflated by the low power of the instrument (F-stat of approxi-
mately 4). Finally, when we divide the sample in temporary and salaried workers, we only find
spillovers among hourly workers (Appendix Table D.8).
The existence of spillovers has two main implications. First, it implies an increase in the
marginal excess burden from the tax reform deriving from the change in labor supply (and
tax revenues) from low-skilled workers. Specifically, in our setting, we estimate that the the
marginal excess burden increases by approximately 15% due to spillovers (see Appendix A.6.1
for details). Second, with spillovers, the use of untargeted workers as a control group to estimate
the labor supply elasticity provides downward-biased estimates. This is yet another reason that
may explain the low elasticity estimated in some of the existing studies (e.g., Eissa and Liebman,
1996; Kreiner et al., 2016). In our setting, using low-skilled workers as a control group in a
difference-in-difference model would result in an elasticity of high-skilled hours of -0.01 (Figure
9 and Appendix Table D.7). This captures only approximately 20% of the elasticity obtained
from the instrumental variable approach of the previous section .
We would expect the spillovers to be stronger in firms with a high degree of coordina-
tion. Consistent with this, Figure 10 shows that the average hours of low-skilled workers in
high-coordination firms decreased after the tax reform relative to their counterparts in low-
coordination firms. Ideally, one would obtain a direct measure of the spillovers in the two
types of firms by estimating equation (11) separately for workers in high- and low-coordination
firms. Based on the results from the previous section, however, hours worked by high-skilled
workers in high-coordination firms were not affected by the reform. As a result, we lack the
first-stage variation to estimate the spillovers in these firms. Thus, in columns 4 and 7 of Table
7, we restrict the analysis to low-skilled workers in firms with a low degree of coordination
22An increase in high-skilled hours by 1 is equivalent to a 0.053% increase. This causes an increase of 0.043% of
low-skilled hours (0.053%*0.88) that, at the average hours worked by low-skilled workers (1,812), is equivalent
to 0.85 hours. The reform caused a decrease of approximately 10 regular hours worked by the high-skilled
(elasticity of -0.03, see Table D.22), thus implying a change of 8.5 regular hours worked by low-skilled workers.
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where hours of high-skilled coworkers were significantly affected by the reform. Among these
workers, we find lower spillovers than across all workers, which suggests weaker spillovers in
low-coordination firms.
Our results complement those of other studies that find aggregate evidence of excess mass
in the distribution of taxable income at kinks in the tax schedule (bunching) among a minority
of workers who do not face these kinks (Chetty et al., 2011, Best, 2014). However, we are the
first to provide firm-level evidence that suggests coordination as a mechanism through which
changes in preferences over hours spill over to other coworkers. In doing so, we also document
a much more pervasive phenomenon than that linked to aggregate bunching. In fact, when
excluding taxpayers close to the major kinks in the Danish tax schedule, the spillovers remain
significant and of similar magnitude (column 5 of Table D.27 in the Appendix).
In online Appendixes C.4 and C.5, we present a set of additional results and robustness
checks that include flexible controls for pre-reform income, the estimation of attenuating and
spillover effects based on an alternative database on hours worked, the use of alternative mea-
sures of coordination and the estimation of specifications that separate the uncompensated
elasticity from the income elasticity.
5.6.3 Spillovers and peer effects
Spillovers across coworkers may occur through peer effects rather than hours coordination. The
existing studies, however, find significant peer effects only among coworkers with similar skills
in Denmark (Fadlon and Nielsen, 2017). On the contrary, we study spillovers across workers
with different skills, which would suggest that peer effects may be of secondary importance in
our setting.
To better investigate whether this is the case, we estimate equation (11) by distinguishing
between spillovers from high-skilled coworkers in the same 3-digit occupation and those from
high-skilled coworkers in different occupations. The results reported in column 2 of Appendix
Table D.9 are suggestive of stronger spillovers across occupations than within occupations.
This would suggest that peers play a secondary role in our results. We further investigate the
importance of peer pressure by estimating the spillovers separately for workers in occupations
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characterized by more repetitive tasks and workers in less repetitive occupations. In fact,
workers performing more standardized tasks can more easily observe and judge one another’s
work and therefore may face stronger peer pressure (Cornelissen et al., 2017). We select the most
repetitive occupations using the classification proposed by Cornelissen et al. (2017), which also
includes occupations such as agricultural helpers or cashiers for which peer effects are known
to be strong (Mas and Moretti, 2009; Bandiera et al., 2010). We find significant spillovers only
among workers in less-repetitive occupations, which confirms that peer pressure is unlikely to
explain the spillovers in our setting (columns 3 to 6 in Table D.9).23
6 Conclusions
This paper explores how the coordination of hours affects the firm component of wages. Our
findings indicate that coordination strongly correlates with wage differentials across firms. Fu-
ture work might investigate how coordination is associated with other dimensions that are
linked to firm wage inequality such as the gender gap (Card et al., 2016).
We also find attenuated responses to tax changes in high-coordination firms and spillovers
on the supply of hours by coworkers not targeted by the tax reform. These suggest that the
labor supply elasticity of the workers directly targeted by a tax reform captures only a part of
the efficiency costs of a tax change. Therefore, future research and policy evaluations should
take these effects into account when assessing the excess burden associated with a tax reform.
Finally, the implications of our results go beyond tax reforms and apply to any policy
intervention that affects the preferences over hours of one group of workers in a firm. For
instance, policies that target the supply of hours of older workers might indirectly affect the
supply of hours of younger coworkers. Similarly, policies that directly affect workers with
children may have spillovers on other coworkers. It would be interesting to evaluate, in these
other settings, the effects of coordination of hours among workers with similar skills and incomes.
23One alternative explanations of the spillovers is the existence of complementarities in leisure time among
coworkers. Unfortunately, the data at hand do not allow us to properly investigate this hypothesis. However,
time use data indicate that Danish workers spend, on average, only 2.5% of their leisure time with non-family
members. This suggests that leisure complementarities are likely to be small. In line with this interpretation,
Georges-Kot et al. (2017) find small leisure complementarities among coworkers in France.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
IDA Sample IDA -Firmstat-LON Final
sample sample
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Workers Characteristics
Mean Age 39.82 12.87 41.11 11.09 42.05 10.91
Fraction < 30 years old 0.27 0.44 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37
Fraction > 50 years old 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.27 0.45
Fraction Males 0.50 0.50 0.66 0.47 0.70 0.46
Fraction Unionized 0.70 0.46 0.73 0.44 0.77 0.15
Fraction Hourly 0.17 0.37 0.24 0.42 0.28 0.45
Fraction Primary Educ. 0.33 0.47 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.45
Fraction Secondary Educ. 0.40 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.50
Fraction Tertiary Educ. 0.27 0.43 0.20 0.39 0.20 0.39
Hourly wage (in DKK) 187.07 141.14 183.65 124.37
Annual Labor Income (in 1000 DKK) 267.00 448.30 357.93 288.35 349.36 248.68
Total Annual Hours 1907.99 213.01 1896.19 197.24
Overtime Annual Hours 27.82 95.55 27.62 87.60
Workers by sector (% of total)
Agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining and quarrying 2.52 0.37 6.05 0.16 4.00
Manufacturing 26.60 32.48 46.83 35.73 47.92
Construction 10.35 8.67 28.15 9.43 29.23
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply,
Trade and transport 30.14 43.46 49.57 40.82 49.15
Financial and insurance, Real estate, Other business 22.95 14.82 35.53 13.71 34.39
Other services 7.44 0.2 4.46 0.15 3.92
Firms Characteristics
Mean Firm Size 51.42 328.24 43.37 302.3649
Mean Capital per employee (1000 DKK) 423.49 7339.72 963.66 43505.13
Mean Value Added per employee (1000 DKK) 436.30 3040.25 504.30 1773.43
Mean Revenues per employee (1000 DKK) 1687.35 6511.18 2132.89 8693.84
Exporters (%) 39.40 48.86 39.96 48.98
Number of observations 22,379,298 4,466,676 787,683
Number of individuals 3,518,236 1,205,301 400,653
Number of firms 266,196 25,249 8,369
Notes: The table shows the mean and the standard deviations for a set of variables on 3 groups of employees. In all 3 groups, we consider only workers who are
between 15 and 65 years of age in the years 2003-2011. The ”IDA Sample” refers to the entire Danish population. The ”IDA-Firmstat-LON” sample refers
to the sample of workers in IDA that can be matched to Firmstat and LON samples. The ”Final sample” is composed of all the workers from IDA-Firmstat-
LON who are employed in firms in which information on hours is available for at least 95% of the workforce. Data on employment by industry for the entire
population are from Statistikbanken (Statistics Denmark), which does not provide standard errors around mean values. Annual and hourly earnings, value
added, capital and sales are expressed in Danish Kroner (DKK) and deflated using the CPI index with 2000 as the base year (8 DKK ' 1 USD in 2000).
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Table 2: Coordination and firm characteristics
Stand. Dev. Of Hours Observations
across skill groups
within firms
(1) (2)
Value Added per employee -0.038*** -0.013** 17807
(0.008) (0.006)
TFP -0.133*** -0.080*** 16212
(0.008) (0.012)
Firm size -0.032*** -0.095*** 17807
(0.007) (0.021)
Share of tertiary educ. workers -0.178*** -0.080*** 17807
(0.007) (0.013)
Exporter status -0.141*** -0.005 17807
(0.007) (0.009)
Fraction of hourly workers 0.337*** 0.257*** 17807
(0.007) (0.016)
Fraction of unionized workers 0.084*** 0.017 17807
(0.008) (0.012)
Fraction of part-timer workers 0.225*** 0.120*** 17807
(0.008) (0.014)
Fraction of female workers -0.035*** 0.035** 17807
(0.008) (0.015)
Mean Managerial Ability -0.069*** -0.019* 16420
(0.008) (0.012)
Negotiation -0.310*** -0.146*** 13441
(0.009) (0.016)
Persuasion -0.313*** -0.153*** 13441
(0.009) (0.016)
Social Perceptiveness -0.289*** -0.116*** 13441
(0.009) (0.015)
Adjust Actions to others -0.160*** -0.077*** 13441
(0.009) (0.013)
Sd Vacation Hours 0.345*** 0.211*** 3832
(0.015) (0.024)
Av. Wage Mangers/Av. Wage Production workers -0.068*** -0.012 13706
(0.008) (0.013)
Production workerers: 90th/10th wage ratio 0.122*** 0.081*** 15772
(0.008) (0.013)
Middle managers: 90th/10th wage ratio -0.044*** -0.012 13632
(0.008) (0.008)
Top managers: 90th/10th wage ratio -0.078*** -0.035*** 12541
(0.008) (0.009)
5 digits industry f.e. NO YES
Notes: The table shows standardized coefficients from a regression of the standard deviation of hours across skill groups within firms from Section 4.3
on a set of firm characteristics and a constant. Each cell in the table corresponds to a different regression. In column 2, we add 5-digit industry
fixed effects to the baseline classification. We use the Danish industry classification DB07 that for the first 4-digit classification corresponds to NACE
rev.2. Regressions are based on firm-year observations from the firms in our final sample (Table 1) over the years 2003–2011. TFP (total factor pro-
ductivity) is obtained following Ackerberg et al. (2015) (online Appendix B.4). Managerial ability is measured as the average individual fixed effect (αˆi)
from an AKM model among the workers in the top quartile of the distribution of αˆi in each firm. To avoid confusion, we label the O*NET descrip-
tor “Coordination” as “Adjust Actions to Others”. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3: Coordination and wage premiums
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e.
Stand. Dev. -0.075*** -0.053*** -0.066*** -0.090*** -0.041**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015)
Stand. Dev. Normal Hours -0.070***
(0.016)
Firm size 0.014* 0.010 0.033*** 0.010 0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Exporter status 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.054** 0.059*** 0.049***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.013)
Union. Rate -0.002 0.031 0.035 0.030 0.062**
(0.027) (0.024) (0.031) (0.024) (0.027)
Female Share -0.055 -0.109** -0.126*** -0.106** -0.086***
(0.045) (0.043) (0.041) (0.043) (0.022)
Average Hours 0.004 0.004 0.015 0.004 -0.041
(0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028)
log(Capital per employee) 0.039*** 0.024* 0.049*** 0.024* 0.032***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
Negotiation 0.348***
(0.105)
Persuasion -0.259***
(0.093)
Social Perceptiveness 0.008
(0.036)
Adjust Actions to others 0.017
(0.017)
Region f.e. NO YES YES YES YES YES
Compos. cntr NO NO YES YES YES YES
Ability Measures NO NO YES YES YES YES
Av. Hours b/w 36.5 and 37.5 YES YES YES NO YES YES
Part. R-sq SD Hours 0.008 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.002
Part. R-sq VA and TFP 0.022 0.010 0.032 0.038 0.032 0.020
Coordination Share 0.349 0.321 0.200 0.196 0.233 0.097
R-sq 0.008 0.033 0.106 0.126 0.108 0.135
N 7312 7312 7312 4415 7299 6089
Notes: In this table, we report the results of estimating equation (7). The dependent variable is the firm fixed effect from the AKM model (8).
“Stand. Dev.” in the table refers to our measure of hours coordination that is the standard deviation of the average total (regular and overtime)
hours worked across skill groups within a firm (Section 4.3). “Stand. Dev. Normal hours” is the standard deviation of the average regular hours
worked across skill groups within a firm. Skill groups are defined as deciles of the distribution of αˆi + βˆ Xijt from the AKM model (8). All re-
gressions report standardized coefficients. The exporter dummy is defined as the modal exporter status between 2003 and 2011. “Compos. cntr”
refers to a vector of controls for the share of workers in each skill group. “Ability Measures” indicates a vector containing the average value of
the individual fixed effects αˆi in each quartile of the distribution of αˆi within a firm. The dependent variable (firm f.e.) in column (5) is based
on wage rates from regular hours only. To avoid confusion, we label the O*NET descriptor “Coordination” as “Adjust Actions to Others”. Coor-
dination Share is derived as the ratio of “Part. R-sq SD Hours” and “Part. R-sq VA and TFP” (Section 4.1). “Part. R-sq VA and TFP” is
from Table D.18. Standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit industry level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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Table 4: Coordination and wage differentials within sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e.
Stand. Dev. -0.060*** -0.031* -0.028* -0.064*** -0.018
(0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017)
Median Abs. Dev. -0.075*** -0.045*** -0.040**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Firm size 0.009 0.006 0.017* 0.010 0.006 0.018* 0.011 0.010*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005)
Exporter status 0.065*** 0.030** 0.021 0.062*** 0.029** 0.020 0.063*** 0.032**
(0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
Union. Rate 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.042 0.040 0.040 0.032 0.051**
(0.025) (0.029) (0.030) (0.025) (0.029) (0.030) (0.024) (0.022)
Female Share -0.140*** -0.069** -0.057* -0.140*** -0.069** -0.057* -0.113*** -0.120***
(0.040) (0.027) (0.029) (0.038) (0.026) (0.028) (0.042) (0.034)
Average Hours -0.006 -0.033 -0.039* -0.018 -0.038* -0.043** 0.001 -0.034
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022)
log(Capital per employee) 0.028** 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.028** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.022* -0.089***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.023)
log(Value added per employee) 0.381***
(0.070)
1 digit Sector f.e. YES NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
2 digits Sector f.e. NO YES NO NO YES NO YES YES
3 digits Sector f.e. NO NO YES NO NO YES YES YES
Part. R-sq SD Hours 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.009
Part. R-sq VA and TFP 0.033 0.016 0.014 0.033 0.016 0.014
Coordination Share 0.113 0.049 0.042 0.181 0.113 0.095
R-sq 0.113 0.155 0.162 0.115 0.156 0.162 0.112 0.104
N 7306 7306 7306 7306 7306 7306 7060 7060
Notes: In this table, we report the results of estimating equation (7). The dependent variable is the firm fixed effect from the AKM model (8). “Stand.
Dev.” in the table refers to our measure of hours coordination that is the standard deviation of the average total (regular and overtime) hours worked
across skill groups within a firm (Section 4.3). The “Median Abs. Dev.” is the the median absolute deviation of median hours across skill groups
within a firm. Skill groups are defined as deciles of the distribution of αˆi + βˆ Xijt from the AKM model (8). All regressions report standardized coef-
ficients. The exporter dummy is defined as the modal exporter status between 2003 and 2011. (Cap/empl) stands for physical capital over the number
of full-time equivalent employees. “Compos. cntr” refers to a vector of controls for the share of workers in each skill group. “Ability Measures” in-
dicates a vector containing the average value of the individual fixed effects αˆi in each quartile of the distribution of αˆi within a firm. In column (8),
TFP is used as an instrument for valued added per employee (log(V.A./empl)). TFP is obtained as in Ackerberg et al. (2015) (online Appendix B.4).
Coordination Share is derived as the ratio of “Part. R-sq SD Hours” and “Part. R-sq VA and TFP” (Section 4.1). “Part. R-sq VA and TFP” is
from Table D.19. Standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit industry level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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Table 5: The elasticity of hours of high-skilled workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High Low High Low
Coordination Coordination Coordination Coordination
Top 50% Bottom 50% Top 25% Bottom 25%
Dependent variable ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH
∆log (1− τH) -0.067*** -0.069*** -0.047*** -0.017 -0.097*** 0.003 -0.147***
(0.008) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.025) (0.018) (0.055)
Log base-year income -0.008*** -0.002 -0.023*** -0.001 -0.038*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.022)
IV NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Region f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Overtime Hours YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mean Hours 1924.47 1924.47 1924.47 1928.33 1914.91 1917.40 1870.33
Pvalue High = Low 0.01 0.01
F-stat Excl. Inst. 1355.19 754.51 1293.74 192.94 566.19 133.53
P-value Excl. Inst. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N Firms 1167 1167 1167 584 583 293 291
N 26488 26488 26488 18875 7613 8307 2371
Notes: This table reports the results from estimating equation (10). It shows the elasticity of high-skilled hours to the net-of-tax rate (1-τH). In columns
4 and 5, we distinguish between high- and low-coordination firms based on whether the firm is in the bottom or top half of the distribution of the standard
deviation of hours across skill groups in 2008, respectively (Section 4.3). In columns 6 and 7, we define high-coordination firms as being in the bottom 25%
of the distribution of the standard deviation of hours across skill groups in 2008 and low-coordination firms as firms in the top 25% of the standard deviation
of hours across skill groups in 2008. Specifications in columns 2 to 7 use mechanical changes in the net-of-tax rate on labor income as an instrument for
observed changes in 1-τH (Section 5.5). First-stage regressions are in Table D.31. Each regression contains the following controls measured in the base year:
work experience, work experience squared, sex, age, number of children, marital status, education, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed effects,
firm size, exporter status, and share of high- and low-skilled workers in the firm (the residual group is omitted). “P-value High=Low” refers to the p-value
of the null hypothesis that the coefficient attached to ∆log (1− τH ) in low- and high-coordination firms is equal. We only consider high-skilled workers who
are at the same firm between 2008 and 2011 and in firms that employ at least 1 low-skilled worker. We estimate this regression on 3-year changes between
2008 and 2011. Observations are weighted by labor income. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 6: Elasticity of high-skilled hours: additional specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low
Coordination Coordination Coordination Coordination Coordination Coordination Coordination Coordination Coordination Coordination
Dependent variable ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH
∆log (1− τH) -0.027 -0.075*** -0.010 -0.099** 0.045 -0.121** -0.041 -0.125** 0.006 -0.073**
(0.017) (0.026) (0.016) (0.039) (0.043) (0.059) (0.032) (0.052) (0.027) (0.036)
∆log (1− τH)× Size -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
∆log (1− τH)× Export -0.073 0.041
(0.048) (0.083)
∆log (1− τH)× High Union Share 0.038 0.044
(0.040) (0.072)
∆log (1− τH)× High TFP -0.040 -0.052
(0.038) (0.072)
Firm f.e. YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Base-year f.e. YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
N Firms 785 675 584 583 584 583 584 583 584 583
N 26497 10267 18875 7613 18875 7613 18875 7613 18875 7613
Notes: This table reports the results from estimating equation (10) while controlling for additional variables and fixed effects. The main variable of inter-
est is the elasticity of high-skilled total hours (regular and overtime) to the net-of-tax rate (1-τH) reported in the first row. We distinguish between high-
and low-coordination firms based on whether the firm is in the bottom or top half of the distribution of the standard deviation of hours across skill groups
in 2008, respectively. The dummy variables “High Union Share” (columns 9 and 10) and “High TFP” (columns 7 and 8) take value 1 if the firm had a
share of unionized workers and TFP above the median in 2008, respectively. “Size” (columns 3 and 4) and “Export Status” (columns 5 and 6) are mea-
sured in 2008. All specifications use mechanical changes in the net-of-tax rate on labor income as an instrument for observed changes in 1-τH (Section
5.5). First-stage regressions are in Tables D.32 and D.33. Each regression contains the following controls measured in the base year: log base-year labor
income, work experience, work experience squared, sex, age, number of children, marital status, education, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed
effects, firm size, exporter status, high unionization rate dummy, high TFP dummy, and share of high- and low-skilled workers in the firm (the residual
group is omitted). We only consider high-skilled workers who are at the same firm between 2008 and 2011 and in firms that employ at least 1 low-skilled
worker. In columns 1 and 2, we consider 3-year changes over the period 2006–2011. In columns 3 to 10, we consider 3-year changes between 2008 and
2011. Observations are weighted by labor income. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 7: The spillover effects on hours worked by the low-skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Low Low
Coordination Coordination
Bottom 50% Bottom 50%
Dependent variable ∆log hL ∆log hL ∆log hL ∆log hL ∆log hL ∆log hL ∆log hL
∆log hHnormal 0.540*** 0.899*** 0.878*** 0.894** 0.624**
(0.112) (0.304) (0.301) (0.373) (0.297)
∆log hHtotal 1.375** 0.706**
(0.612) (0.345)
∆log (1− τL) -0.005 0.023 0.051 0.053 -0.060 0.056 -0.053
(0.009) (0.088) (0.114) (0.126) (0.115) (0.138) (0.115)
IV NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Region f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Splines of log t-1 Inc. and
∆log inc. t-1-t NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Log Mean Inc. High Sk. NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Overtime Hours NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
F-stat Excl. Inst. 13.09, 160.40 15.45,76.76 4.66, 55.84 11.90, 48.55 4.43, 76.72 8.39, 50.92
P-value Excl. Inst. 0.00, 0.00 0.00, 0.00 0.03,0.00 0.00, 0.00 0.04, 0.00 0.00, 0.00
Mean Hours Low Sk. 1812.51 1812.51 1812.51 1812.51 1742.05 1828.87 1760.74
Mean Hours High Sk. 1875.00 1875.00 1875.00 1875.00 1846.56 1905.60 1879.90
N Firms 968 968 968 968 484 968 484
N 10091 10091 10091 10091 4100 10091 4100
Notes: This table reports the results from estimating equation (11). It shows the elasticity of low-skilled hours to the average hours worked by high-
skilled coworkers. We consider both regular (normal) hours (columns 1 to 5) and total (regular and overtime) hours (columns 6 and 7). Specifications
in columns 2 to 7 use mechanical changes in the average net-of-tax rate among high-skilled workers in a firm as an instrument for the average change
in hours and the mechanical change in the net-of-tax rate of low-skilled as an instrument for observed changes in 1-τL (Section 5.5). First-stage results
are in Table D.34. Low-coordination firms (columns 5 and 7) are defined as being in the top half of the distribution of the standard deviation of hours
across skill groups in 2008. Each regression contains the following controls measured in the base year (2008): work experience, work experience squared,
sex, age, number of children, marital status, education, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed effects, firm size, exporter status, and share of
high- and low-skilled workers in the firm (the residual group is omitted). “Splines” refer to a flexible piecewise linear functional form with 5 components.
We only consider low-skilled workers who are at the same firm between 2008 and 2011. We estimate this regression on 3-year changes between 2008
and 2011. Observations are weighted by labor income. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure 1: The distribution of hours across sectors in Denmark
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Notes: The figure presents histograms of weekly total (regular and overtime) hours worked in the six major sectors in Denmark over the years 2003–2011.
Weekly hours are obtained dividing annualized hours by 52. Observations are grouped into bins of 2 hours. Figures are based on a total of 875,078
individual-year observations that include full-time and part-time workers in firms where hours are available for least 95% of the workforce. From the
top left to the bottom right, we have the following sectors: Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying; Manufacturing; Construction; Utilities,
trade and transport; Financial, insurance, real estate and other businesses; and Other services.
Figure 2: Variance of hours decomposition: between and within component
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Notes: The figure depicts the decomposition of the variance of hours worked into between and within components (footnote 5). We consider the total
annualized hours (including overtime) of full-time workers. The figure is based on the 787,683 individual-year observations in our final sample (Table
1). The first bar shows the decomposition into between and within firm components. The second, third and fourth bars show the within-between
decomposition for 1-, 2- and 4-digit sectors, respectively. Industries are defined using the classification NACE rev. 2.
47
Figure 3: Wage rates and hours worked
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Figure 4: The effects of a tax rate change on wages
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Notes: The figure shows on the y-axis the absolute value of the first derivative of the wage hours function in coordinated firms for high-skilled (wˆ′H)
and low-skilled workers (wˆ′L). α = nˆL ÷ nˆH is the ratio between the number of low- and high-skilled workers in coordinated firms. At the optimum,
wˆ′H + αwˆ
′
L = 0. Therefore, we plot the absolute value of wˆ
′
H and wˆ
′
L to have them on the same quadrant. The shift from point A to B represents the
change in optimal hours and wage rates in coordinated firms when the tax rate decreases and the income effect prevails, such that the desired hours of
the high-skilled shift down from h∗0H to h
∗
1H .
48
Figure 5: Validation: standard deviation of hours vs. coordination in O*NET
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Notes: The figure shows on the y-axis the standard deviation of hours across skill groups within firms (Section 4.3) and on the x-axis 3 measures of
firm-level coordination based on O*Net: Contact, Team Work and Communication. These variables are measured on a scale of importance from 0 to
100. For each firm, we take the median importance of Contact, Team Work and Communication across workers. We break ties in median scores using
the average. Firms are grouped into 20 bins, with each one containing the same number of firms. We plot mean values within each bin. At the bottom
of each graph, we report the coefficient and the associated t-stat from a regression of the y on the x variable. We map the ISCO-88 classification of
the Danish registers to the SOC classification in O*Net using the cross-walk provided by the National Crosswalk Center.
Figure 6: The evolution of the marginal tax rate on labor income
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of the marginal tax rate on labor income between 2006 and 2011. The figure is based on Table D.21. Marginal
tax rates on labor income in the bottom and middle brackets are obtained as follows: Statutory Marginal Tax rate * (1-Labor Market contribution)
+Labor Market contribution - EITC; in the top bracket, they are obtained as Marginal Tax Ceiling*(1-Labor Market contribution) +Labor Market
contribution.
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Figure 7: Mechanical marginal net-of-tax rate change across taxable income
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Notes: This figure plots the mechanical change in marginal net-of-tax rates on labor income between 2008 and 2011 over 2008 taxable income for each
individual who is in our sample in 2008 and 2011. Taxable income is expressed in 1000 DKK (5 DKK ' 1 USD). Mechanical marginal tax rates in
2011 are based on 2008 income adjusted by inflation. Each bin contains the same number of workers. The graph plots the median value in each bin.
The dashed line delimits the bottom tax bracket in 2008 (279,800 DKK). The dotted line is the lower boundary of the top tax bracket in 2008 (335,800
DKK, see Table D.21). The solid line is the lower boundary of the top tax bracket in 2011 expressed in 2008 DKK (nominal 389,900 DKK discounted
by 1.06 CPI; see Table D.21).
Figure 8: Average (mechanical) marginal net-of-tax rate change across groups
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Notes: This figure plots the share of workers in each skill group and the average mechanical change in marginal net-of-tax rates on labor income between
2008 and 2011 in each group. Mechanical marginal tax rates in 2011 are based on 2008 income adjusted by inflation. Low-skilled workers are defined
as tax exempt or in the bottom tax bracket in 2008. Workers in the residual group were in the top tax bracket in 2008 and, based on their 2008 income
adjusted by inflation, are predicted to be in the bottom tax bracket in 2011. The high-skilled are all workers who are neither in the residual group nor
low-skilled workers.
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Figure 9: Trends in working hours of high-skilled relative to low-skilled workers
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Notes: This figure plots the set of coefficients βˆt from the following regression: hit = αi + γt +
∑2011
t=2008 βtHighSkilledi × γt + it, where hit is
the log number of total (regular and overtime) hours worked by worker i in year t. αi and γt are individual and year fixed effects, respectively. The
variable HighSkilledi takes value 1 if the worker is high skilled and 0 if the worker is low skilled. High-skilled and low-skilled workers are defined as
in Section 5.1. 2009 is the reference year. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Figure 10: Trends in working hours of low-skilled workers in high vs. low coordination firms
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Notes: This figure plots the set of coefficients βˆt from the following regression: hit = αi + γt +
∑2011
t=2008 βtHighCoordinationi × γt + it, where
hit is the log number of regular hours worked by low-skilled worker i in year t. αi and γt are individual and year fixed effects, respectively. The
variable HighCoordinationi takes value 1 if worker i is in a high-coordination firm and 0 if the worker is in a low-coordination firm. High- and
low-coordination firms are those in the top and bottom 50% of the distribution of coordination in panel (1) and in the top and bottom 25% of the
distribution of coordination in panel (2), respectively. 2009 is the reference year. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Abstract
Although coworkers are spending an increasing share of their working time interacting with one
another, little is known about how the coordination of hours among heterogenous coworkers affects
pay, productivity and labor supply. In this paper, we use new linked employer-employee data
on hours worked in Denmark to first document evidence of positive correlations between wages,
productivity and the degree of hours coordination – measured as the dispersion of hours – within
firms. We then estimate labor supply elasticities by exploiting changes made to the personal income
tax schedule in 2010. We find that hours coordination is associated with attenuated labor supply
elasticity and spillovers on coworkers not directly affected by the tax change. These spillovers led
to a 15% increase in the marginal excess burden from the 2010 tax reform, and if ignored, they
induce substantial downward bias in estimates of the labor supply elasticity. We explain these
findings in a framework in which differently productive firms choose whether to coordinate hours
in exchange for productivity gains, leading more productive firms to select into coordinating hours
and to pay compensating wage differentials.
JEL Codes: J31, H20, J20
A Supplementary derivations of the theoretical model
A.1 The optimal demand of consumption and leisure
Workers with skill i maximize utility (1) given an hourly wage rate wi and an income tax rate
ti and facing the budget constraint
Ei ≡
∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)qi(ω) dω ≤ hiwi(1− ti) + T + p¯i ≡ Yi, (1)
where Ei is expenditures, Yi is after-tax income under a lump-sum transfer T that balances the
government’s budget (there are no other government expenditures), and p¯i ≡ ∫
ω∈Ω pi(ω)dω/(nH+
nL) represents the equal distribution of firm profits as dividends. A worker i’s optimal product
demand then is
q∗i (ω) =
[
p(ω)
P
]−σ
Qi, (2)
and labor supply is implicitly given by
η v′ (`∗ ) =
w∗i (1− ti)
P Q
, (3)
for the (exponentiated) price index P σ−1 ≡ ∫
ω∈Ω p(ω)
−(σ−1) dω. Finally, note that in optimum,
Ei = PQi.
A.2 Wage-hours function and optimal hours: the case of an ad-
ditive separable utility function
Since the indifference condition (2) implicitly defines the wage rate as a function of the hours
worked, it can be used to express wˆ′(hˆ) in terms of marginal utilities. Thus, starting from
Φ(wˆi, hˆ) = U
(
P−1wˆi (1− ti) hˆ+ P−1(T p¯i), 1− hˆ
)
−U (w∗i (1− ti)h∗i + +P−1(T p¯i), 1− h∗i ) = 0,
(4)
we have
wˆ′i(hˆ) = −
(
∂Φ(wˆi, hˆ)
∂hˆ
)(
∂Φ(wˆi, hˆ)
∂wˆi
)−1
= − [P
−1UCwˆi(1− ti)− U`]
P−1UC hˆ(1− ti)
. (5)
2
Under decreasing marginal rates of substitution
wˆ′i(hˆ) = −
[P−1UCwˆi(1− ti)− U`]
P−1UC hˆ(1− ti)

< 0 if hˆ < h∗i
= 0 if hˆ = h∗i
> 0 if hˆ > h∗i
. (6)
Assuming that the utility function is additive separable as in (1), the second derivative of the
wage rate with respect to hours is
wˆ′′i (hˆ) = −
[
wˆ′i hˆ− wˆi
hˆ2
]
−
[
P
hˆ2(1− ti)
]
U`
UC
−
UCUll + UCCU`
[
P−1wˆ′i hˆ (1− ti) + P−1wˆi(1− ti)
]
P−1U2C(1− ti) hˆ
.
(7)
Thus, rearranging the terms in (7), we have1:
wˆ′′i (hˆ) = −
2
hˆ
wˆ′i −
UCUll + UCCU`
[
P−1wˆ′i hˆ (1− ti) + P−1wˆi (1− ti)
]
P−1U2C (1− ti) hˆ
. (8)
In (8), we notice that[
P−1wˆ′i hˆ (1− ti) + P−1wˆi (1− ti)
]
=
−P−1UCwˆi(1− ti) + U` + P−1UCwˆi(1− ti)
UC
=
U`
UC
> 0.
(9)
Assuming UC > 0, U` > 0, UCC < 0 and Ull < 0, it follows that the second term in (8):
− UCUll +
UCCU
2
`
UC
P−1U2C(1− ti) hˆ
> 0. (10)
(10) captures the loss in terms of marginal utilities from working one extra hour. This loss
requires wage rates to increase at an increasing rate when hours increase. Combining (10) and
(8), we have
wˆ′′i (hˆ) = −
2
hˆ
wˆ′i −
UCUll +
UCCU
2
`
UC
P−1U2C(1− ti) hˆ
. (11)
If hˆ = h∗ since wˆ′i(hˆ) = 0, then wˆ
′′
i (hˆ) > 0. If hˆ < h
∗
i then wˆ
′
i(hˆ) < 0 and wˆ
′′
i (hˆ) > 0. Finally, if
hˆ > h∗i , then wˆ
′
i(hˆ) > 0 and the sign of wˆ
′′
i (hˆ) is ambiguous. Using (5) to rearrange (11) wˆ
′′
i > 0
implies
2
wˆi(1− ti)
P
>
U`
UC
+
U``
UC
− UCCU
2
U2C
. (12)
1The rearrangement here involves substituting (5) into the first term on the right-hand side of (7). Then we
take the sum of the first two terms. To gain a more transparent intuition of the results, we then express the
sum of the first two terms in (7) in terms of w’(h).
3
This is the case when P is particularly small and/or U`` is particularly high.
A.3 Optimal hours worked in coordinated firms: derivations
The first-order conditions relative to the minimization problem of section 2.3.2 are
wˆ′LhˆnˆL + wLnˆL + wˆ
′
HhˆnˆH + wˆHnˆH = GH nˆH +GLnˆL, (13)
GH = wˆH(hˆ), (14)
GL = wˆL(hˆ), (15)
γˆφG(nˆL hˆ, nˆH hˆ) = qˆ(ω). (16)
Replacing GH from (14) and GL from (15) into (13) we obtain
wˆ′H(hˆ)nˆH hˆ+ wˆ
′
LnˆLhˆ = 0, (17)
dividing by hˆ we obtain condition (4).
The optimality condition (4) implicitly defines optimal hours in coordinated firms as a
function of the marginal tax rate faced by high-skilled workers. Thus it can be used to obtain
the derivative of hˆ with respect to the tax rate tH . Defining the implicit function
ΦtH (h, tH) = wˆ
′
H(hˆ) + αwˆ
′
L = 0, (18)
we have
dhˆ
dtH
= −
(
∂ΦtH
∂tH
)(
∂ΦtH
∂hˆ
)−1
. (19)
Using (5) to solve for the numerator in (19) gives equation (6).
A.4 The product market: prices, revenues and profits
A firm producing variety ω maximizes its profits by setting the variety-specific price p(ω) given
total demand. By summing the demand indexes Q∗i and Qˆi over all consumers of different skills
and with employment in different labor markets, we arrive at aggregate consumption Q, which
firms take as given under monopolistic competition. However, in the product market for their
individual variety ω, firms are monopoly price setters, taking demand for their variety into
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account:
q(ω) = [p(ω)/P ]−σQ,
after summing (2) over all consumer groups.2 The generic profit maximization problem is
pi(ω) ≡ max
p(ω)
p(ω) q(ω)− µ
γφ
q(ω)− F s.t. q(ω) =
[
p(ω)
P
]−σ
Q, (20)
where the constant µ is the marginal production cost (given constant returns to scale). Note
that F = 0, γ = 1 and µ = µ∗ in the non-coordinated market, whereas F = Fˆ , γ = γˆ > 1 and
µ = µˆ for firms that enter the coordinated market. Applying Euler’s rule to constant-returns-
to-scale production (with homogeneity of degree one in production factors), the minimized cost
function in uncoordinated firms takes the form
C∗(ω) =
µ∗
φ
q∗(ω) with µ∗ ≡ µ(w∗H ,w∗L, h∗H , h∗L),
where µ∗ is the Lagrange multiplier of the constrained minimization problem (3), and q∗(ω) =
φG(n∗Hh
∗
H , n
∗
Lh
∗
L), whereas the function µ(·) also depends on the parameters of the production
function. In coordinated firms the minimized costs function takes the form:
Cˆ(ω) =
µˆ
γˆφ
qˆ(ω) with µˆ ≡ µ(wˆH , wˆL; hˆ(η, P, tH , tL;φ)),
where µˆ is the Lagrange multiplier of the constrained minimization problem in Section 2.3.2
and qˆ(ω) = γˆ φ hˆG(nˆH , nˆL). The optimal prices resulting from (20) are
p∗(ω) =
σ
σ − 1
µ∗
φ
and pˆ(ω) =
σ
σ − 1
µˆ
γˆφ
. (21)
By profit maximization (20), firms with the same φ choose the same optimal price–over-cost
markups, production and revenue, regardless of their specific product variety ω. We therefore
adopt the simplifying notation that optimal prices are p(φ), optimal production is q(φ), and
optimal revenues are p(φ)q(φ). Summing (2) over all consumer groups, total demand for a
firm’s output can be written as q(φ) = [p(φ)/P ]−σQ and the firm’s equilibrium revenues are
p(φ)q(φ) = [p(φ)/P ]−(σ−1)PQ = [p(φ)/P ]−(σ−1)E,
where E = PQ is economy-wide expenditure, aggregated over all consumer groups. By (20),
2Concretely, aggregate demand is Q ≡ ∑i=H,LN∗i Q∗i + NˆiQˆi, where Q∗i = E∗i /P and Qˆi = Eˆi/P with
E∗i = h
∗
iw
∗
i (1− ti) + T and Eˆi = hˆwˆi(1− ti) + T .
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the profits of a firm with productivity φ are
pi(φ) =
p(φ)q(φ)
σ
− F =
[
p(φ)
P
]−(σ−1)
E
σ
− F.
Using optimal prices (21) for non-coordinated and coordinated firms in this profit relationship,
we can state a firm φ’s prospective profits in the two labor market segments as in Section 2.3.3.
A.5 Tax changes and wage rates with coordination
In the setting described in Section 2, a tax change that affects coordinated hours also affects
wage rates through the wage-hours function. The sign of the effect on wages depends on
whether the income or the substitution effect prevails and on whether high-skilled workers
desire to work more or less hours than low-skilled workers. Figure 4 shows the case in which
the tax rate decreases, the income effect prevails and high-skilled workers desire to work more
hours (i.e., h∗H > h
∗
L). In this case, a decrease in the tax rate moves the equilibrium from A
to B. At the new equilibrium, both | w′H | and | w′L | are lower, implying lower wage rates for
both high-skilled and low-skilled workers. Intuitively, the lower supply of hours induced by the
tax drop moves low-skilled workers (who work more than desired at the original equilibrium)
closer to the optimum. This shift results in lower wage premiums for low-skilled workers.
For high-skilled workers, the reform drives down both their coordinated and desired hours
worked. Coordinated hours, however, decrease less than the desired hours, thus shrinking the
gap between the optimum and the coordinated hours. This shift results in lower wage rates. The
other possible cases can be derived following a similar reasoning, and they lead to the conclusion
that wage rates and hours move together if, in equilibrium, low-skilled workers prefer to work
less than high-skilled workers, while hours and wages move in opposite directions if low-skilled
workers prefer to work more.
Unfortunately, the specific setting of our empirical analysis does not allow us to distinguish
between the two cases. In fact, using the instrumental variable approach described in Section 5,
we fail to find significant effects of the 2010 tax reform on wage rates (Table D.10), which may
be due to the fact that the spillover effects on hours were too small to generate a significant
wage effect.
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A.6 A framework for the empirical model of taxation with spillovers
Similar to Gruber and Saez (2002), we assume that type i workers maximize a utility function
that depends on consumption (c) and labor income (z). For simplicity, we assume that labor
income is given as the product of wage rates and hours worked such that the utility function
takes the following form: Ui (ci, hiwi). Following Kleven and Schultz (2014), we define ci =
zi − Ti (z) = zi (1− τi) + yi, where Ti (z) is tax liability, τi = T ′i () and virtual income is defined
as yi = ziτi− Ti (z). In uncoordinated firms, the wage rate is exogenously set by the market at
wi = w
∗
i . The optimal choice of hours is then a function of the marginal net-of-tax rate, virtual
income and the exogenous wage rate: hi = h (1− τi , yi ,w∗i ). In this framework, changes in τi
and yi affect the supply of hours as follows:
dhi = − ∂h
∂ (1− τi) dτi +
∂h
∂yi
dyi (22)
Defining the uncompensated elasticity of hours with respect to the net-of-tax rate as α2 =
[(1− τi) /hi] [∂h /∂ (1− τi)] and the income elasticity as α3 = (1− τi) [∂h /∂yi], then the terms
in equation (22) can be rearranged as
dhi
hi
= −α2 dτi
(1− τi) + α3
dyi
hi (1− τi) (23)
Using a log-log specification, equation (23) can be estimated as
∆log(hi) = α0 + α2 ∆log (1− τi) + α3 ∆log(yi) + εi (24)
The compensated elasticity of hours to a net-of-tax rate change (ζc) can be obtained from α2
and α3 using the Slutsky equation: ζ
c = α2 − α3.
If firms coordinate hours among workers, then the supply of hours by type i workers in a firm
will also depend on the hours worked by other types of workers in the same firm. Hours worked
by other types will, in turn, depend on the net-of-tax rate, the virtual income and the market
wage rate that the other types face. We assume there is one type of other workers, indexed as
−i. Hours worked by type i workers can then be expressed as hi = h (1− τi , yi , h−i ,w∗i ), where
h−i = h
(
1− τ−i , y−i ,w∗−i
)
. In defining h−i, we assume that hours worked by type −i workers
are independent of the tax rate and virtual income faced by type i workers. This assumption,
while restrictive, fits well our empirical setting in which tax changes experienced by low-skilled
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workers (type i) are of small magnitude and do not affect hours worked by high-skilled (type
−i) workers in a significant way. We assume that the assignment of workers to a type does
not change when the tax rate changes. This finding is consistent with our framework, in which
workers are defined as high- or low-skilled based on the marginal tax rate that they face prior
to the reform and the mechanical marginal tax rates that they face after the reform.
Changes in τi, yi, τ−i and y−i affect the supply of hours of type i workers as follows:
dhi
hi
= −α2 dτi
(1− τi) + α3
dyi
hi (1− τi) +
∂h
∂h−i
1
hi
[
−β2 h−i dτ−i
(1− τ−i) + β3
dy−i
(1− τ−i)
]
(25)
In a log-log specification, equation (25) can be estimated using the following empirical model:
∆log(hi) = α0 + α1 ̂∆log (h−i) + α2 ∆log (1− τi) + α3 ∆log(yi) + εi (26)
Where ̂∆log (h−i) is predicted using ∆log (1− τ−i) and ∆log(y−i) as instruments.
A.6.1 Marginal excess burden with hours coordination
We measure the marginal excess burden (MEB) as the ratio of the change in tax revenues due
to behavioral responses (dB) to total changes in tax revenues (dR). Abstracting from spillovers,
we have
MEB =
dB
dR
=
dBH + dBL
dMH + dML + dBH + dBL
where the change in tax revenues due to behavioral responses for a type i worker is defined as
dBi = ( ei · hi · wi · τi1−τidτi)×Ni, and ei, hi, wi, τi, Ni are, respectively, the elasticity of type i
hours, average hours, average wage rates, average marginal tax rates and the number of type i
workers in our sample. dτi measures the average change in marginal tax rates on labor income
due to the reform among type i workers. The mechanical change in tax revenues is defined as
dMi = dτi · hi · wi and captures losses (gains) in revenues due to changes in the tax schedule
absent behavioral changes.
In our setting, eL is insignificant, so dBL can be ignored. In comparing the MEB with
coordination relative to the MEB that would be implied by low coordination, we first estimate
MEB assuming eH = −0.05, which is the elasticity across all firms. Then we compute MEB
under eH = −0.1, which is the elasticity in low-coordination firms (column 5 in Table 4).
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Including spillovers, we have
MEBSpillover =
dBSpillover
dR
=
dBSpilloverL + dBH + dBL
dBSpilloverL + dMH + dML + dBH + dBL
where dBSpilloverL = e
Spillover
L · (dhH/hH) ·wL ·hL ·τL. Here, eSpilloverL is the elasticity of low-skilled
hours to the hours of high-skilled coworkers, and dhH is the change in hours of high-skilled
workers due to the reform. In practice, we consider spillovers from normal hours only because
they have better power in first-stage regressions (column 3 in Table 6).
B Further institutional details and data descriptions
B.1 The overtime and vacation time regulation in Denmark
Overtime work is defined in the large majority of collective agreements as the number of weekly
hours worked beyond the normal hours set in the employment contract. In order to remunerate
overtime work, there are two options: i) an hour of paid leave for each hour of overtime work or
ii) an increase in the hourly wage according to the rates set in the collective agreements.3 Many
agreements, for example, set the overtime premium to 50% for the first three hours of overtime
and to 100% for overtime over three hours. Work on Sundays and during public holidays is also
considered overtime work, which is usually rewarded with a 100% increase in the hourly rate.
Collective agreements generally establish a cap on overtime hours per week unless explicitly
agreed upon differently by the employer and the union representatives at the company level.4
Moreover, overtime work is also indirectly affected by two laws regarding working time. The
first law states that every worker is entitled to rest at least 11 hours per day on average and at
least one day per week (Health and Safety Act, passed in 1996).5 The daily rest period of 11
hours can be reduced by a local agreement, even though it cannot be below 8 hours per day on
average.
3This is not the case for salaried workers, who are not entitled to overtime pay.
4In the manufacturing sector, the cap on overtime work is currently 8 hours, and it can be increased to 12
hours for the reparation of machines (Industriens Overenskomst 2014-2017 ). In the transport sector, the same
cap is set to 3 hours per week (Industriens Overenskomst 2014-2017 ). In the financial sector, there is not an
explicit limit on overtime work (Standardoverenskomst 2014- Finansforbundet), but there is a reference to the
rule on maximum weekly working hours.
5 Arbejdsmiljloven (2010)
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The second law sets the maximum weekly working hours, including overtime work, to an
average of 48 hours per week over a reference period (Directive on working time, passed in
2002).6The reference period, however, can vary substantially from sector to sector. For instance,
both in the manufacturing sector and in the public sector, the 48-hour maximum is always
determined over a reference period of 4 months, unless a shorter or longer period of maximum
12 months is negotiated at the company level. In the service sector, the picture is more blurred.
The reference period is 4 months for employees working in shops, but those employees working
in offices and warehouses have a reference period of 6 months.7 However, deviations from the 4-
or 6-month period can be specified at the sectoral level. Finally, employees in the transportation
sector have stricter limitations on maximum weekly hours, which should not exceed 42 hours.
As far as vacation time is concerned, the ”holiday year” runs from the 1st of May until the
30th of April. Under the Danish Holiday Act, every employee in Denmark receives five weeks
of leave per year as long as they have worked for one calendar year before the beginning of the
holiday year. If the employee has not completed a full calendar year, they are entitled to 2.08
days of holiday for every month in which they have been employed. Any employee who has not
earned their full five-week holiday allowance is still entitled to take up to five weeks per year
as unpaid holiday. Generally, if the employee does not take vacation during the holiday year,
they can transfer some of this vacation time to the next vacation year or convert the fifth week
of holiday into wages. Employees are also entitled to additional vacation days, which are often
referred to as the sixth week of vacation. These days are not covered by the Danish Holiday
Act and are usually part of bilateral negotiation between employers and employees. Therefore,
the rules can differ from place to place with regard to eligibility, use and possible payout.
B.2 Construction of the data on hours and earnings
In equation (8) of the main paper, we use hourly wages derived as the ratio of labor earnings
gross of taxes and total working hours. We use hours and earnings relative to the highest-paying
job in the November spell. This is the only spell that can be matched to employers’ data through
6Bekendtgrelse af lov om gennemfrelse af dele af arbejdstidsdirektivet (2004)
7In the financial sector, the reference period is set to 13 weeks (Standardoverenskomst 2014- Finansforbun-
det).
10
FIDA. For workers whose November spell lasts less than 1 entire year, we annualize hours and
earnings multiplied by the inverse of the share of the year in which they stayed in the spell. We
exclude from the analysis the workers with annualized earnings lower than 2000$ (13000 DKK)
or those with annual hours greater than 5,616 (18 × 6 × 52). This results in the exclusion of
approximately 10,000 observations over the years 2003-2011 (Table D.2).
We use the gross labor earnings variable called joblon from IDA based on yearly labor earn-
ing records, which include all forms of labor compensation, excluding pension contributions.8.
Following Kleven and Schultz (2014), we use information on labor and total earnings stemming
from the income register (INDK ) in the tax simulator.9 As a deflator for the income variables,
we use the Consumer Price Index from Statistics Denmark with 2000 as the base year.10
Normal working hours are from Lønstatistikken (LON thereafter) and are inclusive of va-
cation, weekends, legal holidays and lunch breaks, whereas unpaid leave and overtime hours
are excluded. Lønstatistikken also reports information on overtime hours (i.e., overtid), which
takes a value of zero for approximately 70% of our final sample. Among salaried workers, this
share increases to 81%, while among hourly workers, this share is approximately 42%. All the
information contained in LON originates from employers.
For most private companies (with the equivalent of at least 10 full-time employees), the
data are collected by the Danish employers confederation (Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening and
Finanssektorens Arbejdsgiverforening). Employers in Denmark report hours worked because
they make contributions for each employee to a pension fund (Additional Pension from the
Labor Market, known as ATP), and the size of the contribution depends on hours and the
contract type (i.e., monthly paid, weekly paid and casual work, see also Table D.1).
Over the 2003-2011 period, only approximately 55% of the observations in IDA can be
matched to LON. Attrition can be partially explained by the fact that data on approximately
15% of the firms surveyed are judged to be of low quality by Statistics Denmark, and they are
8IDA also contains two alternative measures of earnings. The first is lonind, which measures the gross annual
labor earnings, not just those for the November spell. The second is timelon, which measures hourly wages.
However, this measure is missing for approximately 20,000 observations. Additional details about how the
gross annual earnings are measured can be found at http://www.dst.dk/da/TilSalg/Forskningsservice/
Dokumentation/hoejkvalitetsvariable/loenforhold-der-vedroerer-ida-ansaettelser-/joblon
9In this register, the variable capturing labor earnings is qlontmp2.
10This index can be accessed at http://www.statistikbanken.dk/PRIS6
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not released in LON. Data on hours are also available in 2002 when, however, only 30% of the
observations in IDA can be matched to LON. For this reason, we exclude the year 2002 from
the analysis. We do not consider part-timers, who are defined as those working less than 26
weekly hours, where weekly hours are calculated by dividing annual hours by 52.
With the introduction of the e-income registry (E-indkomst), the Danish tax authorities
obtained information on hours worked by all employees over the age of 14, including employees
in smaller enterprises, on a monthly basis.11 This database is available only for the years
2008-2011. For this reason, we use E-indkomst as a secondary source of data to check the
robustness of our baseline results. We make hours in E-indkomst comparable to those in LON
by aggregating monthly hours into annual hours. We also exclude observations for which hours
are imputed.
B.3 Accounting data
As far as firms’ variables are concerned, capital stock (MAAT) is measured as the value of land,
buildings, machines, equipment and inventory, according to the Accounting Statistics register
(Regnskabsstatistik).12 We obtain total sales (OMS) from the same register. The definition of
value added is that suggested by Statistics Denmark. This definition changes over the sample
period to account for adjustments in accounting standards. Specifically, from 2002 to 2003, the
value added is calculated as
(OMS + AUER + ADR +DLG)−
(KRH +KENE +KLOE + UDHL+ UASI + UDV B + ULOL+ EKUD + SEUD)
where AUER is the value of work performed for one’s own purposes and capitalized as a part
of fixed assets, ADR represents other non-operating income (such as interest payments), DLG
measures inventories, KRH consists of purchases of raw materials, finished goods and packaging
(excluding electricity), KENE denotes energy purchases, KLOE represents labor costs, UDHL
measures rents, UASI represents losses on small inventories, UDVB denotes the costs of hiring
workers from other companies (such as temporary agency employment), ULOL measures leasing
11The hours variable that we use is called ajoloentimer.
12 http://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/dokumentation/Times/regnskabsstatistik-for-firmaer/
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costs, EKUD represents other external costs (a part from secondary costs), and SEUD measures
secondary costs.
From 2004 to 2012, the valued added is calculated as
(OMS + AUER + ADR +DLG)−
(KV V +KRHE +KENE +KLOE + UASI + UDHL+ UDV B + ULOL+ EKUD + SEUD)
where KVV is the purchase of goods for resale, while KRHE consists of purchases of raw
materials, finished goods and packaging (excluding electricity).
B.4 Total factor productivity
Total factor productivity (TFP) is obtained from a Cobb-Douglas production function:
yit = β0 + βl `it + βk kit + vit + εit (27)
where y is log value added, ` is the log number of full-time employees and k is the log of
physical capital in firm i at time t. We assume that the error component εit cannot be observed
or predicted by firms, while the productivity shock vit is assumed to follow a Markov process so
that p (vit+1 | Iit) = p (vit+1 | vit), where Iit - the information held by a firm at time t- includes
the realization of vi up to t (Olley and Pakes, 1996). This assumption implies that
vit = g(vit−1) + ξit (28)
where E [ξit | Iit] = 0 by construction. We assume that capital at t is a function of capital
and investments at t − 1: kit = κ (kit−1, iit−1), while labor is chosen after t − 1. Furthermore,
following Ackerberg et al. (2015) (henceforth ACF), we assume that labor is part of the demand
of intermediate inputs (mit):
mit = f(kit, vit, `it) (29)
As in other studies, we assume that f() is strictly increasing in vit so that
vit = f
−1(kit,mit, `it) (30)
and replacing this equation in (27), we have
yijt = β0 + βl `it + βk kit + f
−1(kit,mit, `it) + εit = Φit(kit, `it,mit) + εit (31)
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As in ACF we use the following moment condition to obtain an estimate of Φit (Φˆit) through
GMM:
E [εit | Iit] = E [yit − Φit(kit, `it,mit) | Iit] = 0 (32)
Then, we estimate β0, βl and βk through GMM from the following moment condition:
E [εit + ξit | Iit−1] =
E [yit − β0 − βl `it − βk kit − g (Φit(kit−1, `it−1,mit−1)− β0 − βl `it−1 − βk kit−1) | Iit−1] = 0
(33)
Finally, TFP is derived as
TFPit = Φˆit − βˆl `it − βˆkkit (34)
In practice, we proxy for f−1() using a 4th order polynomial function of k, `, m and a full set
of interactions among these terms, while g() is assumed to be a quadratic function of vit−1.
B.5 The Danish Tax System
Table D.20 reports all types of income relevant to the Danish tax system.13 The taxable income
(TI) is defined as the sum of personal income (PI) and capital income (CI) minus deductions
(D). Personal income is given by the sum of labor income (LI) and other sources of income,
such as transfers or grants. Table D.21 shows tax rates and tax bases in the years 2008-2011.
The tax system consists of a flat regional tax14, progressive national taxes, labor market and
EITC contributions. Income deriving from stocks (SI) is taxed following a separate progressive
schedule. The tax rates shown in the table are cumulative. This means, for instance, that the
tax rate for a taxpayer in the top tax bracket is the sum of the tax rates in the bottom, middle
and top tax brackets, along with the regional tax rate, the labor market contribution and the
EITC contribution rates. The sum of the tax rates, however, cannot exceed a marginal tax rate
ceiling. If it does, then the ceiling is binding.
As shown in Table D.21, several changes to the tax system occurred over the years consid-
13We base Table D.20 on Table 1 in Kleven and Schultz (2014). We update the table to reflect the tax code
relevant in the period that we analyze.
14The regional tax consists of a church, a municipality and a county tax. In the exposition that follows, we
show regional tax rates in the average municipality.
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ered. In 2009, the income cutoff of the middle and top tax brackets were equalized, while the
bottom tax rate slightly decreased. The changes were particularly beneficial to taxpayers in the
middle bracket, for whom the marginal tax rate ceiling was not binding and who had a tax base
wide enough to fully exploit the change in bottom tax rates. In the following year, the 2010
Tax Reform abolished the middle tax bracket and lowered the bottom tax rate from 5.04% to
3.67%. As an effect of those changes, the marginal tax rate ceiling was also lowered from 59%
to 51.5%. As a result, between 2008 and 2011, the marginal tax rate on labor income in the
top tax bracket decreased from 62.28% to 55.83%, while in the middle tax bracket, it decreased
from 45.06% to 37.78% (Figure 6). Finally, in the bottom tax bracket, the marginal tax rate
on labor income decreased from 39.54% to 37.78%. The same reform also introduced a 40,000
DKK deduction on capital income in the top bracket while increasing the income cutoff of the
top tax bracket. In fact, the lowest income amount to be considered in the top tax bracket
increased in nominal terms from 335,800 DKK to 389,900 DKK. This shift corresponds to an
increase of 9% in real terms, which further reduced the actual marginal tax rate faced by high
incomes.
C Appendix: additional results
C.1 AKM estimation: exogenous mobility and separability
We estimate equation (8) in the main paper using the methodology developed by Abowd et al.
(2002) to identify sets of connected firms. These sets consist of firms that have movers in
common. In the analysis that follows, we focus on the largest set of connected firms. Due
to the high mobility that characterizes the Danish labor market, the largest connected set
contains more than 99% of the workers and firms in the sample (Table D.11). The simultaneous
identification of the firm and the individual wage component requires setting to zero either one
firm fixed effect or one individual fixed effect. Thus, the firm effect ψj(i,t) has to be interpreted
as the proportional wage premium or discount paid by firm j to all employees.
The estimation of unbiased coefficients from equation (8) requires that the unobserved
component of the hourly wage rate rijt is mean independent of individual and firm fixed effects
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and time-varying characteristics:
E
(
rijt|Xijt, αi, ψj(i,t)
)
= 0 (35)
To gain a better understanding of condition (35), following Card et al. (2013) (henceforth CHK),
we assume that the error component rijt consists of 3 parts:
rijt = ηij(i,t) + ζit + εit (36)
ηij(i,t) is a match-specific component that captures an idiosyncratic wage premium (or discount)
earned by individual i at firm j. This component is assumed to have a mean zero for all i and
j. ζit is a unit root component meant to capture drifts in the portable component of the
individual’s earning power (e.g., health shocks, unobserved human capital accumulation, etc.).
This component is also assumed to have a zero mean. Finally, εit is a residual mean-reverting
component.
Under these assumptions, E (rijtαi) = 0 for all i and t. Furthermore, assuming that the
components of Xijt are exogenous (i.e., E (rijtXijt) = 0 ∀ i, t), then condition (35) holds if the
vector of firm fixed effects is exogenous to the error component (i.e., E
(
rijtψj(i,t)
)
= 0 ∀ i, t).
As shown in CHK, for this condition to hold, the assignment of workers to firms must obey a
strict exogeneity condition (i.e., the ”conditional exogenous mobility”).
Following CHK, we investigate the plausibility of the ”conditional exogenous mobility”
assumption by considering 3 cases in which the assumption is violated. First, we consider
the case of sorting based on the idiosyncratic employer-employee match component of wages
ηij(i,t). This type of sorting is problematic because workers are paid differently in each firm,
depending on the match component. Absent any match effect, the average wage gains and
losses from moving from high- to low-wage firms are expected to be symmetric. This is the case
for both males and females. The existence of match effects, however, will tend to offset the
losses associated with moving to a low-wage firm. In the extreme case, in which all transitions
were voluntary and selection was based only on the match component, movers will experience
no wage losses.
To check this possibility, we follow CHK and construct the mean of log coworkers’ wages
for each person in each year to obtain a distribution of coworkers’ wages in each year. Thus,
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we assign each worker to a quartile of the coworkers’ wages distribution in a year based on the
average log wage of his/her coworkers in that year. We then identify movers as workers who
move from one firm to another and who can be observed for two consecutive years in both the
sending firm and the receiving firm. Thus, we derive average wage rates of movers in the two
years before and after the move in each quartile of the coworkers’ wages distribution.15 Figure
D.3 shows the wage trends of movers from the 1st (i.e., low paying) or 4th (i.e., high paying)
quartile of the coworkers’ wage distribution. Similar to other studies, we find rather symmetric
wage losses and wage gains for workers moving from high- to low-paying firms, and vice versa.
This evidence is confirmed in Tables D.12 and D.13, which show the average log wage changes
associated with transitions from and to each quartile of the coworker wage distribution. We
also fail to find large changes in the wages of workers moving across firms in the same quartile
of the coworkers’ wage distribution. Overall, this evidence suggests that the sorting based on a
match component is likely to play a minor role in our setting.
A second case in which the exogenous conditional mobility is violated is when mobility is
related to the drifts in the expected wage a person can earn at all jobs (i.e., the shocks at the
unit root component of ζit). For instance, if a worker’s ability is revealed slowly over time and
if it is valued differently at different firms, workers who are more productive than expected will
experience rising wages at their initial employer and may be more likely to move to higher-
paying firms. The absence of any systematic trend in wages prior to a move for workers who
move to high- versus low-paying firms (Figure D.3) suggests that this type of mobility likely
plays a minor role in our setting.
Finally, a third problematic case might arise if mobility is related to the transitory fluctua-
tions in the unobserved component εit of wages. This is the case, for example, if workers leave
firms that experience negative shocks and join firms that experience positive shocks. This type
of correlation would imply systematic dips in the wage of leavers and unusual growth in the
wage of joiners, which we fail to find in our data (Figure D.3).
Related to the particular framework discussed in this paper, mobility might be attributable
to unobserved shocks to preferences over hours worked. An unexpected disease, for instance,
15Since our sample period ranges from 2003 to 2011, we focus on movers who moved in the years 2005-2009.
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might induce a worker to move to a lower-paying firm in exchange for a working schedule that
better fits the new desired hours. If this is the case, however, we would observe substantial
changes in hours worked by movers, particularly for workers moving from top- to bottom-paying
firms, and vice versa. Table D.14 shows the average percentage change in annual hours worked
by movers in the two years prior versus the two years after the job change. Hours worked by
movers are relatively stable across employers paying different wages. This is the case for males
and females, independent of whether they move between the top- and bottom-paying firms or
not.16 This finding suggests that unobserved shocks to preferences over hours play a minor role
in determining mobility in our sample. The sample that we consider, however, is composed
of full-time workers who move between firms in the private sector only. Therefore, we do not
consider movers from full-time to part-time work and from the private sector to the public
sector, for whom we might expect greater variation in hours (Arizo et al., 2016).
Overall, the evidence from this paragraph suggests that the matching between firms and
workers in our sample is based predominately on a combination of permanent firm and indi-
vidual characteristics. Other recent studies reach similar conclusions (e.g., Card et al., 2013;
Card et al., 2016; Song et al., 2016).
Equation (8) assumes additive separable firm and individual fixed effects. Systematic depar-
tures from this assumption would imply great residuals from (8). Following CHK, Figure D.4
plots mean residuals within cells defined by deciles of the estimated worker and firm effects.
Reassuringly, the mean residuals are uniformly low and never exceed 3.7%, with the largest
deviations appearing among the lowest deciles of the individual and firm effects. Therefore,
while for some workers and firms, we observe small deviations from the additivity assumption,
these appear unlikely to play a major role.
16The average wage changes by quartiles of the coworkers’ wage distribution in the sending firm never exceed
0.5%, which is equivalent to approximately 9 hours on a yearly basis.
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C.2 Validation of coordination measures using survey data
C.2.1 Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC)
The Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) collects, among other variables, information on a range of
generic skills required of individuals in their work. The survey covers approximately 166,000
adults aged 16-65 who were surveyed in the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium
(Flanders), Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, the
United Kingdom (England and Northern Ireland), the United States, Cyprus and the Russian
Federation. The data collection took place from August 1, 2011, to March 31, 2012, in most
participating countries.
In the analysis that follows, we exclude from PIAAC workers in the public sector, self-
employed workers and students. We focus on the following two characteristics of a job: Sharing
work-related information and Time cooperating with coworkers, both of which imply the co-
ordination of hours. These characteristics are measured on a discrete scale ranging from 1 to
5, where 1 means that the characteristic is not important and 5 means that it is extremely
important. In order to merge this information with the Danish Registers, we first take the
modal value of each characteristic within each 4-digit (ISCO-08) occupation and then merge
them to the registers using the same occupation code. We finally take the average value of
each characteristic within a firm as a measure of the importance of each characteristic. Figure
D.5 plots the standard deviation of hours across skill groups against the importance of these
characteristics in each firm-year of our sample. We find a strong and negative correlation of the
standard deviation with both job characteristics that is consistent with the evidence presented
in section 4.3.1. That is, in firms in which these characteristics are more important, hours
coordination is also high.
C.2.2 Measures of coordination in time use survey data
The time use survey was conducted in 2001 and 2008 by the Danish National Institute of Social
Research. Industry information, however, is available only in the 2001 survey, and for this
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reason, in the following analysis, we use only 2001 data. The data collection consists of a ques-
tionnaire interview that collects information on demographic and labor market characteristics
and two diaries; one diary is for a weekday, while the other is for a weekend day. Each diary
is divided into 10-minute intervals and stretches from 4am to 4am the following day. In each
interval, the respondent must note i) what he/she did (the primary activity) and ii) where
he/she was. The survey includes a representative sample of approximately 3,000 individuals.
We restrict our analysis to full-time employees (>26 weekly hours) in the private sector or
approximately 750 observations.17
Based on this specification, we construct a coordination index as follows: we group workers
into two educational groups, the tertiary educated and all others. For each educational group
and in each sector and hour of the day, we compute the share of workers who are at work
relative to the total number of workers in that educational group:
Shareehs =
Nehs
Nes
(37)
where e indicates either tertiary educated (t) or other workers (o); h is hour of the day, which
ranges from 4am to 4am the following day; while s indicates sector. Due to the limited number
of observations in the survey, we use a 1-digit sector classification analogous to the one used in
Table D.4. The coordination index in a sector is defined as the correlation between the share
of tertiary educated and other workers across the 24 hours of the day:
Coordination indexs = correlation (Shareths , Shareohs) (38)
High correlation between the share of differently educated workers throughout the day can be
interpreted as signaling high coordination.
Table D.15 shows the coordination index in each sector. In line with Table D.4, the index
is extremely high in some of the service industries, such as utilities, trade and the financial
sector, while it takes relatively low values in agriculture and construction. In line with Table
D.15, the index is higher in manufacturing than in construction and agriculture but lower than
in most of the service sectors. Differently from Table D.4, the residual sector (i.e., ”Public
17The variable that identifies workers in the private sector is missing for 1,073 observations out of 3,000. We
also exclude from the analysis self-employed workers, students and workers whose industry of employment is
missing.
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administration, education, health and arts”) shows a lower index relative to the other services.
In our final sample, however, only 29 firms out of more than 8,000 are part of this sector.
C.2.3 Coordination and regular work schedule
Following the same procedure as in Section 4.3.1, we use O*NET to derive a measure of the
importance of a regular work schedule at the firm level. In Figure D.6, we plot this measure
against our measure of coordination. The figure shows that greater coordination is associated
with a lower importance of having a regular work schedule, thus suggesting that our measure
is not driven merely by the use of traditional work arrangements (i.e., 9am to 5pm jobs).
C.3 Coordination and wage differentials: additional robustness
checks
Hours worked might be measured with errors, which might bias the estimated correlation be-
tween coordination and wage premiums. To obtain a sense of the size and the direction of
this bias, in column 1 of Table D.16, we use the average importance of the Contact, Teamwork
and Communication in a firm (see Section 4.3) as an instrument for the standard deviation of
hours in equation (7). To the extent that the importance of these factors is correlated with the
coordination of hours, this IV approach allows us to better separate the coordination compo-
nent from the measurement error in σj. The coefficient from this specification is negative and
greater in magnitude than that in the baseline model, which suggests that measurement errors
generate attenuation bias and that the division bias (Borjas, 1980) is unlikely to play a major
role in our setting.18
Column 2 of Table D.16 shows the results obtained while using the median absolute deviation
from the median hours (MAD) as an alternative measure of coordination. This measure is
less sensitive to outliers. The magnitude of the standardized coefficients in this specification
increases, suggesting that, if anything, outliers might drive down the correlation between wages
and coordination.
18If the first and second moments of the distributions of the errors and the actual hours are uncorrelated,
then measurement error can be shown to generate downward-biased estimates.
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Van Reenen (1996) finds that innovation in a firm causes higher wages. While we cannot
directly measure innovation, if we control for the stock of immaterial assets in a firm, we find
that the coefficient on coordination is barely affected (column 3). Moreover, coordination may
be expected to be more important among workers of the same plant. In fact, when we restrict
the analysis to single-plant firms (80% of the sample), we find the coefficient to be greater in
magnitude than in the baseline (column 4). In the last column (5) of Table D.16, we control for
the number of skill groups in a firm as a way to remove any spurious correlation between high
dispersion in hours and the skill diversity of the workforce in a firm. The results are robust to
this control.
In the baseline specification, we focus only on the firms in which attrition in hours worked
is low (i.e., less than 5% of the workforce in a year). Columns 1 and 2 in Table D.17 report
the coefficients estimated when we consider all firms in the largest set of connected firms.
The coefficient is negative and significant, and the coordination share within 3-digit industries
(column 2) is similar to that estimated in the baseline model.
In the baseline version of equation (8) of the main paper, we control for firm time-varying
characteristics to isolate the firm fixed effects from capturing temporary fluctuations in wages
due to firm-specific shocks.19 As a robustness check in columns 3 and 4 of Table D.17, we
show the results obtained from estimating equation (8) with a parsimonious specification in
which we include only workers’ time-varying controls.20 The coefficients of these regressions are
still negative and significant, even if less precisely estimated possibly because the temporary
variations in wages add some noise to the firm fixed effects in this specification.
Finally, in order to check whether the correlation we find is driven by other period-specific
factors, we divide the overall sample period into 3 sub-periods (2003-2005, 2006-2018 and 2009-
2011). Then, we estimate equation (8) separately for each of these shorter panels to obtain the
firm component of the wages specific to a sub-period (ψsj(i,t)). In the second step, we then relate
19The time-varying characteristics that we use are value added, sales per employee, exporter status and the
share of salaried workers
20These controls are a set of interactions between year dummies and educational attainments and interaction
terms between quadratic and cubic terms in age and educational attainments.
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ψsj(i,t) to coordination in that sub-period σ
s
j , a set of controls and sub-period fixed effects γ
s.
ψ̂sj(i,t) = δ0 + δ1 σ
s
j + δ2 Z¯
s
j + γ
s + vsj (39)
While the fixed effects allow us to control for factors specific to a sub-period, this panel re-
gression is based on firm fixed effects (ψsj(i,t)) estimated for shorter panels and thus for a lower
number of movers, which might be reflected in less accurate estimates. With these caveats in
mind, column 5 in Table D.17 shows δ1 estimated from equation (39). The coefficient remains
negative and significant but less precisely estimated, as expected.210
C.4 Additional robustness checks on the coordination of the labor
supply and tax changes
Table D.23 shows the labor supply elasticity of normal hours in the residual group, obtained
through the same empirical model used for high-skilled workers (equation (10)). Independently
of the specific controls for base-year income, the elasticity remains positive, close to zero and
insignificant (columns 2 to 5). At the point estimate, however, the elasticity is twice as large
among workers who are in the bottom half of the income distribution within the residual group.
These workers are also more distant from the top tax bracket, which is suggestive of weaker
responses among workers who are more likely to end up in the top bracket by increasing their
hours.
In columns 1 and 2 of Table D.24, we examine the labor supply response of high-skilled
women with children and of high-skilled workers in the top 10% of the income distribution
in 2008. In line with other recent studies, we find stronger responses among women and top
incomes. Differently from high-skilled males, women show a positive elasticity. The type of
specification that we use assumes away bunching at the kink points. With significant bunching,
however, bias may be created. Thus, in column 3, we exclude workers at the major kink
points of the tax schedule. The estimated elasticity is extremely robust to this specification.
Finally, in column 4, we estimate the effect of the reform on labor income rather than hours.
In order to compare our results with those of other studies, we estimate this specification for
21The lower precision, however, is likely due to outliers because when we use the median absolute deviation
of hours as a measure of coordination, the coefficient is much more precisely estimated (column 6)
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all wage earners. In line with Kleven and Schultz (2014), we estimate a positive and small
(0.03) elasticity of labor income, which suggests that the negative elasticity of hours that we
find might be linked to the specific sample for which data on hours are available.
For the reasons discussed in Section 5.5, the instrumental variables that we use depend on
income at time t. This can be problematic due to mean reversion or to the existence of other
trends that unevenly affect the labor supply of workers across the distribution of income at the
same time as the tax reform. In columns 3 to 7 of Table 4, we control for pre-reform income
using piece-wise splines of income at t−1 and the log change of income between time t−1 and t
(similar to Kopczuk, 2005). We select this specification based on the strength of the first stage.
However, to check whether the baseline results are sensitive to controls of base-year income, in
Table D.25, we estimate equation (10) in the main paper by controlling for pre-reform income
in a number of flexible ways. In columns 1 and 2, we control for 5-piece splines of income at
time t (similar to Gruber and Saez, 2002), while in columns 3 and 4, we control for a 5th-order
polynomial function of income at time t and an indicator function for positive base-year income
(as in Dahl and Lochner, 2012). Finally, in columns 5 and 6, we include 5-piece splines of
income at t − 1 and the change of income between t − 1 and t (similar to Kopczuk, 2005).22
The results from these alternative specifications are very much in line with the baseline ones.
In particular, the labor supply in low-coordination firms is significantly more elastic than that
in firms with a high degree of coordination in all the specifications. The magnitude of the
elasticity in low-coordination firms is close to that estimated in the baseline regressions, and it
ranges from -0.07 to -0.1, depending on the specification.
In Table D.26, we perform a similar set of robustness checks on the spillover effects estimated
through equation (11) of the main paper. In these specifications, we control for base-year income
(column 1), 5-piece splines of income at t (column 2), and a 5th-order polynomial function of
income at time t (column 3). The coefficient on ∆log hH remains significant, positive and of
comparable magnitude to the baseline results.
The significance and magnitude of the spillovers that we find is robust to the inclusion of
22Gruber and Saez (2002) use 10-piece splines, while we use 5-piece splines of the base year income. Since we
focus on a limited sample of the Danish population and since we exploit only one tax reform, we do not have
enough power to estimate more than 5-piece splines of income.
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firm and base-year fixed effects that capture the unobserved characteristics of a firm or of the
time period over which the reform occurred (columns 1 and 2 in Table D.27). The coefficient
capturing the spillovers is of greater magnitude, but less precisely estimated, when we condition
it on the effects of being in a firm with a share of unionized workers above the median (column 3
in Table D.27). This result suggests that spillovers are not driven by differences in unionization.
The spillovers remain of similar magnitude and significance when we control for the average
change in hours among coworkers in the residual group. In addition, consistent with the fact
that hours in the residual group are unaffected by the reform, we do not find significant spillovers
from this group on low-skilled coworkers (column 4 of Table D.27).
In columns 1 to 4 in Table D.28, we present the results obtained from using the alternative
measure of coordination described in Section 4.3, where skill groups are defined from the in-
tersection of education (primary, secondary and tertiary) and occupation (blue collar, middle
and top manager) groups. In columns 1 and 2, we estimate equation (10) from Section 5.3
on workers in high- and low-coordination firms. As in the baseline model, the labor supply in
low-coordination firms remains significantly more elastic, and the magnitude of the coefficients
is close to the baseline. Columns 3 and 4 show the results obtained from estimating equation
(11) in Section 5.4 for workers in low-coordination firms. In column 3, we focus on normal
hours of work, while in column 4, we consider total hours inclusive of overtime. The spillovers
remain significant and of similar magnitude to those estimated in the baseline model.
In columns 5 and 6 in Table D.28, we estimate equation (10) of the main paper using data
on hours worked from E-indkomst (called ”BFL hours” in the tables). This database is an
alternative source of administrative data on hours worked for the years 2008-2011 only (see
Appendix B.2). We restrict the analysis to the workers included in the baseline specification,
which can be matched to E-indkomst. As in the baseline regressions, we do not find significant
effects on the elasticity of hours of high-skilled workers in high-coordination firms. The elas-
ticity in low-coordination firms remains significant and of similar magnitude as in the baseline
regressions. In column 7, we estimate the spillovers from equation (11) of the main paper using
data on hours from E-indkomst. The spillovers remain significant and of a magnitude compa-
rable with that of the baseline specification. However, these results must be interpreted with
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caution because some of the first-stage regressions lack power (i.e., F-stat lower than 2).
C.5 Income and uncompensated elasticity to tax changes
In the specifications that we discuss in the paper, the labor supply elasticity is inclusive of the
income effect. In the robustness section, we also present separate estimates of the income effects
for both high- and low-skilled workers. To estimate the income effects, we follow the standard
model used in the taxable income literature, and we modify equation (10) and equation (11) of
the main paper in the following way:
log
(
hHijt+3
hHijt
)
= θ0 + θ1 log
(
1− τHit+3
1− τHit
)
+ θ2 log
(
vyHit+3
vyHit
)
+ θ3Xijt + υijt (40)
log
(
hLijt+3
hLijt
)
= µ0 +µ1 log
(
hHjt+3
hHjt
)
+µ2 log
(
1− τLit+3
1− τLit
)
+µ3 log
(
vyLit+3
vyLit
)
+µ4Xijt + ijt (41)
In these models, the terms log(vyLit+3 / vy
L
it) and log(vy
H
it+3 / vy
H
it ) indicate the changes in virtual
income of low- and high-skilled workers, respectively, between time t and t + 3. Due to the
same endogeneity problems that we discussed in Section 5.5, we estimate these specifications
using mechanical changes of the virtual incomes and net-of-tax rates as instruments for the
observed changes in these variables. Mechanical changes of the virtual income are obtained
from simulating the post-reform virtual income while assuming that the real income remained
constant between t and t+ 3 as described (Section 5.5).
Following Kleven and Schultz (2014), we define virtual income as τzLAB +
∑N
n=1 t
nzn −
T (zLAB, z1, ..zN), where T() indicates total tax liabilities, τ is the marginal tax rate on labor
income (zLAB), and t
n is the marginal tax rate on the nth component of income zn. This
characterization is a generalization of the standard definition of virtual income to a situation
with multiple income components. It differs from the definition used in some of the existing
studies (e.g., Gruber and Saez, 2002) where virtual income is defined as after-tax income. Based
on this, the coefficients θ1 and µ2 measure the uncompensated elasticity of hours worked to the
marginal net-of-tax rates. θ2 and µ3 measure the elasticity of hours with respect to virtual
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income (see Section A.6).23
In columns 1 and 2 of Table D.29, we estimate equation (40) in high- and low-coordination
firms, respectively. Unfortunately, due to the fact that our identifying variation is based on
one tax reform only, we miss the power to estimate the income effect and the uncompensated
elasticity separately. Even if they are imprecisely estimated, the point estimates show a sub-
stantial difference in both the income and the uncompensated elasticity between firms at high
versus low degrees of coordination. In fact, in line with the baseline results, the uncompensated
elasticity and the income effects are greater in magnitude in low-coordination firms. In the last
column of Table D.26, we show the spillover effects obtained from estimating equation (41). In
this specification, we use the mechanical change in the virtual income of low-skilled workers as
an instrument for the observed change in virtual income. In the first-stage regressions, we also
use the average virtual income of high-skilled coworkers as an additional instrument. Adding
these additional controls does not have sizable effects on the estimated spillovers, which remain
significant and of similar magnitude as in the baseline model.
C.6 The effect of the 2010 tax reform on firm characteristics
We investigate the effects of the tax reform on firm characteristics using the following regression
model:
log
(
yjt+3
yjt
)
= γ0 + γ1 log
(
1− τHjt+3
1− τHjt
)
+ γ2 Zjt + εjt (42)
We estimate this model considering 4 different y variables: firm size, the share of high-skilled
workers, the share of low-skilled workers in a firm and the amount of physical capital. The
regressor of interest in this model is
log
(
1− τHjt+3
1− τHjt+3
)
= log
[
H−1jt+3
∑
i∈ Hjt+3 ( 1− τijt+3 )
H−1jt
∑
i∈ Hjt (1− τijt+3)
]
(43)
23Other studies in this literature use the after-tax income rather than virtual income in estimating similar
types of regressions (e.g., Gruber and Saez, 2002). In these studies, the analogue of θ1 or µ2 in our specification
measure the compensated elasticity of hours. In our specification, θ1 and µ2 can be combined to θ2 and µ3,
respectively, using the Slutsky equation to obtain the compensated elasticity (Section A.6).
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This equation measures the log change of the average net-of-tax-rate on labor income faced by
high-skilled workers in a firm. We see this as a proxy of the intensity of the effect of the tax
reform on firm j. For reasons similar to those discussed in Section 5.5, we use the mechanical
change log
(
1− τHMjt+3
)
−log
(
1− τHjt
)
defined in equation (13) as an instrument for the actual
change defined in equation (43). Zjt is a vector of firm characteristics measured in the base
year.
Table D.30 shows the results from this model. The coefficient of interest in these specifica-
tions is the one attached to the variable ∆log (1− τH) that corresponds to γ1 in equation (42).
Each column of the table reports the effects on a different outcome variable y. In column 1, the
outcome variable is the log change in firm size, in columns 2 and 3, we analyze the effects on
the log change of the share of high-skilled workers and the share of low-skilled workers in a firm,
respectively. Finally, in column 4, we look at the effects on the amount of physical capital in
a firm. The coefficient γ1 estimated in all these specifications remains small and insignificant,
consistent with the fact that firms did not change their production technologies as an effect of
the reform.
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D Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures
D.1 Additional graphs and tables
Figure D.1: Variance of vacation hours: between and within firm component
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Source: 2003-2010 Danish Administrative Data
Note: Vacation hours of full time workers (>26 weekly hours)
Notes: The figure shows the decomposition of the variance in vacation hours in between and within firm components (footnote 5) in the main paper.
We consider total vacation hours of full-time workers (> 26 weekly hours). The first bar refers to vacation hours of hourly workers, the second one to
salaried workers. Data on hours of vacation are available between 2003 and 2010.
Figure D.2: The Danish tax schedule
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Notes: The figure plots the marginal tax rate on labor income over taxable income in 1000 DKK (5 DKK ' 1 USD). Taxable income is in nominal
terms. The solid line plots the tax schedule prior to the tax reform (2008). The dashed line plots the tax schedule after the tax reform (2011). The
figure is based on Table D.21. Marginal tax rates on labor income in the bottom and middle brackets are obtained as follows: Statutory Marginal Tax
rate * (1 - Labor Market contribution) + Labor Market contribution - EITC; in the top bracket, they are obtained as Marginal Tax Ceiling*(1 - Labor
Market contribution) + Labor Market contribution.
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Figure D.3: Wage dynamics of movers
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Figure D.4: Mean residuals by person-establishment deciles
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Notes: The figure shows the mean residuals from estimated AKM with cells defined by decile of estimated firm effect, interacted with decile of the
estimated person effect.
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Figure D.5: PIAAC validation exercise coordination
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Note: Classification of the variable ”sharing work related information”: 1-Never, 2-Less than once a month, 3-Less than once a week but at least once
a month, 4-At least once a week but not every day, 5-Every day. Classification of the variable ”time cooperating with coworkers”: 1-None of the time,
2-Up to a quarter of the time, 3- Up to half of the time, 4-More than half of the time, 5-All of the time. We group firms in 20 equally sized bins based
on the variable on the x-axis.
Figure D.6: Coordination and regular work schedule job from O*NET
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Notes: The figure shows the standard deviation of hours across skill groups within firms on the y-axis (Section 4.3 of the main paper) and the importance
of a regular work schedule in that firm, based on O*Net, on the x-axis. This variable measures the importance of a regular work schedule on a scale that
ranges between 0 and 100 for each SOC occupation. We map the SOC classification in O*Net with the ISCO-88 classification of the Danish registers
using the crosswalk provided by the National Crosswalk Center. For each firm, we then compute the median importance of a regular work schedule
among workers. We break ties in median scores using the average. In the graph, firms are grouped into 20 bins, which each one containing the same
number of firms. We plot mean values within each bin. At the bottom of each graph, we show the coefficient and the associated t-stat from a regression
of the y variable in the graph on the x variable.
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Table D.1: ATP contributions and hours worked (2008-2015)
Contributions paid by workers (in DKK) Contributions paid by employers (in DKK) Total contributions
Montly paid workers
(Working hours per month) Monthly Contribution Monthly Contribution Monthly Contribution
At least 117 90 180 270
Between 78 and less than 117 60 120 180
Between 39 and less than 78 30 60 90
Less than 39 0 0 0
Forthrightly paid workers
(Working hours per fortnight) Forthrightly contributions Forthrightly contributions Forthrightly contributions
At least 54 47.4 94.8 142.2
Between 36 and less than 54 31.6 63.2 94.8
Between 18 and less than 36 31.6 15.8 47.4
Less than 18 0 0 0
Weekly paid workers
(Working hours per week) Weekly contributions Weekly contributions Weekly contributions
At least 27 23.7 47.4 71.1
Between 18 and less than 27 15.8 31.6 47.4
Between 9 and less than 18 7.9 15.8 23.7
Less than 9 0 0 0
Casual workers Hourly contributions Hourly contributions Hourly contributions
0.64 1.28 1.92
Notes: Causal workers are those whose pay does not occur at any of the other frequencies.
Table D.2: Steps of the data preparation
Obs. Workers Firms Obs. Workers Firms
share tot. share tot. share tot.
1. Entire Population 22,379,298 3,518,236 266,196 100 100 100
2. Lønstatistikken sample 12,130,358 2,649,618 39,778 54.20 75.31 14.94
3. Firms administrative data sample 5,211,149 1,485,789 29,957 23.29 42.23 11.25
4. Keep firms with more than 2 workers 5,209,536 1,485,478 29,576 23.28 42.22 11.11
5. Keep full time workers only 4,476,222 1,207,580 29,116 20.00 34.32 10.94
6. Drop Outliers in hours and income 4,466,676 1,205,301 29,111 19.96 34.26 10.94
7. Keep firms with less than 5% of obs. missing 787,683 400,653 8,293 3.52 11.39 3.12
Notes: Workers younger than 15 and older than 65 are excluded from the entire population.
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Table D.3: Desired hours by skill groups
Skills Definion 1 Average desired weekly hours Obs.
skill ≤ 10th percentile 37.34 465
10th percentile< skill < 20th percentile 36.78 462
20th percentile< skill < 30th percentile 37.69 463
30th percentile< skill ≤40th percentile 37.72 461
40th percentile< skill ≤ 50th percentile 38.55 461
50th percentile< skill ≤ 60th percentile 38.33 463
60th percentile< skill ≤ 70th percentile 38.48 463
70th percentile< skill ≤ 80th percentile 39.33 461
80th percentile< skill ≤ 90th percentile 38.79 462
skill > 90th percentile 40.42 461
Skills Definition 2 Average desired weekly hours
Primary education, blue collar 37.67 963
Secondary education, blue collar 37.73 1,512
Tertiary education, blue collar 38.31 106
Primary education, middle manager 38.39 245
Secondary education, middle manager 38.25 852
Tertiary education, middle manager 39.17 693
Primary education, manager 41.55 43
Secondary education, manager 41.72 113
Tertiary education, manager 43.97 96
Notes: Information on desired hours is obtained from the 2008-2010 Danish labor force survey data. We focus on workers whose ref-
erence week is in November to better match information in the Labor Force Survey to registers data. Skills Definition 1 refers to
skill groups defined as deciles of the distribution of αˆi + βˆ Xijt from equation (8) (AKM regression). AKM regressions are estimated
on the years 2008-2010. Skills definition 2 refers to skill groups defined at the intersection of occupational and educational category.
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Table D.4: Coordination by sector
Stand. Dev. Of Total Hours Unionization
rate
Coordination by Industry (2003-2011)
Mean Std. Dev.
Agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining and quarrying 118.69 90.47 0.71
Manufacturing 104.08 86.92 0.77
Constructions 140.70 104.12 0.72
Utilities,Trade and Transport
76.04 88.49 0.64
Financial and insurance, Real estate, Other business services 84.72 84.09 0.63
Other services 65.20 57.37 0.71
Overall sectors 95.59 94.00 0.68
Observations 8182
Notes: The first 2 columns of the table show the mean and standard deviation of our measure of coordination (i.e., the standard deviation of hours
across skill groups from Section 4.3) in each of the 6 major sectors of the Danish economy. The last column shows the average share of workers
unionized in each sector. For each firm in the sample (8182 total) and in each year (2003-2011), we compute the share of workers unionized and
the standard deviation of hours across skill groups within that firm-year. Then, we take the average (and standard deviations) within each sector.
Table D.5: Wage differentials from hours coordination: Lavetti and Schmutte (2016) approach
(1) (2)
OME TWFE
Dependent Variable Log Wage - βˆ X Log Wage
Stand. Dev. Def. 2 -0.052*** -0.050***
(0.009) (0.010)
R-squared 0.911 0.684
Obs. 664632 664632
Notes: Following Lavetti and Schmutte (2016), column 1 reports the effects from an orthogonal match effect model (OME) obtained from a two-step
procedure. In the first step, we estimate the following regression: lnwit = β1Xit + β2 σjt + Φij(i,t) + it, where σjt (labeled as ”Stand. Dev.
Def. 2”) is the measure of coordination described in Section 4.3, and skills are defined as the intersection of education and occupation groups (defini-
tion 2) so that they do not depend on the estimates from the AKM model. Φij(i,t) is the match effect between individual i and firm j, and Xit in-
cludes the following set of controls: year dummies interacted with education dummies, quadratic and cubic terms in age interacted with education dum-
mies, VA per employee, capital per employee, sales per employee, exporter status, and the fraction of salaried workers. The second step consists of es-
timating the following regression: Pit = αi + λt + γome σjt + ψj(i,t) + rit where Pit = lnwijt − βˆ1Xit, αi is an individual fixed effect, λt
is a year fixed effect, and Ψj(i,t) is a firm fixed effect. Column 1 in the table reports the coefficient γˆome estimated from the second step regression
that captures the wage differentials from hours coordination. In column 2, we estimate a two-way fixed effects model (TWFE) of the following type:
lnwit = αi + γtwfe σjt + ψj(i,t) + β1Xit + ξit where the notation is the same as in the OME model above. Column 2 in the table reports γˆtwfe.
The table shows standardized coefficients that are therefore comparable to those of Table 2. Standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit industry level.
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Table D.6: Elasticity of high-skilled hours: salaried and hourly workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High Coord. Low Coord. High Coord. Low Coord. High Coord. Low Coord.
Dependent variable ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH
∆log (1− τH) -0.012 -0.026 -0.004 0.002 -0.058 -0.045
(0.017) (0.031) (0.013) (0.032) (0.051) (0.051)
Log base-year income -0.001 -0.010 -0.001 -0.007 -0.016 -0.116***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.019) (0.030)
Salaried work. only YES YES YES YES NO NO
Hourly workers only NO NO NO NO YES YES
IV YES YES YES YES YES YES
Overtime Hours YES YES NO NO YES YES
Mean Hours 1937.70 1965.55 1913.64 1928.79 1833.02 1813.96
Pvalue High = Low 0.69 0.87 0.87
F-stat Excl. Inst. 1132.07 98.27 1132.07 98.27 141.89 139.60
P-value Excl. Inst. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N Firms 576 522 576 522 93 349
N 17183 5059 17183 5059 1685 2548
Notes: Each regression contains the following controls measured in the base year: work experience, work experience squared, sex, age,
number of children, marital status, education, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed effects, firm size, exporter status, share
of high- and low-skilled workers in the firm (the residual group is omitted). Observations are weighted by labor income. The ta-
ble report Angrist-Pischke F-stats and P-values relative to the variable ∆log (1 − τH ). First-stage regressions are available from
the authors upon request. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table D.7: Elasticity of high-skilled hours: difference in difference
(1) (2)
Log Hours Log Hours
High Sk. × Post -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003)
High Skilled 0.052*** 0.048***
(0.003) (0.003)
Post 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.003) (0.003)
Individual Controls NO YES
N Firms 1518 1518
N 156591 156591
Notes: The regressions are based on data for the 2008-2011 period. The variable Post is a dummy that takes a value of 1 in the post tax-
reform years of 2010 and 2011. The treatment group consists of high-skilled workers, while the control group is composed of low-skilled workers,
both of which are defined in section 5.1. The specification in column 2 includes the following controls averaged over the pre-reform year (2008-
2009): work experience, work experience squared, age, and the number of children. Column 2 also includes as controls the modal value over the
pre-tax reform period of the following dummy variables: gender; marital status; and primary, secondary and tertiary education. We consider to-
tal hours worked (regular and overtime). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.8: The spillover effects on low-skilled hours: salaried and hourly workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Coord. Low Coord.
∆log hL ∆log hL ∆log hL ∆log hL
∆log hH 0.779* 0.655 0.047 -0.055
(0.464) (0.568) (0.685) (0.584)
∆log (1− τL) -0.194 -0.101 0.240* 0.150
(0.172) (0.174) (0.134) (0.154)
Hourly workers only YES YES NO NO
Salaried work. only NO NO YES YES
IV YES YES YES YES
Overtime Hours NO NO NO NO
Mean Hours Low Sk. 1700.72 1668.11 1889.59 1882.18
Mean Hours High Sk. 1840.16 1832.65 1899.04 1872.92
N Firms 380 315 826 355
N 4117 2684 5966 1410
Notes: This table reports the results from estimating equation (11) of the main paper separately for salaried and hourly workers. Each regression con-
tains the following controls measured in the base year: work experience, work experience squared, sex, age, number of children, marital status, educa-
tion, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed effects, firm size, exporter status, share of high- and low-skilled workers in the firm and 5 com-
ponent splines of income at t-1 and income change between t-1 and t. Low-coordination firms (columns 2 and 4) are defined as being in the top
half of the distribution of the standard deviation of hours across skill groups in 2008. First-stage results are available from the authors upon re-
quest. Observations are weighted by labor income. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.9: Spillovers and peer effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline 5 percent Remaining Occupations Remaining
Specification most repetitive Occupations with low Occupations
occupations learning content
Dependent Variable ∆log hL ∆log hL ∆log hL ∆log hL ∆log hL ∆log hL
∆log hH 0.878*** -0.697 0.867*** 0.362 0.866***
(0.301) (3.897) (0.299) (0.987) (0.302)
∆log hHsame occupation 0.384
(0.664)
∆log hHdifferent occupation 0.874
(1.416)
IV YES YES YES YES YES YES
Splines of log t− 1 Inc.
and ∆log inc. t− 1− t YES YES YES YES YES YES
Overtime Hours NO NO NO NO NO NO
F-stat Excl. Inst. 2.40, 1.77 0.28 14.91 2.67 14.13
P-value Excl. Inst. 0.12, 0.18 0.6 0.00 0.11 0.00
Mean Hours Low Sk. 1812.51 1807.17 1758.18 1814.89 1855.84 1811.87
Mean Hours High Sk. 1875.00 1869.94 1841.98 1876.44 1877.18 1874.97
N Firms 968 723 101 958 66 962
N 10091 8001 422 9669 148 9943
Notes: This table reports the results from estimating equation (11) in the main paper. It shows the elasticity of low-skilled hours to the average hours worked
by high-skilled coworkers. The specification in column 2 separates between the elasticity to the average hours worked by high-skilled coworkers in the same 3-
digit occupation and the elasticity to the average hours worked by high-skilled coworkers in different occupations. In columns 3 and 4. we estimate the elasticity
separately for workers in the 5% most repetitive occupations and for workers in other occupations. In columns 5 and 6, we estimate the elasticity separately
for workers in occupations with low learning content and for workers in other occupations. A complete list of the 5% most repetitive occupations and of the oc-
cupations with low learning content can be found in the appendix Table F.3 of Cornelissen et al. (2017). We use mechanical changes of the average net-of-tax
rate among high-skilled workers in a firm as an instrument for the average change in hours. We also control for changes in marginal net-of-tax rate of low-
skilled workers ∆log (1− τL), and we use the mechanical change in the net-of-tax rate of low-skilled workers as an instrument for observed changes of 1-τL
(Section 5.5). First-stage results are available on request. Each regression contains the following controls measured in the base year (2008): work experience,
work experience squared, sex, age, number of children, marital status, education, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed effects, firm size, exporter
status, and the shares of high and low-skilled workers in the firm (the residual group is omitted). ”Splines” refer to a flexible piecewise linear functional form
with 5 components. We consider only low-skilled workers who are at the same firm between 2008 and 2011. We estimate this regression on changes between
2008 and 2011. Observations are weighted by labor income. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.10: The spillover effects on the hourly wages of low-skilled workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low Coord. Low Coord.
∆log wL ∆log wL ∆log wL ∆log wL ∆log wL ∆log wL
∆log hHnormal -0.248 -1.528 -1.019 -0.497
(0.217) (1.228) (1.125) (0.958)
∆log hHtotal -1.556 -0.557
(1.972) (1.086)
∆log (1− τL) -0.504*** 1.322*** 0.606 0.400 0.618 0.417
(0.060) (0.350) (0.499) (0.444) (0.511) (0.442)
IV NO YES YES YES YES YES
Region F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Splines of log t− 1 Inc.
and ∆log inc. t− 1− t NO NO YES YES YES YES
Overtime Hours NO NO NO NO YES YES
F-stat Excl. Instr. 12.65, 163.45 14.94, 77.89 11.34, 48.34 3.97, 77.72 7.46, 51.25
P-value Excl. Instr. 0.00, 0.00 0.00, 0.00 0.00, 0.00 0.05, 0.00 0.01, 0.00
Mean Hours Low Sk. 1812.88 1812.88 1812.88 1742.40 1831.72 1763.13
Mean Hours High Sk. 1875.10 1875.10 1875.10 1846.59 1910.16 1882.25
N Firms 967.00 967.00 967.00 484.00 967.00 484.00
N 10043 10043 10043 4066 10043 4066
Notes: This table reports the results of estimating a model equivalent to equation (11) and using changes in wages rather than changes in hours as the
dependent variable. It shows the elasticity of low-skilled wages to the average hours worked by high-skilled coworkers. We consider both regular (normal)
hours (columns 1 to 5) and total (regular and overtime) hours (columns 6 and 7) worked by high-skilled workers. Specifications in columns 2 to 7 use
mechanical changes in the average net-of-tax rate among high-skilled workers in a firm as an instrument for the average change in hours and the me-
chanical change in the net-of-tax rate of low-skilled workers as an instrument for observed changes of 1-τL (Section 5.5). First-stage results are available
from the authors on request. Low-coordination firms (columns 5 and 7) are defined as being in the top half of the distribution of the standard deviation
of hours across skill groups in 2008. Each regression contains the following controls measured in the base year: work experience, work experience squared,
sex, age, number of children, marital status, education, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed effects, firm size, exporter status, and the shares
of high- and low-skilled workers in the firm (the residual group is omitted). ”Splines” refer to a flexible piecewise linear functional form with 5 compo-
nents. We consider only low-skilled workers who are at the same firm between 2008 and 2011. We estimate this regression on changes between 2008
and 2011. Observations are weighted by labor income. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.11: Summary statistics of the AKM regression
All Sample Largest group
of connected firms
Person and estabilishment parameters
Number of person effects 1205295 1195884
Number of firm effects 26227 26121
Summary of parameters estimates
Std. dev. of person effects 0.962 0.960
Std. dev. of firm effects 0.141 0.137
Std. dev. Of Xb 0.829 0.828
Adjusted R-squared 0.913
Std. dev. of log wages 0.451 0.450
Number of person-year observations 4466655 4445484
Notes: Controls in first step (AKM) regressions: year dummies interacted with education dummies, quadratic and cubic terms in age inter-
acted with education dummies, VA per employee, capital per employee, sales per employee, exporter status, and the fraction of salaried workers.
Table D.12: Mobility and wage changes: males
Log wages of movers (mean) Log wage change
Origin to destination quartile Number of moves 2 years before 2 years after Raw Adjusted
1 to 1 2895 5.14 5.25 0.11 0.00
1 to 2 1515 5.16 5.28 0.12 0.03
1 to 3 965 5.21 5.36 0.15 0.05
1 to 4 500 5.29 5.48 0.19 0.09
2 to 1 960 5.22 5.25 0.03 -0.06
2 to 2 2443 5.29 5.35 0.06 -0.02
2 to 3 1824 5.33 5.43 0.10 0.02
2 to 4 925 5.39 5.51 0.13 0.04
3 to 1 612 5.37 5.37 0.00 -0.07
3 to 2 2110 5.39 5.43 0.05 -0.03
3 to 3 6217 5.40 5.46 0.06 0.00
3 to 4 2120 5.49 5.59 0.10 0.02
4 to 1 304 5.43 5.41 -0.02 -0.10
4 to 2 760 5.51 5.55 0.03 -0.05
4 to 3 2354 5.55 5.60 0.05 -0.02
4 to 4 6395 5.62 5.70 0.08 0.00
Notes: Entries are observed mean log real hourly wages in the 2003-2011 period for job changers with at least 2 years of wages at
the old job and the new job. Job refers to the firm of main occupation in the year. Origin/destination quartiles are based on
mean wages of coworkers in the year before (origin) or year after (destination) a job move. Four-year wage changes in adjusted re-
gressions include controls for age, age squared and cubed, education dummies, and quadratics of age fully interacted with education.
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Table D.13: Mobility and wage changes: females
Log wages of movers (mean) Log wage change
Origin to destination quartile Number of moves 2 years before 2 years after Raw Adjusted
1 to 1 2869 4.94 5.04 0.10 0.00
1 to 2 759 5.01 5.12 0.11 0.02
1 to 3 496 5.04 5.17 0.13 0.03
1 to 4 240 5.12 5.24 0.12 0.03
2 to 1 511 5.08 5.12 0.04 -0.05
2 to 2 1128 5.11 5.18 0.07 -0.01
2 to 3 869 5.13 5.23 0.10 0.01
2 to 4 465 5.19 5.29 0.10 0.01
3 to 1 324 5.15 5.17 0.03 -0.06
3 to 2 873 5.18 5.24 0.06 -0.02
3 to 3 2934 5.24 5.30 0.06 0.00
3 to 4 1064 5.29 5.40 0.11 0.02
4 to 1 195 5.27 5.27 0.00 -0.08
4 to 2 419 5.24 5.28 0.04 -0.05
4 to 3 1371 5.34 5.39 0.05 -0.01
4 to 4 3177 5.41 5.49 0.07 -0.01
Notes: See notes from Table D.12
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Table D.14: Dynamics in the hours of movers
Average change in annual hours worked by movers (%)
Breakdown by quartiles of the coworkers wage distribution
Type of origin firm Males Females
Obs. Mean change (%) Obs. Mean change (%)
1st Quartile 6709 0.05 4920 -0.25
2nd Quartile 7182 0.01 3444 -0.31
3rd Quartile 12924 0.27 5952 0.06
4th Quartile 11549 0.04 5913 -0.39
Mean change (%) in annual hours worked by movers
Detailed Breakdown for movers in the 1st and 4th quartile
Sending to Receiving firm Males Females
Obs. Mean change (%) Obs. Mean change (%)
1st to 1st 3284 0.02 3202 0.43
1st to 2nd 1775 0.04 853 -1.06
1st to 3rd 1084 0.08 575 -0.40
1st to 4th 566 0.24 290 0.04
4th to 1st 351 0.01 220 -0.52
4th to 2nd 995 0.00 502 -0.70
4th to 3rd 2709 0.23 1541 0.10
4th to 4th 7494 0.07 3650 -0.45
Mean Hours 1935 1930
Notes: Panel A in the table shows the average percentage change in hours worked by movers broken down the quartile of the cowork-
ers wage distribution of the sending firm. In Panel b we then further break down the hours change within the 1st and 4th of
the sending firm depending on the quartile of the coworkers wage distribution of the receiving firm. We do this in each inter-
val 2003-2007, 2004-2008, 2005-2009, 2006-2010 and 2007-2011. In the table we show the average change across these periods.
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Table D.15: Coordination index by sector using TUS data
Coordination index
Agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining and quarrying 0.833
Manufacturing 0.978
Construction 0.956
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply, trade and transport 0.982
Financial and insurance, Real estate, Other business 0.986
Public administration, education, health, arts 0.929
Observations 748
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Table D.16: Coordination and wage differentials: measurement error and regular hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e.
Stand. Dev. Tot. Hours -0.342** -0.069*** -0.072*** -0.061***
(0.172) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Median Abs. Dev. Tot. Hours -0.085***
(0.015)
Firm size 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.148* 0.004
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.075) (0.004)
Exporter status 0.023 0.072*** 0.065*** 0.059*** 0.051***
(0.029) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015)
Union. Rate 0.068** 0.035 0.030 0.030 0.020
(0.029) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Female Share -0.113*** -0.108** -0.104** -0.087** -0.111**
(0.038) (0.042) (0.044) (0.040) (0.044)
Average Hours 0.024 -0.001 0.008 0.006 0.002
(0.043) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025)
log(Cap/empl) 0.019 0.029** 0.025* 0.038*** 0.028**
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Numb. of skill groups 0.072***
(0.012)
(Intang. Assets)/empl 0.019**
(0.009)
O*NET IV YES NO NO NO NO
Multi-plant firms YES YES YES NO YES
Coordination Share 0.279 0.256 0.273 0.200
F-stat excl. instr. 8.942
R-sq 0.020 0.118 0.101 0.101 0.105
N 6089 7374 7312 5695 7312
Notes: The stand. dev. of total hours is the standard deviation of the average hours worked across skill groups within a firm. The median abs.
dev. is the the median absolute deviation of median hours across each skill group within a firm. Skill groups are defined as deciles of the dis-
tribution of αˆi + βˆ Xijt from the AKM model. O*NET IV refers to a vector composed of the average importance of the Contact, Teamwork and
Communication in the firm (Section 4.3). All regressions show standardized coefficients. Exporter and industry dummies are based on the median
value between 2003 and 2011. (Cap/emp) stands for physical capital per employee. Intang. Assets/empl indicates intangible assets per employee.
All regression include a vector of controls for the share of workers in each skill group and for the average value of the individual fixed effects αˆi
in each quartile of the distribution of αˆi within a firm. Coordination share is derived as the ratio of ”Part. R-sq SD Hours” and ”Part. R-sq
VA and Sales”. Standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit industry level. *, ** and *** are 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Table D.17: Wage differentials and coordination: additional robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e.
Stand. Dev. Def. 1 -0.041*** -0.021** -0.051*** -0.030*
(0.011) (0.010) (0.018) (0.016)
Median Abs. Dev. Def. 1 -0.069*** -0.034***
(0.016) (0.012)
Firm size 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.010
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Exporter status 0.048*** 0.022** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.013 0.012
(0.011) (0.009) (0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009)
Union. Rate 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.038 0.042 0.027 0.029
(0.015) (0.013) (0.026) (0.026) (0.018) (0.018)
Female Share -0.150*** -0.089*** -0.131*** -0.134*** -0.055** -0.057**
(0.039) (0.020) (0.044) (0.042) (0.027) (0.026)
Average Hours -0.021** -0.045*** -0.015 -0.028 -0.045** -0.055**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
log(Cap/empl) 0.022* 0.036*** 0.026** 0.026** 0.017 0.017
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Connected set sample YES YES NO NO NO NO
3 digits Sector f.e. NO YES NO NO NO NO
3-year sub-period f.e. NO NO NO NO YES YES
AKM individual controls NO NO YES YES NO NO
Part. R-sq SD Hours 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001
Part. R-sq VA and Sales 0.022 0.008 0.014 0.014 0.004 0.004
Coordination Share 0.084 0.074 0.182 0.209 0.198 0.190
R-sq 0.153 0.200 0.092 0.094 0.380 0.380
N 20766 20766 7305 7305 8487 8487
Notes: The stand. dev. of total hours is the standard deviation of the average hours worked across skill groups within a firm. The median abs. dev. is the
the median absolute deviation of median hours across each skill group within a firm. Skill groups are defined as deciles of the distribution of αˆi + βˆ Xijt
from the AKM model. All regressions show standardized coefficients. Exporter and industry dummies are based on the median value between 2003 and
2011. (Cap/empl) stands for physical capital over the number of full-time equivalent employees. Specifications (7) also include quadratic and cubic terms
of value added per employee. All regression include a vector of controls for the share of workers in each skill group and for the average value of the indi-
vidual fixed effects αˆi in each quartile of the distribution of αˆi within a firm. Coordination share is derived as the ratio of ”Part. R-sq SD Hours” and
”Part. R-sq VA and Sales”. Standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit industry level. *, ** and *** are 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Table D.18: Value added, sales and and wage premiums relative to Table 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e.
log(VA/empl) 0.122*** 0.095*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.166*** 0.157***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022)
TFP 0.049 0.031 0.097*** 0.113*** 0.096*** 0.059**
(0.034) (0.024) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.023)
Firm size 0.016** 0.013* 0.041*** 0.013* 0.013**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006)
Exporter status 0.062*** 0.046*** 0.047** 0.047*** 0.037***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.013)
Union. Rate -0.001 0.038 0.045 0.039 0.067***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.031) (0.024) (0.025)
Female Share -0.058 -0.107*** -0.111*** -0.105*** -0.098***
(0.040) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.020)
Average Hours -0.020 -0.031 -0.030* -0.030 -0.063***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.023)
log(Cap/empl) 0.019 -0.008 0.023 -0.007 -0.007
(0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015)
Persuasion -0.188**
(0.074)
Social Perceptiveness 0.025
(0.044)
Adjust Actions to others 0.005
(0.017)
Negotiation 0.254**
(0.097)
Region F.E. NO YES YES YES YES YES
Compos. cntr NO NO YES YES YES YES
Ability Measures NO NO YES YES YES YES
Av. Hours b/w 36.5 and 37.5 YES YES YES NO YES YES
Part. R-sq VA and Sales 0.022 0.010 0.032 0.038 0.032 0.020
R-sq 0.022 0.041 0.148 0.153 0.147 0.165
N 7117 7117 7060 4279 7047 5904
Notes: All regressions show standardized coefficients. Exporter and industry dummies are based on the median value between 2003 and 2011.
(Cap/empl) stands for physical capital over the number of full-time-equivalent employees. All specifications control for quadratic and cubic func-
tions of value added per employee and TFP. TFP is obtained as described in Appendix B.4. ”Compos. cntr” refers to a vector of controls for
the share of workers in each skill group. ”Ability Measures” indicate a vector containing the average value of the individual fixed effects αˆi in
each quartile of the distribution of αˆi within a firm. Coordination share is derived as the ratio of ”Part. R-sq SD Hours” and ”Part. R-sq VA
and Sales”. Standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit industry level. *, ** and *** are 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Table D.19: Value added, sales and and wage premiums relative to Table 3
(1) (2) (3)
Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e.
log(VA/empl) 0.159*** 0.148*** 0.142***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
TFP 0.122*** 0.083*** 0.084***
(0.029) (0.021) (0.021)
Firm size 0.012** 0.007* 0.018*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.010)
Exporter status 0.034** 0.018 0.010
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Union. Rate 0.044* 0.042 0.043
(0.026) (0.028) (0.028)
Female Share -0.136*** -0.083*** -0.066***
(0.030) (0.023) (0.025)
Average Hours -0.041** -0.052*** -0.057***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
log(Cap/empl) -0.005 -0.001 0.006
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Region f.e. YES YES YES
Compos. and Ability cntr. YES YES YES
1 digit Sector f.e. YES NO NO
2 digits Sector f.e. NO YES NO
3 digits Sector f.e. NO NO YES
Part. R-sq VA and Sales 0.033 0.016 0.014
R-sq 0.156 0.183 0.188
N 7055 7055 7055
Notes: All regressions show standardized coefficients. Exporter and industry dummies are based on the median value between 2003 and 2011. All specifi-
cations control for quadratic and cubic functions of value added per employee and TFP. TFP is obtained as described in Appendix B.4. ”Compos. cntr”
refers to a vector of controls for the share of workers in each skill group. ”Ability Measures” indicate a vector containing the average value of the indi-
vidual fixed effects αˆi in each quartile of the distribution of αˆi within a firm. Coordination share is derived as the ratio of ”Part. R-sq SD Hours” and
”Part. R-sq VA and Sales”. Standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit industry level. *, ** and *** are 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
Table D.20: Income types in the Danish tax system
Acronym Income Type Main Intems Included
LI Labor income Salary, wages, honoraria, fees, bonuses, fringe benefits, business earnings
PI Personal income LI+ transfers, grants, awards, gifts, received alimony
-Labor market contribution, certain pension contributions
CI Capital income Interest income, rental income, business capital income
-interest on debt (mortgage, bank loan, credit cards, student loans)
D Deductions Commuting costs, union fees, UI contribution, other work expenditures,
charity, paid alimony
PCP Private capital pension contribution
ECP Employer paid capital pension contribution
TI Taxable income PI+CI-D
SI Stock Income Dividends and realized capital gains from shares
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Table D.21: Personal income tax system in Denmark
2008 2009
Tax type Base Rate Tax Bracket (DKK) Base Rate Tax Bracket (DKK)
Regional tax* TI 33.16 TI 33.21
National taxes
Bottom tax PI+CI(>0) 5.48 0 - 279799 PI+CI(>0) 5.04 0 - 347199
Middle tax PI +CI(>0) 6.0 279800 - 335799 PI +CI(>0) 6.0 >347200
Top tax PI+CI(>0)+PCP+ECP 15.0 335800 PI +CI(>0)+PCP+ECP 15.0 >347200
Labor market contribution LI 8.0 LI 8.0
EITC LI 4.0 LI 4.25
Tax on stock income SI 28.0, 43.0, 45.0 SI 28.0, 43.0. 45.0
Marginal tax ceiling PI/CI/TI 59.0 PI/CI/TI 59.0
2010 2011
Tax type Base Rate Tax Bracket (DKK) Base Rate Tax Bracket (DKK)
Regional tax* TI 33.32 TI 33.38
National taxes
Bottom tax PI+CI(>0) 3.67 0 - 389899 PI+CI(>0) 3.64 0 - 389899
Middle tax - - - -
Top tax PI +CI(>40000)+PCP+ECP 15.0 >389900 PI +CI(>40000)+PCP+ECP 15.0 >389900
Labor market contribution LI 8.0 LI 8.0
EITC LI 4.25 LI 4.25
Tax on stock income SI 28.0, 42.0 SI 28.0, 42.0
Marginal tax ceiling PI/CI/TI 51.5 PI/CI/TI 51.5
Notes: Acronyms are explained in Table D.20. The regional tax includes municipal, county and church taxes. The regional tax rate in the table is
the average across municipalities. Tax rates are cumulative. For example, the marginal tax rate in the top bracket (in the average municipality) in
2008 is equal to 33.16 + 5.48 + 6 + 15 = 59.64 percent. Since this figure exceeds the marginal tax ceiling (59 percent), however, the ceiling is bind-
ing. For labor income, there is a labor market contribution of 8 percent on top of the tax ceiling, but at the same time, labor income enters all the
other tax bases net of the labor market contribution. The effective tax ceiling on labor income in 2008 is therefore equal to 8.0 + (1 − 0.08) ×
59.0 = 62.3 percent. The sum of regional and National taxes (with the exclusion of the stock income tax) can not exceed the marginal tax ceiling.
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Table D.22: Elasticity of high-skilled hours: normal hours worked
(1) (2) (3)
∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH
∆log (1− τH) -0.022*** -0.050*** -0.028**
(0.007) (0.016) (0.013)
Log base-year income -0.008***
(0.002)
IV NO YES YES
Region F.E. YES YES YES
Overtime Hours NO NO NO
Mean Hours 1888.27 1888.27 1888.27
F-stat Excl. Inst. 1355.00 754.53
P-value Excl. Inst. 0.00 0.00
N Firms 1166 1166 1166
N 26489 26489 26489
Notes: Each regression contains the following controls measured in the base year: work experience, work experience squared, sex, age, number of chil-
dren, marital status, education, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed effects, firm size, exporter status, and the shares of high- and low-skilled
workers in the firm (the residual group is omitted). We consider only regular hours worked. Observations are weighted by labor income. Standard er-
rors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. First-stage regressions are available from the authors upon request. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table D.23: Elasticity of hours of workers in the residual group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH
∆log (1− τResidual) -0.014** 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.017
(0.006) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.026)
∆log (1− τResidual5th ) 0.011
(0.024)
IV NO YES YES YES YES YES
Splines of inc. at t NO NO YES NO NO YES
Splines of log t-1 inc. and ∆ log inc. t-1-t NO NO NO YES NO NO
5th ord. polynomial inc. t NO NO NO NO YES NO
Base-year inc. above median only NO NO NO NO NO YES
Mean Hours 1876.15 1876.15 1876.15 1879.48 1870.05 1878.65
F-stat Excl. Inst. 407.80 476.59 348.64 377.72 291.47
P-value Excl. Inst. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N Firms 932 932 932 792 965 742
N 6246 6246 6246 4962 4958 3123
Notes: Each regression contains the following controls measured in the base year: work experience, work experience squared, sex, age, number of chil-
dren, marital status, education, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed effects, firm size, exporter status, and the shares of high- and low-skilled
workers in the firm (the residual group is omitted). We consider only regular hours worked. Observations are weighted by labor income. Standard er-
rors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. First-stage regressions are available from the authors on request. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.24: Elasticity of hours and labor income: extra specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆loghH ∆loghH ∆loghH ∆log(Labor incomeH)
∆log(1− τH) 0.071** -0.063* -0.045*** 0.0336***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.015) (0.0087)
Log base-year income -0.012 -0.003 -0.008*** -0.1988***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.003) (0.0063)
Women with kids only YES NO NO NO
Workers at kinks YES YES NO YES
Top 10\% income only NO YES NO NO
Mean Hours 1888.72 1951.85 1927.68
F-stat Excl. Inst. 189.17 14.46 678.35 5.66e+04
P-value Excl. Inst. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 2998 2648 24736 1865067
Notes: The regression in columns 1 to 3 contains the following controls measured in the base year: work experience, work experience squared, sex, age,
number of children, marital status, education, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed effects, firm size, exporter status, and the shares of high- and
low-skilled workers in the firm (the residual group is omitted). We consider both regular and overtime hours worked. To be consistent with Kleven and Schultz
(2014), we include the following controls in column 4: labor market experience, experience, squared, age, gender, marital status, number of children aged 0-18
years, educational degree, industry, municipality, local unemployment rate, and base-year fixed effects. Observations are weighted by labor income. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. First-stage regressions are available from the authors on request. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table D.25: Elasticity of high-skilled hours: income controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High Coord. Low Coord. High Coord. Low Coord. High Coord. Low Coord.
Top 50% Bottom 50% Top 50% Bottom 50% Top 50% Bottom 50%
Dependent Variable ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH
∆log (1− τH) -0.020 -0.082*** -0.024** -0.072**
(0.014) (0.027) (0.012) (0.029)
∆log (1− τ 5thH) -0.023 -0.115***
(0.022) (0.031)
IV YES YES YES YES YES YES
Region F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Splines of inc. at t YES YES NO NO NO NO
5th ord. polynomial inc. t NO NO YES YES NO NO
Splines of log t-1 inc.
and ∆ log inc. t-1-t NO NO NO NO YES YES
Pvalue High=Low 0.05 0.02 0.02
Mean Hours 1904.10 1847.66 1904.29 1850.89 1907.00 1853.11
F-stat Excl. Inst. 1298.25 461.91 307.72 79.46 857.62 250.09
P-value Excl. Inst. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N Firms 584 583 584 581 537 519
N 19067 7421 17852 6814 15619 5649
Notes: Each regression contains the following controls measured in the base year: work experience, work experience squared, sex, age, number of children,
marital status, education, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed effects, firm size, exporter status, and the shares of high- and low-skilled workers
in the firm (the residual group is omitted). ”Splines” refer to a flexible piecewise linear functional form with 5 components. τ5th refers to marginal tax rates
obtained as in Dahl and Lochner (2012). ”P-value High=Low” refers to the p-value of the null hypothesis that the coefficient attached to ∆log (1 − τH ) is
equal in low- and high-coordination firms. Observations are weighted by labor income. Coordination is measured using Std. Dev. Definition 1. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. First-stage regressions are available from the authors on request. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.26: Spillover effects: income controls
(1) (2) (3)
∆log hL ∆log hL ∆log hL
∆log hH 1.152*** 1.160*** 1.115**
(0.373) (0.365) (0.464)
∆log (1− τL) 0.050 0.044
(0.105) (0.123)
∆log (1− τL5th) 0.030**
(0.015)
Log base-year income YES NO NO
Splines of inc. at t NO YES NO
5th ord. polynomial inc. t NO NO YES
F-stat Excl. Inst. 13.65, 105.11 17.17, 62.25 3.91, 459.04
P-value Excl. Inst. 0.00, 0.00 0.00, 0.00 0.05, 0.00
Mean Hours Low Sk. 1809.02 1809.02 1809.49
Mean Hours High Sk. 1877.51 1877.51 1877.50
N Firms 1157 1157 1151
N 14402 14402 13654
Notes: Each regression contains the following controls measured in the base year: work experience, work experience squared, sex, age, num-
ber of children, marital status, education, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed effects, firm size, exporter status, and the shares of
high- and low-skilled workers in the firm. ”Splines” refer to a flexible piecewise linear functional form with 5 components. τ5th refers to
marginal tax rates obtained as in Dahl and Lochner (2012). Observations are weighted by labor income. First-stage regressions are avail-
able from the authors on request. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.27: The spillover effects on low-skilled hours: additional specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆log hL ∆log hL ∆log hL ∆log hL ∆log hL
∆log h
H
normal 0.888*** 1.763 0.983** 0.893***
(0.333) (1.214) (0.445) (0.303)
∆log hH × High Union Share -1.200
(1.394)
∆log h
H
total 1.217**
(0.576)
∆log h
Residual
normal -0.179
(0.567)
High Union Share 0.012
(0.008)
∆log (1− τL) 0.163* 0.151 0.006 0.026 0.064
(0.088) (0.094) (0.066) (0.069) (0.116)
Overtime hours NO YES NO NO NO
Firm f.e. YES YES NO NO NO
Base-year f.e. YES YES NO NO NO
Workers at kinks YES YES YES YES NO
Mean Hours Low Sk. 1815.25 1833.23 1813.05 1811.60 1811.95
Mean Hours High Sk. 1873.63 1906.57 1875.14 1877.83 1874.93
F-stat Excl. Inst. 6.23,24.55 2.45, 25.57 1.81, 8.57, 133.48 4.41,12.16, 122.94, , 13.97, 77.48
P-value Excl. Inst. 0.01,0.00 0.12, 0.00 0.18, 0.00, 0.00 0.04,0.00, 0.00 0.00,0.00
N Firms 835 835 977 799 958
N 15985 15985 10196 9606 9979
Notes: This table reports the results from estimating alternative specifications of equation (11) in Section 5.4. We consider both regular (normal) hours
(columns 1, 3, 4 and 5) and total hours (column 2). All specifications use mechanical changes of the average net-of-tax rate among high-skilled workers in a firm
as an instrument for the average change in hours, and the mechanical change of the net-of-tax rate of low-skilled workers as an instrument for observed changes
of 1-τL (Section 5.5). The dummy variable ”High Union Share” in column 3 takes a value of 1 if the firm had a share of unionized workers above the median in
2008. In column 4, we also consider change in average hours among workers in the residual group within the same firm. We instrument for the average change
in hours in this group using the average mechanical change of the net-of-tax rate among workers in the residual group. Each regression contains the following
controls measured in the base year: work experience, work experience squared, sex, age, number of children, marital status, education, local unemployment
(municipality), region fixed effects, firm size, exporter status, the shares of high- and low-skilled workers in the firm, 5 component splines of income at t-1 and
income change between t-1 and t. Workers close to the kink points (column 5) are defined as having taxable income within 5,000 DKK of the top kink or 2,000
DKK of the bottom kink (Kleven and Schultz, 2014). In evaluating the closeness of workers to kinks, base year income is measured in 2005 DKK (6 DKK '
1 USD in 2005). Observations are weighted by labor income. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.28: Elasticity of high-skilled hours: alternative definitions of coordination and data on
hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High Coord. Low Coord. Low Coord. Low Coord. High Coord. Low Coord.
Top 50% Bottom 50% Bottom 50% Bottom 50% Top 50% Bottom 50%
Def. 2 Def. 2 Def. 2 Def. 2 BFL Hours BFL Hours BFL Hours
Dependent variable ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hL ∆log hL ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hL
∆log (1− τH) -0.001 -0.092*** -0.008 -0.091**
(0.012) (0.022) (0.041) (0.042)
∆log hHnormal 0.684**
(0.307)
∆log hHtotal 0.760**
(0.319)
∆log hHblf 1.015**
(0.400)
∆log (1− τL) -0.016 -0.077 0.187
(0.107) (0.113) (0.291)
Log base-year income -0.001 -0.022*** -0.022** -0.010
(0.002) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
Overtime hours YES YES NO YES NO NO NO
BFL hours NO NO NO NO YES YES YES
Mean Hours 1905.27 1863.52 1760.44 1783.84 1901.01 1854.16 1851.93
Pvalue High=Low 0.00 0.15
F-stat Excl. Inst. 1034.04 282.28 5.43,35.78 9.88,35.78 962.85 179.52 1.37,33.69
P-value Excl. Inst. 0.00 0.00 0.00,0.00 0.00,0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26,33.69
N Firms 583 583 489 489 477 521 802
N 15701 10788 4749 4749 15521 6330 8562
Notes: Each regression contains the following controls measured in the base year: work experience, work experience squared, sex, age, number of children,
marital status, education, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed effects, firm size, exporter status, and the shares of high- and low-skilled workers in
the firm (the residual group is omitted). Columns 3, 4 and 7 contain controls for flexible piecewise linear functions with 5 components of income at t-1 and the
change in income between t-1 and t. BFL hours refer to hours from E-indkomst. Total hours refer to the sum of normal and overtime hours. Coordination is
measured using the St. Dev. Definition 2 in columns 1 to 4 and the St. Dev. Definition 1 in columns 5 to 7. Observations are weighted by labor income. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. First-stage regressions are available from the authors on request. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.29: Uncompensated elasticity and virtual income
(1) (2) (3)
High Coord. Low Coord.
Top 50% Bottom 50%
Dependent variable ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hL
∆log (1− τH) -0.028** -0.552
(0.014) (6.212)
∆log vyH -0.013 -1.154
(0.017) (15.801)
∆log hH 0.957***
(0.283)
∆log (1− τL) -0.008
(0.065)
∆log vyL -0.008
(0.020)
Log base-year income 0.002 0.429 0.010
(0.007) (6.200) (0.013)
Overtime hours YES YES NO
Mean Hours 1924.91 1907.33 1812.58
Pvalue ∆log (1− τH) High=Low 0.98
Pvalue ∆log vyH High=Low 0.98
F-stat Excl. Inst. 2049,43.8 0.65,0.01 23.84,5,78,29.7
N Firms 583 584 968
N 18824 7618 10066
Notes: Each regression contains the following controls measured in the base year: work experience, work experience squared, sex, age, num-
ber of children, marital status, education, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed effects, firm size, exporter status, and the shares of
high- and low-skilled workers in the firm (the residual group is omitted). In column 3, we consider only regular hours worked. Observa-
tions are weighted by labor income. ”P-value ∆log (1 − τH ) High=Low” refers to the p-value of the null hypothesis that the coefficient at-
tached to ∆log (1 − τH ) in low- and high-coordination firms is equal. ”P-value ∆log (1 − vyH ) High=Low” refers to the p-value of the
null hypothesis that the coefficient attached to ∆log (1 − vyH ) in low- and high-coordination firms is equal. First-stage regressions are avail-
able from the authors on request. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.30: The effects of the tax reform on firm characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆log (FirmSize) ∆log (ShareHighSk.) ∆log (ShareLowSk.) ∆log (PhysicalCapital)
∆log (1− τH) -0.204 0.161 -0.466 0.063
(0.398) (0.349) (0.357) (1.481)
Firm Size -0.000 0.000 -0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ind. Exp. -0.055*** 0.034** -0.071*** 0.251**
(0.020) (0.016) (0.022) (0.101)
Ind. Mupltiplant -0.036* -0.011 0.025 0.003
(0.021) (0.014) (0.020) (0.106)
Share of Low Sk. 0.053 -0.527*** -0.214 -0.599
(0.100) (0.089) (0.141) (0.567)
Share of High Sk. 0.042 -0.128 -0.800*** -0.315
(0.095) (0.081) (0.125) (0.542)
Mean Log base year (t) income -0.047 -0.011 0.243** 0.299
(0.116) (0.068) (0.111) (0.455)
IV YES YES YES YES
Region F.E. YES YES YES YES
F-stat Excl. Inst. 116.04 116.04 116.04 117.07
P-value Excl. Inst. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N Firms 968 968 968 963
Notes: Each regression contains the following additional controls measured in the base year: average work experience, average work ex-
perience squared, share of males, share of married workers, average worker age, average number of children per worker, local un-
employment (firm municipality), share of primary, secondary and tertiary educated workers, and region fixed effects. ”Mech.” stands
for mechanical change. First-stage regressions are available from the authors on request. F-stat Excl. Inst. refers to the
Angrist-Pischke F-statistic. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
54
D.2 First-stage regressions
Table D.31: First-stage regression relative to Table 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High Coord. Low Coord. High Coord. Low Coord.
Top 25% Bottom 25%
Dependent Variable ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH ∆log hH
∆log (1− τH) Mech. 1.935*** 2.086*** 1.942*** 2.429*** 1.952*** 2.499***
(0.053) (0.076) (0.054) (0.175) (0.082) (0.216)
Log base-year income -0.030*** -0.016*** -0.056*** -0.010 -0.057***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.016) (0.006) (0.014)
IV YES YES YES YES YES YES
Region fe YES YES YES YES YES YES
Overtime Hours YES YES YES YES YES YES
F-stat 1.36e+03 7.55e+02 1.29e+03 1.93e+02 5.66e+02 1.34e+02
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N Firms 1167 1167 584 583 293 291
N 26488 26488 18875 7613 8307 2371
Notes: Each regression contains the following controls measured in the base year: work experience, work experience squared, sex, age, num-
ber of children, marital status, education, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed effects, firm size, exporter status, and the shares
of high- and low-skilled workers in the firm (the residual group is omitted). The abbreviation ”Mech.” stands for mechanical changes. Ob-
servations are weighted by labor income. Coordination is measured using Std. Dev. Definition 1. F-stat Excl. Inst. refers
to the Angrist-Pischke F-statistic. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table D.32: First-stage regression relative to Table 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆log (1− τH) ∆log (1− τH) ∆log (1− τH) ∆log (1− τH)× Size ∆log (1− τH) ∆log (1− τH)× Size ∆log (1− τH) ∆log (1− τH)× Export ∆log (1− τH) ∆log (1− τH)× Export
∆log (1− τH) Mech. 1.835*** 2.182*** 1.946*** 136.367*** 2.494*** 93.787*** 2.086*** 0.202*** 2.529*** 0.197***
(0.047) (0.116) (0.067) (44.471) (0.195) (21.641) (0.132) (0.026) (0.266) (0.066)
∆log (1− τH)Mech.× Mech. Size -0.000 1.684*** -0.000 1.710***
(0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.101)
∆log (1− τH)Mech.× Export -0.167 1.685*** -0.159 1.888***
(0.138) (0.050) (0.213) (0.102)
Log base-year income -0.012*** -0.038*** -0.016*** -7.925** -0.056*** -7.290*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.056*** -0.025***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (3.299) (0.016) (1.894) (0.004) (0.003) (0.016) (0.006)
Firm F.E. YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Base-year F.E. YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
F-stat 1542.40 353.25 1033.24 6991.11 291.82 605.65 204.80 4583.96 113.01 658.43
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N Firms 785 675 584 584 583 583 584 584 583 583
N 26497 10267 18875 18875 7613 7613 18875 18875 7613 7613
Notes: Each regression contains the following controls measured in the base year: work experience, work experience squared, sex, age, number of chil-
dren, marital status, education, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed effects, firm size, exporter status, and the shares of high and low-skilled
workers in the firm (the residual group is omitted). ”Mech.” stands for mechanical changes. Observations are weighted by labor income. F-stat Excl.
Inst. refers to the Angrist-Pischke F-statistic. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table D.33: First-stage regression relative to Table 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆log (1− τH) ∆log (1− τH)× High Union. Share ∆log (1− τH) ∆log (1− τH)× High Union. Share ∆log (1− τH) ∆log (1− τH)× High TFP ∆log (1− τH) ∆log (1− τH)× High TFP
∆log (1− τH) Mech. 1.961*** 0.126*** 2.612*** 0.397*** 2.058*** 0.164*** 2.480*** 0.193***
(0.082) (0.020) (0.192) (0.136) (0.061) (0.025) (0.222) (0.038)
∆log (1− τH)Mech.× High Union. Share -0.029 1.696*** -0.255 1.794***
(0.096) (0.056) (0.179) (0.120)
∆log (1− τH)Mech.× High TFP -0.190** 1.625*** -0.105 1.843***
(0.082) (0.062) (0.183) (0.107)
Log base-year income -0.016*** -0.009*** -0.057*** -0.039** -0.017*** -0.010*** -0.056*** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.016) (0.019) (0.004) (0.003) (0.016) (0.004)
Firm F.E. NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Base-year F.E. NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
F-stat 508.71 4396.99 193.07 633.39 992.97 2269.59 152.40 915.10
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N Firms 584 584 583 583 584 584 583 583
N 18875 18875 7613 7613 18875 18875 7613 7613
Notes: Each regression contains the following controls measured in the base year: work experience, work experience squared, sex, age, number of chil-
dren, marital status, education, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed effects, firm size, exporter status, and the shares of high- and low-
skilled workers in the firm (the residual group is omitted). ”Mech.” stands for mechanical changes. Observations are weighted by labor income. F-stat
Excl. Inst. refers to the Angrist-Pischke F-statistic. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table D.34: First-stage regression relative to Table 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
∆log hH ∆log (1− τL) ∆log hH ∆log (1− τL) ∆log hH ∆log (1− τL) ∆log hH ∆log (1− τL) ∆log hHtotal ∆log (1− τL) ∆log hHtotal ∆log (1− τL)
∆log (1− τH) Mech. -0.432*** -0.185* -0.432*** -0.178* -0.438** 0.139 -0.545*** -0.187 -0.277 -0.178* -0.495** -0.187
(0.163) (0.111) (0.163) (0.097) (0.193) (0.118) (0.192) (0.152) (0.178) (0.097) (0.194) (0.152)
∆log (1− τL) -0.063* 0.649*** -0.061 0.492*** -0.061 0.478*** -0.143** 0.858*** -0.038 0.492*** -0.107* 0.858***
(0.036) (0.051) (0.037) (0.060) (0.037) (0.059) (0.056) (0.113) (0.037) (0.060) (0.061) (0.113)
Region F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Splines of log t-1 Inc. and
∆log inc. t-1-t NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Log Mean Inc. High Sk. NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Overtime Hours NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
F-stat Excl. Inst. 13.09 160.40 15.45 76.76 4.66 55.84 11.90 48.55 4.43 76.72 8.39 50.92
P-value Excl. Inst. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
N Firms 968 968 968 968 968 968 484 484 968 968 484 484
N 10091 10091 10091 10091 10091 10091 4100 4100 10091 10091 4100 4100
Notes: Each regression contains the following controls measured in the base year: work experience, work experience squared, sex, age, number of chil-
dren, marital status, education, local unemployment (municipality), region fixed effects, firm size, exporter status, and the shares of high- and low-skilled
workers in the firm (the residual group is omitted). Observations are weighted by labor income. ”Mech.” stands for mechanical change. F-stat Excl.
Inst. refers to the Angrist-Pischke F-statistic. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 .
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D.3 Standard deviation of hours definition 2: tables and graphs
In this section, we present the results of a parallel analysis performed using the standard
deviation of hours across skill groups, where skill groups are defined at the the intersection of 3
educational groups (i.e., primary, secondary and tertiary education) and 3 broad occupational
categories (i.e., manager, middle manager and blue collar) (Section 4.3).
Figure D.7: Tasks and coordination of hours (Def. 2 education-occupation)
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Notes: We group firms into 20 equally sized bins based on the variable on the x-axis.
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Figure D.8: PIAAC validation exercise coordination (Def. 2)
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Table D.35: Coordination by sector (def. 2)
Std. Dev. hours Def. 2
(education occupation)
Coordination by Industry (2003-2011)
Mean Std. Dev.
Agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining and quarrying 112.25 101.70
Manufacturing 98.55 80.31
Constructions 129.04 96.06
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply,
Trade and transport 68.15 86.97
Financial and insurance, Real estate, Other business 79.00 80.38
Public administration, education, health,
arts, entertainment and other services 67.41 65.92
Overall sectors 87.79 89.60
Observations 8182
Notes: The table shows average values over the 2003-2011 period.
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Table D.36: Coordination and firm characteristics (Def. 2)
Stand. Dev. Def. 2 Obs.
(education-occupation)
(1) (2)
V.A. /employee -0.037*** -0.014* 17714
(0.008) (0.007)
Capital/employee -0.006 -0.005*** 17714
(0.007) (0.001)
Sales/employee -0.042*** -0.004 17714
(0.009) (0.020)
TFP -0.112*** -0.061*** 16148
(0.008) (0.013)
Firm size -0.018** -0.050*** 17714
(0.007) (0.015)
Share of tertiary educ. -0.139*** -0.061*** 17714
(0.008) (0.014)
Number of plants -0.022*** -0.027 17714
(0.007) (0.017)
Exporter status -0.133*** -0.009 17714
(0.007) (0.010)
Fraction of hourly work. 0.317*** 0.235*** 17714
(0.007) (0.017)
Fraction of Unionized work. 0.095*** 0.025** 17714
(0.008) (0.012)
Fraction of Females -0.019** 0.061*** 17714
(0.008) (0.016)
Fraction of Part-Time work 0.207*** 0.121*** 17714
(0.008) (0.014)
Mean Managerial Ability -0.055*** -0.022** 17714
(0.008) (0.011)
Negotiation -0.291*** -0.128*** 16401
(0.009) (0.015)
Persuasion -0.298*** -0.134*** 13353
(0.009) (0.015)
Social Perceptiveness -0.277*** -0.099*** 13353
(0.009) (0.015)
Adjust Actions to others -0.146*** -0.063*** 13353
(0.009) (0.013)
5 digits industry f.e. NO YES
Notes: The table shows standardized coefficients from a regression of the standard deviation of hours across skill groups on firm characteristics. Each
cell is a different regression. TFP is obtained from the procedure described in Appendix B.4. To avoid confusion, we label the O*NET descriptor
”Coordination” as ”Adjust Actions to Others”. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.37: Coordination and wage premiums
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e.
Stand. Dev. Def. 2 -0.070*** -0.047** -0.042** -0.077*** -0.038**
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
Stand. Dev. Normal Hours -0.044**
(0.019)
Firm size 0.015* 0.014** 0.038*** 0.014** 0.012**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.007) (0.005)
Exporter status 0.069*** 0.083*** 0.085*** 0.084*** 0.081***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.025) (0.018) (0.016)
Union. Rate -0.003 0.047* 0.038 0.046* 0.053**
(0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.025)
Female Share -0.055 -0.070** -0.077*** -0.067* -0.049**
(0.045) (0.034) (0.028) (0.035) (0.019)
Average Hours 0.003 -0.011 0.002 -0.012 -0.039
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026)
log(Cap/empl) 0.038*** 0.067*** 0.083*** 0.067*** 0.064***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014)
Negotiation 0.201
(0.123)
Persuasion -0.151***
(0.056)
Social Perceptiveness 0.017
(0.068)
Adjust Actions to others -0.034*
(0.017)
Region F.E. NO YES YES YES NO YES
Compos. cntr NO NO YES YES NO YES
Ability Measures NO NO YES YES YES
Av. Hours b/w 36.5 and 37.5 YES YES YES NO NO YES
Part. R-sq SD Hours 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Part. R-sq VA and Sales 0.022 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.005
Coordination Share 0.276 0.251 0.280 0.260 0.255 0.227
R-sq 0.006 0.031 0.072 0.073 0.072 0.079
N 7285 7285 7285 4392 7271 6067
Notes: The ”Stand. Dev.” is the standard deviation of the average total hours worked across skill groups within a firm. The Stand. Dev. of
normal hours is the standard deviation of the average normal hours worked across skill groups within a firm. Skill groups are defined as deciles
of the distribution of αˆi + βˆ Xijt from the AKM model. All regressions show standardized coefficients. The exporter dummy is derived as the
modal exporter status between 2003 and 2011. (Cap/empl) stands for physical capital over the number of full-time equivalent employees. ”Com-
pos. cntr” refers to a vector of controls for the share of workers in each skill group. ”Ability Measures” indicate a vector containing the aver-
age value of the individual fixed effects αˆi in each quartile of the distribution of αˆi within a firm. The dependent variable (firm f.e.) in column
(5) is based on the wage rate from normal hours. To avoid confusion, we label the O*NET descriptor ”Coordination” as ”Adjust Actions to Oth-
ers.” Coordination Share is derived as the ratio of ”Part. R-sq SD Hours” and ”Part. R-sq VA and TFP”. ”Part. R-sq VA and Sales” is from
Table D.18. Standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit industry level. *, ** and *** are 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Table D.38: Coordination and wage differentials within sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e. Firm f.e.
Stand. Dev. Def. 2 -0.038** -0.031* -0.028 -0.038** -0.032*
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
Median Abs. Dev. Def. 2 -0.049*** -0.037** -0.034**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Firm size 0.013** 0.009* 0.021* 0.013** 0.009* 0.020* 0.015** 0.014**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
Exporter status 0.058*** 0.039*** 0.031** 0.054*** 0.037*** 0.029** 0.086*** 0.077***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018)
Union. Rate 0.038 0.035 0.033 0.038 0.035 0.033 0.050** 0.058***
(0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.025) (0.022)
Female Share -0.085** -0.037 -0.016 -0.085** -0.037 -0.017 -0.078** -0.063**
(0.036) (0.024) (0.021) (0.036) (0.025) (0.023) (0.033) (0.025)
Average Hours -0.019 -0.030 -0.036 -0.022 -0.033 -0.038* -0.013 -0.019
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025)
log(Cap/empl) 0.057*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.058*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.067*** 0.021
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.029)
log(VA/empl) 0.145**
(0.071)
Region f.e. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Compos. and Ability cntr. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
1 digit Sector f.e. YES NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
2 digits Sector f.e. NO YES NO NO YES NO NO NO
3 digits Sector f.e. NO NO YES NO NO YES YES YES
Part. R-sq SD Hours 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
Part. R-sq VA and Sales 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.004
Coordination Share 0.163 0.171 0.150 0.113 0.276 0.237
R-sq 0.065 0.087 0.091 0.066 0.088 0.092 0.076 0.083
N 7240 7240 7240 7306 7306 7306 7035 7035
Notes: The ”Stand. Dev.” is the standard deviation of the average total hours worked across skill groups within a firm. The Median Abs. Dev. is the
the median absolute deviation of median hours across all skill groups within a firm. Skill groups are defined as deciles of the distribution of αˆi + βˆ Xijt
from the AKM model. All regressions show standardized coefficients. Exporter and industry dummies are based on the median value between 2003 and
2011. (Cap/empl) stands for physical capital over the number of full-time equivalent employees. In column (8), TFP is used as an instrument for val-
ued added per employee (log(V.A./empl)). TFP is obtained as described in Appendix B.4. ”Compos. cntr” refers to a vector of controls for the share of
workers in each skill group. ”Ability Measures” indicate a vector containing the average value of the individual fixed effects αˆi in each quartile of the dis-
tribution of αˆi within a firm. Coordination share is derived as the ratio of ”Part. R-sq SD Hours” and ”Part. R-sq VA and TFP”. ”Part. R-sq VA and
Sales” is from Table D.19. Standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit industry level. *, ** and *** are 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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